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Uranium is a contentious and emotive commodity. Attitudes towards uranium and the 
nuclear fuel cycle have, overall, been negative. Distrust of the nuclear industry and 
misunderstandings about the level of risk posed by the transport of uranium oxide (also 
known as yellowcake) has influenced a policy ban prohibiting uranium exports from 
Western Australian ports. Western Australia has a nascent uranium industry, with four 
major projects at various stages of government approval. When these mines commence 
production, producers will be forced to truck the uranium oxide by road to either Port 
Adelaide or Port Darwin for export. 
This thesis analyses the issues facing Western Australian producers as a consequence 
of the export ban. The current regulatory regime exposes Western Australian 
producers to three governments, five regulatory agencies, and at least seven different 
approvals and permits. The radiation protection schemes in each jurisdiction varies, so 
a consignment of uranium oxide is subject to different requirements between the 
Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia. Further, different versions 
of the Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material operate around Australia, 
compounding legislative discrepancies.  
This thesis considers that the current regime is overly complex, overlapping and out-
of-date with international best practice, and considers broad reforms to harmonise the 
legislation governing the transport of uranium oxide. It argues that multiple regulators 
and different legislative requirements impose significant financial burdens and 
compliance costs on Western Australian producers. These differences also threaten the 
integrity of the overall goal of radiation protection to protect the health and safety of 
people from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. Further, Australia’s inability to 
remain up-to-date with international developments affects contractual relationships 
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Every year, 20 million consignments of radioactive materials are transported globally 
by road, rail, air and sea.1 The vast majority of radioactive materials are transported 
for use in medicine, agriculture, research and mineral exploration.2 Approximately five 
per cent of these consignments are related to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC).3 The NFC 
encompasses a series of processes where fissionable material is transformed into fuel 
to create nuclear energy.4  
Uranium is indispensable to the NFC – natural uranium,5 once enriched, generates 
20,000 times more energy than black coal.6 Importantly, Australia is a uranium 
producer and only participates in the first two stages of the NFC – the mining of 
uranium ore and the milling of uranium oxide.7 Consequently, all Australian uranium 
is exported overseas to ‘consumer nations’ for nuclear energy.8 In the 2010–11 
financial year, Australia exported 6,950 tonnes of uranium oxide worth AU$610 
million.9 
                                                 
1 World Nuclear Association, Transport of Radioactive Materials (May 2017) <http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/transport-of-nuclear-materials/transport-of-
radioactive-materials.aspx>. 
2 D Ferate II, ‘The Transport of Radiopharmaceuticals in the United States’ (Paper presented at 14th 
International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Berlin, 
Germany, 20-24 September 2004); Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Food 
and Agriculture (2017) 
<http://www.ansto.gov.au/NuclearFacts/BenefitsofNuclearScience/FoodandAgriculture/>; M S 
Yadav, Nuclear Energy and Power: Environmental Impact and Other Effects (SBS Publishers & 
Distributors, 2007) 103. 
3 World Nuclear Association, Transport of Radioactive Materials, above n 1.  
4 Jefferson W Tester et al, Sustainable Energy: Choosing Among Options (MIT Press, 2012) 482-8.  
5 Natural uranium is 99.3% U–238, a mildly radioactive but not fissile isotope. The remaining 0.7% is 
the fissile U–235. U–235’s natural concentration is increased via ‘enrichment’ (a NFC process): Paul 
Harding, ‘Uranium Enrichment’ in Ian Hore-Lacy (ed), Uranium for Nuclear Power: Resources, 
Mining and Transformation to Fuel (Elsevier, 2016) 321, 321.  
6 Ian Hore-Lacy, ‘Uranium for Nuclear Power: An Introduction’ in Ian Hore-Lacy (ed), Uranium for 
Nuclear Power: Resources, Mining and Transformation to Fuel (Elsevier, 2016) 3 ,4. 
7 Uranium oxide is also known as uranium oxide concentrate, yellowcake or U3O8. Australia has yet 
to expand its NFC operations to conversion, enrichment, energy generation and spent fuel 
management. However, SA recently completed a Royal Commission, examining the State’s potential 
to expand its NFC operations. It concluded expansion could safely occur, including the disposal of 
used nuclear fuel and waste: South Australia, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission, Report (2016). 
8 Australia only exports uranium to countries with which it has a nuclear cooperation (safeguards) 
agreement. Australia has 23 nuclear safeguard agreements covering 41 countries (including the 
European Union): Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Network of Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreements (2017) <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-
disarmament-arms-control/policies-agreements-treaties/nuclear-cooperation-
agreements/Pages/australias-network-of-nuclear-cooperation-agreements.aspx>. See Appendix A for 
a list of the agreements and Chapter III generally for an explanation of Australia’s nuclear non-
proliferation regime. 




Australia is a major player in the provision of uranium to the world energy market.10 
We are the world’s third biggest uranium producer, behind Canada and Kazakhstan.11 
Australia is home to the largest percentage of the world’s reasonably assured uranium 
resources (RAR),12 representing 29 per cent of the global total.13 These resources are 
concentrated in South Australia (SA), the Northern Territory (NT), Western Australia 
(WA) and Queensland.14  
The NT and SA have a long history of uranium mining, and are the only Australian 
jurisdictions currently producing and exporting uranium. The NT’s Ranger mine 
commenced operations in 1980. 15 Actual mining of uranium ore ceased in November 
2012,16 but Ranger continues to process ore from stockpiles and is expected to close 
completely by 2020.17 In the 2015–16 financial year, Ranger processed 2,208 tonnes 
of uranium oxide.18 SA’s Olympic Dam mine commenced operations in 1988 and is 
one of the world’s largest mineral resources, also producing copper, gold and silver.19 
Olympic Dam continues to operate and produced 4,363 tonnes of uranium oxide in the 
2015–16 financial year.20 
                                                 
10 Sinclair Davidson and Ashton De Silva, Realising Australia’s Uranium Potential (Minerals Council 
of Australia, 2015) 5. 
11 Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency, Uranium 2016: Resources, 
Production and Demand (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2016) (Red 
Book) 59. 
12 RAR are resources ‘thought to exist with sufficient confidence that mining operations can proceed’. 
The resource estimate is broken down by cost because lower grade uranium ore is more expensive to 
produce (eg RAR at US$260 per kg): Dave Elliott, Bob Everett and Janet Ramage, ‘The Future of 
Nuclear Power’ in Bob Everett et al (eds), Energy Systems and Sustainability: Power for a 
Sustainable Future (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 427, 433; ibid 9.  
13 Red Book, above n 11, 15. See also Ian Lambert et al, ‘Why Australia has so much uranium’ [2005] 
(80) AusGeo News <http://www.ga.gov.au/ausgeonews/ausgeonews200512/uranium.jsp>. 
14 SA holds 80% of Australia’s RAR, representing 23% of the global total. Of the remaining 
Australian RAR, the NT holds 10%, WA holds 6% and Queensland holds 4%: Department of 
Resources, Energy and Tourism, above n 9.  
15 The NT commenced uranium mining in 1953 with the Rum Jungle mine. Rum Jungle operated until 
1971 and produced 863,000 tonnes of uranium ore. It was followed by the South Alligator mine 
(between 1959 to 1964) and Nabarlek (1979 to 1988): Paul Kay, ‘Australia’s Uranium Mines: Past 
and Present’ (Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1997). 
16 Cole Latimer, ‘Open cut operations cease at Ranger uranium mine’, Australian Mining (online), 11 
December 2012 <http://www.australianmining.com.au/news/open-cut-operations-cease-at-ranger-
uranium-mine/>. 
17 Department of the Environment and Energy, Uranium Mining in the Alligator Rivers Region (2017) 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/science/supervising-scientist/supervision/arr-mines/ranger>. 
18 World Nuclear Association, Australia’s Uranium Mines (January 2017) <http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/appendices/australia-s-uranium-
mines.aspx>. 
19 Kay, above n 15.  
20 World Nuclear Association, Australia’s Uranium Mines, above n 18. Four Mile is the only other 
operating mine in SA; the Beverley and Honeymoon mines have ceased production: Department of 




WA has a nascent uranium industry. A ban on uranium exploration was lifted in 
2008,21 and at present, there are four major uranium projects at various stages of 
approval and development (see Table 1). Due to the current low price of uranium, it is 
uncertain when these projects will be completed and when production will begin.22  
Table 1: Major Uranium Projects in WA 







Mulga Rock Vimy Resources 
Ltd 
Yes25 Yes26 
Wiluna Toro Energy Ltd Yes27 Yes: Centipede and Lake Way 
Deposits28 






                                                 
21 Department of Premier and Cabinet, 'Liberal-National Government lifts uranium mining ban' 
(Media Statement, 17 November 2008). 
22 See, eg, David Weber, ‘Uranium mines ‘not priority’ in WA following profit downgrade, 
environmentalists claim’, ABC (online), 11 February 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-
11/wa-uranium-mines-not-priority-environmentalists-claim/8262280>; ‘Struggling uranium market 
pushes ERA to another impairment’, Australian Mining (online), 18 January 2017 
<https://www.australianmining.com.au/news/struggling-uranium-market-pushes-era-to-another-
impairment/>. 
23 Albert Jacob, ‘Statement that a Proposal may be Implemented (Pursuant to the Provisions of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986): Kintyre Uranium Project’ (Ministerial Statement, Statement No 
997, 4 March 2015).  
24 Greg Hunt, ‘Approval: Kintyre Uranium Project, WA’ (Approval Decision, EPBC 2010/5637, 22 
April 2015). 
25 Albert Jacob, ‘Statement that a Proposal May be Implemented (Environmental Protection Act 
1986): Mulga Rock Uranium Project’ (Ministerial Statement, Statement No 1046, 16 December 
2016). 
26 Josh Frydenberg, ‘Proposed Approval: Mulga Rock Uranium Project, Shire of Menzies, WA’ 
(Approval Decision, EPBC 2013/7083, 2 March 2017).  
27 Bill Marmion, ‘Statement that a Proposal may be Implemented (Pursuant to the Provisions of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986): Wiluna Uranium Mine, 30 km South and 15 km South-East of 
Wiluna, Shire of Wiluna’ (Ministerial Statement, Statement No 913, 10 October 2012); Albert Jacob, 
‘Statement that a Revised Proposal may be Implemented (Environmental Protection Act 1986): 
Revised Wiluna Uranium Proposal’ (Ministerial Statement, Statement No 1051, 9 January 2017). 
28 Tony Burke, ‘Statement of Reasons for Approval under the Environment Protection and 
Biodivserity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)’ (Ministerial Statement, EPBC 2009/5174, 16 May 2013). 
29 See Tim Wyndham, ‘Notification of Extension to Time to which to make a Decision whether to 
Approve a Controlled Action: Extension of Wiluna Uranium Mine Project, Shire of Wiluna, WA 
(Departmental Decision, EPBC 2014/7138, 12 October 2016); Jarrod Lucas, ‘Toro Energy’s Wiluna 
uranium mine in Goldfields gets green light from WA Government’, ABC News (online), 9 January 
2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-09/toro-energy-wiluna-uranium-mine-approved-by-wa-
government/8171398>. 
30 Albert Jacob, ‘Statement that a Proposal may be Implemented (Environmental Protection Act 1986): 
Yeelirrie Uranium Project’ (Ministerial Statement, Statement No 1053, 20 January 2017). 
31 See Bruce Edwards, ‘Notification of Extension of Time in Which to Make a Decision Whether to 
Approve a Controlled Action, Yeelirrie Uranium Mine, Shire of Wiluna, WA (Departmental Decision, 
EPBC 2009/4906, 2 September 2016).  
 
4 
NT and SA mines export uranium from their local ports in Darwin and Adelaide 
respectively. However, when uranium production commences in WA, it will be 
transported interstate by road to either Port Adelaide or Port Darwin for export. This 
is because State Government policy prohibits the export of uranium oxide from local 
ports. As a result, WA producers are exposed to an additional layer of regulation. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse elements of the regime governing the road 
transport of WA uranium oxide and highlight its deficiencies and subsequent impact 
on WA producers.  In doing so, it becomes clear that while WA producers are at a 
disadvantage to their NT and SA counterparts, the whole regime is overly complex, 
repetitious, and incapable of responding to international developments concerning 
radioactive materials transport.  
A A Complicated Regime 
The current regime for the transport of uranium oxide is outdated, overlapping and 
complex, even for a producer exporting from their home State. This is compounded 
for WA producers because they cannot use local ports for export. Instead, the uranium 
oxide must travel by road to Darwin or Adelaide. To do so, they must obtain at least 
seven approvals from five agencies operating under three different governments (see 
Table 2).  
Table 2: Overview of the transport permits required by NT, SA and WA producers 
 Approval/Permit Agency NT SA WA 
W
A
 Environmental Approval EPA N N Y 




 Environmental Approval EPA N Y N 




 Environmental Approval EPA Y N N 





Transport Permit ASNO Y Y Y 
Possession Permit Y Y Y 
Mineral Export Permit DIIS Y Y Y 
Individual Consignment Approval Y Y Y 
 
In WA, before a uranium mine is constructed, the proponent must obtain 
environmental approval for all aspects of production (including transport) from the 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). Once production starts and a consignment 
is ready for export, the producer and transporter individually obtain licences from the 
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WA Radiological Council. They must also gain possession and transport permits from 
the Australian Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) and individual consignment approval 
and a Mineral Export Permit from the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science 
(DIIS). Further, transport licences from the NT Work Health Authority or SA 
Environment Protection Authority are also required for interstate transport.  
The law governing uranium can be broadly broken into three categories: security, 
safeguards, and safety.32 Nuclear security focuses on preventing the intentional misuse 
of nuclear materials by terrorists and other non-state actors.33 Nuclear safeguards 
prevent new States gaining nuclear weapons,34 and is achieved primarily through the 
nuclear non-proliferation agreement framework.35 These areas are regulated by the 
Commonwealth through non-proliferation and export controls.36 
Nuclear safety encompasses radiation protection measures that protect human health 
and the environment from the effects of ionising radiation.37 Historically, the States 
and Territories are responsible for mining, public health, environment protection and 
transport.38 The radiation protection legislation is intertwined with each of these areas. 
In WA, the Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) (RSA) mandates licensing requirements, 
dose limits,39 reporting obligations and training requirements.  
The Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) 
(WA Transport Regulations) implements the Code for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Material (Transport Code). This Code is published by the Australian 
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) and mirrors the 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (International 
                                                 
32 Carlton Stoiber, ‘Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in a New Century: Legal Issues and 
Approaches’ (2006) AMPLA Yearbook 1, 3. 
33 Ibid; Australian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Agency, Code of Practice for Security of Radioactive 
Sources (2007); D Flory, ‘What Isn’t Working and New Requirements: The Need to Harmonize 
Safety and Security Requirements’ (Paper presented at International Conference on the Safe and 
Secure Transport of Radioactive Material: The Next Fifty Years – Creating a Safe, Secure and 
Sustainable Framework, Vienna, 16–21 October 2011).  
34 Stoiber, above n 32, 3.  
34 Ibid.  
35 The Australian non-proliferation safeguards regime is explained in Chapter III at page 32. See also 
Appendix A for a list of Australia’s bilateral agreements. 
36 The Commonwealth’s non-proliferation safeguards and export regime is explained in Chapter III at 
pages 32. 
37 International Atomic Energy Agency, Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety 
(No GSR, 1st revised ed, 2016) pt 1, 2.  
38 The constitutional basis for uranium regulation is explored in Chapter III at page 27. 
39 A dose limit is the value of an effective or equivalent dose (see 13–4 nn 86–7) to individuals from 
planned exposure situations that shall not be exceeded: J Valentin (ed), Annals of the ICRP: The 2007 
Recommendations of the International Committee on Radiological Protection (Publication 103, 
Elsevier, 2007) 22.  
 
6 
Regulations) developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is 
implemented in the radiation protection legislation of each Australian jurisdiction. The 
International Regulations represent world’s best practice for the regulation of the 
transport of radioactive materials.40 They are reviewed biannually, with the last 
substantive revision occurring in 2012.41 This revision is reflected in the 2014 
Transport Code. However, this is not uniformly implemented across Australia. In fact, 
three different editions of the Transport Code operate across State borders.  
B The Problem 
Each jurisdiction has its own radiation protection regime governing the transport of 
radioactive materials, and consequently, the transport of uranium oxide. Further, other 
permits are required at the Commonwealth level to regulate nuclear security and 
safeguards. There is no mechanism in place (such as a mutual recognition scheme) to 
reduce the number of permits required by a producer to transport uranium oxide. This 
is compounded for producers in WA because the product must travel interstate due to 
the policy ban.  
This entails significant economic consequences for WA producers. The variety of 
regulators and approvals increase costs and draws out the time required for approval. 
This in turn can delay shipments of uranium oxide, with contractual consequences for 
producers and the overseas consumer. There are also major discrepancies between the 
requirements of the radiation protection legislation in the NT, SA and WA. This 
increases compliance costs for WA producers as they attempt to abide by the 
disjunctive licensing, reporting and other requirements imposed. Further, the different 
operational versions of the Transport Code in force across Australia has safety 
implications, as requirements are not consistent with international requirements, and 
                                                 
40 Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council, Background Paper: Transport of Radioactive 
Material in Australia – Discussion of the Risks (Australian Government, December 2013) 2; D Clein, 
‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material: Content and Application’ (Paper 
presented at Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, Vienna, 7–11 July 2003) 70; S Sarkar, 
‘Australian Experience in Implementing Transport Safety Regulations and Transport Security 
Recommendations’ (Paper presented at International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of 
Radioactive Material: The Next Fifty Years – Creating a Safe, Secure and Sustainable Framework, 
Vienna, 16–21 October 2011) 5; Yadav, above n 2, 107–8.  
41 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material (No SSR–6, 2012 ed) (2012 International Regulations). The 2012 International 
Regulations are implemented in Australia via Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety 
Agency, Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (Radiation Protection Series C–2, 2014 
ed). See also Chapter V.  
 
7 
may induce a shipment denial42 where a consignment does not meet the version of the 
International Regulations enforced overseas.  
C The Solution? 
The science is clear that the physical dangers presented by uranium oxide are low 
compared to other radioactive materials and heavy metals regularly transported in 
WA.43 The policy ban then, is likely the culmination of negative public attitudes 
towards uranium.44 These attitudes are influenced by negative associations with 
uranium mining,45 distrust of the industry,46 and recent nuclear incidents (such as the 
Fukushima-Daiichi disaster in 2011).47 Further, WA has a new Labor Government 
ideologically opposed to uranium mining.48 In these circumstances, it is unlikely that 
the policy ban will be lifted in the near future.  
As a result, a solution must be reached between the States, Territories and 
Commonwealth to simplify the regime for the transport of uranium oxide. A solution 
not straightforward – as indicated above, the regime for uranium oxide transport 
canvasses multiple legal areas and levels of government. Reform to uranium oxide 
transport must consider its impact on areas such as general transport, radiation 
protection, uranium mining, and the Australian NFC. Further, reform can impact non-
NFC industries – for instance, reform to radiation protection legislation may also affect 
medicine and radiology.  
D Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis examines the current regime for the transport of uranium oxide in WA and 
highlights the difficulties and costs faced by producers and transporters trucking the 
                                                 
42 A denial of shipment is the ‘explicit or implicit refusal to carry a shipment of radioactive material 
though it conforms to all the applicable Regulations’: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Handbook for Addressing Instances of Denials/Delays of Shipment of Radioactive Material (2010) 
(Shipment Denial Handbook) cl 2. Shipment denials are discussed further in Chapter V.  
43 Chapter V explains that uranium oxide is classed as ‘LSA-I’ material, which is characterised by a 
low level of radioactivity. Compare this to radioisotopes (used in medicine, industry and research) 
which are commonly transported in ‘Type A’ packages (and are therefore more radioactive, and more 
dangerous).  
44 The factors influencing the policy ban are analysed in Chapter II.  
45 Nuclear Energy Agency, Perceptions and Realities in Modern Uranium Mining: Extended 
Summary (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014) 3, 7. 
46 See, eg, Erin Jones, ‘SA Police close Olympic Way as anti-uranium protesters light bonfire in the 




47 See Lei Huang et al, ‘Effect of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident on the Risk Perception of 
Residents near a Nuclear Power Plant in China’ (2013) 110(49) Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America 19742. 
48 See Chapter II at page 16. 
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material interstate. Chapter II explains the WA policy ban, its influencing factors and 
the capacity of WA ports to handle and export uranium oxide. Chapter III introduces 
the legislative scheme governing the transport of uranium oxide at the Commonwealth 
and WA levels. It explains the practical effect of the current scheme on producers and 
transporters. Chapter IV analyses the radiation protection legislation in the NT, SA 
and WA and highlights the major discrepancies between the three regimes. It argues 
that these differences impose greater obligations on WA producers compared to their 
interstate counterparts. Chapter V introduces the International Regulations and 
Transport Code and explains their application throughout Australia. It analyses the 
different versions of the Transport Code in force and explains the importance of it 
staying up to date with Australian and international developments. Finally, Chapter VI 
proposes three reforms to modify and harmonise the existing regime to improve the 





II THE PORT PROBLEM 
A Introduction 
In the NT and SA, uranium producers have two regulatory regimes governing 
shipment: their own and the Commonwealth. This is because uranium oxide can be 
exported from local ports. WA producers face a very different situation. A policy ban 
prevents uranium oxide being exported from WA ports. Consequently, WA producers 
must transport uranium oxide interstate to either Port Adelaide or Port Darwin for 
export. This policy decision exposes producers to three regulatory schemes and in turn, 
increases business and compliance costs.49  
The public perception of uranium influences such policy decisions. 50 The regulator is 
tasked not only with protecting the public from the actual hazards of uranium oxide, 
but also managing negative perceptions.51 This Chapter begins by outlining the policy 
ban itself. It then explains the actual hazards posed by uranium oxide and the local 
influences on its perception. Finally, this Chapter explores Fremantle Port’s capacity 
to export uranium oxide if the ban was lifted.  
B The Policy Ban 
There is no legislative impediment prohibiting uranium oxide export from WA ports 
– the ban is pure policy. When the uranium mining ban was lifted in 2008,52 WA 
industrial port facilities were considered as potential export hubs. 53 Soon after, the 
Minister for Mines and Petroleum stated that ‘in the early stages … any material will 
be exported through ports in the Northern Territory or South Australia. Uranium will 
not be exported through residentially bound ports’.54 By 2012, the State Government 
did not consider any WA ports suitable because they were ‘either surrounded by 
residential areas or [did] not have container facilities’.55  
                                                 
49 These costs are explained further in Chapters III and IV. 
50 See generally Paul Slovic, ‘Public Perception of Risk’ (1997) 59(9) Journal of Environmental 
Health 22, 22.  
51 Deloitte, Review of Regulatory Efficiency in Uranium Mining (Final Report, December 2008) 17, 
71–2; Rory Sullivan, ‘Assessing the Acceptability of Environmental Risk – A Public Policy 
Perspective’ (1998) 5(2) Australian Journal of Environmental Management 72, 78.  
52 Department of Premier and Cabinet, above n 21. 
53 Tim Clarke, ‘Barnett lifts WA uranium ban’, WAToday (online), 17 November 2008 
<http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/barnett-lifts-wa-uranium-ban-20081117-68vl.html>. 
54 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 November 2008, 458b–459a 
(Norman Moore) (emphasis added). 





The lack of port container facilities is a legitimate barrier to uranium oxide export. 
This is because uranium oxide is sealed in 200-litre steel drums, which are then stowed 
in shipping containers for transport.56 In WA, Fremantle Port handles the majority of 
containerised trade.57 The Port of Esperance also has facilities for containerised 
cargo.58 Both ports are excluded as potential uranium export ports because they are 
surrounded by residential areas.59 However, it is argued that this reason is not sufficient 
by itself to exclude uranium oxide export. This is because the hazards posed by 
uranium oxide are low and can be safely managed.  
C Hazards of Uranium Oxide 
The hazards posed by uranium oxide can be understood from three perspectives: (1) 
transport risks; (2) radiological risks; and (3) chemical risks.  
1 Transport Risks 
The risk in transporting uranium oxide is derived from the material itself and the mode 
of transport selected. The shipping container stowing the uranium oxide is transported 
by articulated trucks. Heavy vehicle transport has baseline risks. Heavy vehicles are 
disproportionally involved in casualty crashes, representing 16 per cent of road crash 
fatalities.60 Risk factors associated with heavy vehicle accidents include speed,61 road 
and vehicle design,62 and fatigue.63  
                                                 
56 The shipping containers are 20 foot International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) containers. 
See World Nuclear Transport Institute, Good Practice Guide: Good Practice for the Securing of 
Drums of Uranium Ore Concentrate in 20’ ISO Containers (World Nuclear Transport Limited, 2011); 
World Nuclear Transport Institute, Information Paper: Uranium Concentrates Industry Best Practice 
for Avoiding Contamination of Packages and Shipping Containers in Multimodal Transport (World 
Nuclear Transport Limited, 2013); World Nuclear Transport Institute, Uranium Concentrates Industry 
Good Practices for ISO Containers in Multimodal Transport (World Nuclear Transport Limited, 
2011); M A Charette, ‘Good Practice for Uranium Concentrate Transport’ (2010) 21(3) Packaging, 
Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material 169.  
57 Department of Transport, Ports Handbook: Western Australia 2016 (Ports WA, 2016) 8.  
58 Ibid 25. 
59 Taylor, above n 55. 
60 Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics, Heavy Truck Safety: Crash Analysis 
and Trends (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2016) 8; Bureau of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economic, Freightline 1 – Australian Freight Transport 
Overview (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2014) and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Motor Vehicle Census, Australia, 31 Jan 2015 (Cat No 9309.0, 2015) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/9309.0Main+Features131%20Jan%202015?
OpenDocument>. 
61 Jane Elkington and Mark Stevenson, The Heavy Vehicle Study – Final Report (Curtin Monash 
Accident Research Centre, 2013) 36.  
62 SJ Raftery, JAL Grigo and JE Woolley, Heavy Vehicle Road Safety: Research Scan (Centre for 
Automotive Safety Research, 2011) 21.  
63 Jennie Connor et al, ‘The Role of Driver Sleepiness in Car Crashes: A Systematic Review of 
Epidemiological Studies’ (2001) 33(1) Accident Analysis & Prevention 31; G Robb et al, ‘A 




Fatigue is a particularly important issue for the transport of WA uranium oxide and a 
compelling reason to review the policy ban. This is because consignments must travel 
long distances from the uranium mine in WA to either Port Adelaide or Darwin.64 The 
journey between Port Adelaide and Kalgoorlie65 is over 2,100 kilometres and 
approximately 22 hours of driving time. Similarly, the distance between Port Adelaide 
and Wiluna66 is 2,600 kilometres and 27 hours of driving time (see Figure 1). In 
contrast, Olympic Dam is 570 kilometres and six hours from Port Adelaide and Ranger 
is 260 kilometres and three hours from Port Darwin. Some SA uranium mines are also 
supported by rail infrastructure to Port Adelaide.67  
Figure 1: WA uranium mines and relevant ports and townsites 
 
The transport risk can also be assessed by examining historical accident data. Millions 
of shipments of radioactive materials occur around the world each year.68 Since 1961, 
there is no record of any accident involving the transport of radioactive materials 
(either by road, rail, air or sea) causing significant radiological damage to human 
                                                 
Traffic Crashes and Injuries’ (2008) 14(1) Injury Prevention 51; Ann Williamson et al, Driver 
Fatigue: A Survey of Long Distance Heavy Vehicle Drivers in Australia (Information Paper CR 198, 
2001); LN Sharwood et al, ‘Investigating the Role of Fatigue, Sleep and Sleep Disorders in 
Commercial Vehicle Crashes: A Systematic Review’ (2011) 22(3) Journal of the Australasian 
College of Road Safety 24; Ibid 39; Lee Di Milia et al, ‘Demographic Factors, Fatigue and Driving 
Accidents: An Examination of the Published Literature’ (2011) 43(2) Accident Analysis & Prevention 
516.  
64 Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council, above n 40.  
65 Kalgoorlie is the closest town to the Mulga Rock development.  
66 Wiluna is the closest town to the Wiluna and Yeelirrie developments.  
67 Department of State Development, The Facts about Uranium Mining in South Australia 
(Government of South Australia, 2016) 9; Australasia Railway Corporation, Rail Operator (2017) 
<http://www.aarail.com.au/railway/operations/>; Minerals Council of Australia, Uranium: Natural 
Energy (2014) 41.  
68 World Nuclear Association, above n 1.  
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health or the environment.69 This is likely the consequence of the robust packaging 
and control system developed by the IAEA.70  
The IAEA’s records for radioactive waste dumping and radiological losses at sea 
demonstrates the danger posed by historical accidents. 71 Only two major incidents 
involving the sea transport of NFC materials have ever been recorded. The first was 
the Mont Luis sinking in 1984, carrying low-level enriched uranium hexafluoride. The 
second was the MSC Carla hull failure, carrying caesium-137 sealed sources. No 
releases of radioactivity were reported in either case.72  
Cook et al have also predicted the risk of death from an accident involving the transport 
of radioactive waste, describing that risk as ‘vanishingly small’.73 Common hazards 
like smoking, traffic accidents, surgical anaesthesia and air travel present a greater risk 
of death than an accident involving the rail or sea journey of radioactive waste (see 
Table 3).74 
Table 3: Risk of death from common and radiological hazards 
Hazard Annual risk of death 
Smoking 1 in 100 
Traffic accident 1 in 8,000 
Surgical anaesthesia 1 in 185,000 
Air travel 1 in 12.5 million 
1,000 km rail journey of radioactive waste 1 in 4 billion 
20,000 km sea journey of radioactive waste 1 in 1,000 trillion 
Australian radiation incidents are recorded in the Australian Radiation Incident 
Register (ARIR). The ARIR records incidents in 31 categories, including transport.75 
Very few transport incidents have been recorded and the radiological consequences of 
these have been negligible or minor.76 In 2015, 95 per cent of reported radiation 
                                                 
69 The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material were first published in 1961.  
70 The packaging system under the International Regulations is explained in Chapter V. See also 
Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council, above n 40; United Nations Scientific Committee on 
the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation (United Nations, 2008) vol 
II, Scientific Annex C, 16.  
71 International Atomic Energy Agency, Inventory of Radioactive Material Resulting from Historical 
Dumping, Accidents and Losses at Sea: For the Purposes of the London Convention 1972 and London 
Protocol 1996 (IAEA-TECDOC-1776, 2015) 3.  
72 Ibid 23.  
73 Darron Cook et al, Safety and Risks in the Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and in 
Australia: Transport Safety and Risks Overview and Assessment (Jacobs Group (Australia) Pty Ltd, 
2016) 49.  
74 Ibid.  
75 These categories also include nuclear medicine, radiology, dental, mining and lasers.  
76 Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council, above n 40, 2.  
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incidents were medically related.77 Between 2004 and 2015, 1717 incidents were 
reported to the ARIR – only 17 were transport incidents.78 
Transport data indicates the risk of a serious incident involving radioactive materials 
is low. However, the risk may be exacerbated by transport conditions specific to WA 
– that is, the transport of uranium oxide over long distances between the mine and port.  
2 Radiological Risks 
Uranium oxide emits ionising radiation.79 Ionisation occurs when an unstable atom 
(with an excess of protons and neutrons) attempts to stabilise itself by discharging 
excess particles.80 The atom disintegrates and transforms into a different nuclide 
through radioactive decay.81 Radiation is the energy released during radioactive decay; 
radioactivity is the rate of radiation emission.82 Ionising radiation discharges a lot of 
energy which can cause chemical change and damage in living tissue.83 
Radioactivity is measured by the Becqueral (Bq).84 Radiation exposure is measured 
by the Gray (Gy).85 The Sievert (Sv) measures biological exposure to radiation.86 
These units are usually accompanied by a prefix denoting a fraction (eg milli, micro) 
(see Appendix B). 
                                                 
77 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Australian Radiation Incident 
Register: Summary of Radiation Incidents – 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015 (Australian 
Government, 2015); Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Annual Summary 
Reports of the Australian Radiation Incident Register (2016) 
<http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/arir/arir-reports.cfm> (ARIR Website). 
78 This represents less than 1% of all Australian radiation incidents reported in the RAR: see ARIR 
Website, above n 77.  
79 See Damijan Balenovic and Emilije Stimac, Radiation Exposure: Sources, Impacts and Reduction 
Strategies (Nova Science, 2012) 13.  
80 Ilya Obodovskiy, Fundamentals of Radiation and Chemical Safety (Elsevier, 2015) 5; Alan Martin 
et al, An Introduction to Radiation Protection (CRC Press, 6th ed, 2012) 8; Larry A Burchfield, 
Radiation Safety: Protection and Management for Homeland Security and Emergency Response (John 
Wiley and Sons, 2009) 38–40.  
81 Obodovskiy, above n 80, 5; Martin et al, above n 80, 8; Burchfield, above n 80, 38–40.  
82 Obodovskiy, above n 80, 5; Martin et al, above n 80, 8; Burchfield, above n 80, 38–40.  
83 Obodovskiy, above n 80, 20; Martin et al, above n 80, 27; Burchfield, above n 80, 39–40.  
84 Bureau International des Poids et Mesures, The International System of Units (Organisation 
Intergouvernementale de la Convention du Mètre, 8th ed, 2006) 120. Australia has adopted the 
International System of Units (SI) under the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) (see also the 
National Measurement Regulations 1999 (Cth) sch 1 pt 2).  
85 Radiation exposure is called the ‘absorbed dose’ and measures the energy deposited into a material 
or substance: Bureau International des Poids et Mesures, above n 84, 120.  
86 Biological exposure is called the equivalent dose. ‘Effective dose’ also measures the biological 
exposure of organs in the human body. Some organs are more sensitive to radiation. These include the 
bone marrow, lungs and breasts: Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, 
Fundamentals: Protection Against Ionising Radiation (Radiation Protection Series F-1, 2014) 7–9; 
Bureau International des Poids et Mesures, above n 84, 120. 
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Uranium emits ionising radiation in the form of alpha () particles. Alpha particles are 
only a health concern if they enter the body, 87 but cannot travel far – they cannot 
penetrate a sheet of paper and travel only a few centimetres in the air.88 Uranium is 
also a weak gamma () emitter. Gamma rays have the highest level of energy in the 
electromagnetic spectrum and can pass through most materials.89 During transport, the 
gamma dose rate from uranium oxide increases because of the close proximity of the 
drums and as the material decays.90 
Uranium oxide’s radioactivity is explained by comparing its dose to other common 
doses of ionising radiation. We are constantly exposed to natural background radiation 
emanating from the environment (eg in rocks and soil). In Australia, the annual dose 
from background radiation is approximately 1.5 mSv.91 Other sources of radiation are 
CT scans (5–10 mSv), chest x-rays (0.06 mSv) and international travel (return flight 
between Melbourne and London, 0.11 mSv).92 Uranium mine workers and radioactive 
transport workers receive an annual dose below 1 mSv in the course of their 
employment (see also Table 4).93 There is no evidence that ionising radiation affects 
human health for doses up to 10 mSv,94 although any event, the occupational limit set 
by the ICRP is 20 mSv per year.95 A person would need to stand within one metre of 
a drum containing uranium oxide for 1,000 hours to reach the occupational limit.96 
                                                 
87 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Alpha Particles (2012) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/RadiationProtection/Basics/alpha.cfm>. 
88 Ibid; Alan Martin, Karen Beach and Sam Harbison, An Introduction to Radiation Protection 
(Hodder Education, 6th ed, 2012) 7.  
89 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Gamma Radiation (2012) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/Basics/gamma.cfm>. 
90 Uranium Council Transport Working Group, Guide to Safe Transport of Uranium Oxide 
Concentrate (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2012) 13. 
91 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Ionising Radiation and Health (2015) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/RadiationProtection/Factsheets/is_ionising.cfm>. 
92 These figures refer to annual doses: Department of Mines and Petroleum, Transporting Uranium 
Oxide in WA – Your Questions Answered (2013) 
<http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Investors/Community-TransportingUraniumOxide.pdf>.  
93 Ibid; NRPB Chilton UK et al, Statistics on the Transport of Radioactive Materials and Statistical 
Analyses (Final Report, European Commission, 2003) 25. 
94 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Ionising Radiation and Health, above 
n 91. See also Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Research on Health Effects of Low-Level Ionizing Radiation Exposure (National Academies Press, 
2014).  
95 The occupational limit is averaged over 5 years and no single year can exceed 50 mSv: Valentin, 
above n 39, Table 6.  
96 Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 14.  
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 dose at 1m 
(mSv/h) 
 dose at 2m 
(mSv/h) 
Max  dose at 
surface 
(mSv/h) 
Drum 10 0.004 - 0.02 
Container 440 0.02 0.01 0.06 
 
3 Chemical Risks 
Uranium oxide’s chemical characteristics are a greater threat to human health than its 
radiological characteristics. 98 Uranium oxide is not easily absorbed into the human 
body because it is insoluble,99 but can enter the bloodstream if ingested or inhaled.100 
If absorbed, uranium targets kidney tissue and renal processes.101 However, the 
average adult can tolerate an intake of up to 11 mg per year,102 and in low doses 
(between 25–40 mg), the kidney repairs itself.103  
This toxicity is not unique – other heavy metals, including lead, nickel and copper, 
also threaten human health at certain doses.104 In Australia, toxic heavy metals (such 
as lead sulphite concentrate) are transported daily as ‘environmental hazardous 
substances’ under the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road 
and Rail (ADG Code). Further, uranium oxide is stable and does not pose an explosion 
hazard. 105  
4 Concluding Remarks 
Transporting uranium oxide will always have risks, but this is no different to the 
transport of other radioactive substances, toxic metals or dangerous goods routinely 
transported in Australia. The chemical and radiological risks of uranium oxide are 
                                                 
97 Ibid.  
98 Sam Keith et al, Toxicological Profile of Uranium (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry, 2013) 271–2; ibid 11–2.  
99 Between 0.76–5% of inhaled uranium and 0.1–6% of ingested uranium will enter the bloodstream. 
Uranium is very unlikely to enter the human body through the skin: Keith, above n 98, 41. 
100 Ibid 4.  
101 Sidney A Katz, ‘The Chemistry and Toxicology of Depleted Uranium’ (2014) 2 Toxics 50, 63–5.  
102 Department of Protection of the Human Environment, Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposures and 
Health Effects (World Health Organization, 2011) 146.  
103 Depleted UF6 Management Information Network, Uranium Health Effects (2016) 
<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/ucompound/health/index.cfm>. 
104 See Monisha Jaishankar et al, ‘Toxicity, Mechanism and Health Effects of Some Heavy Metals’ 
(2014) 7(2) Interdisciplinary Toxicology 60, 60; Paul B Tchounwou et al, ‘Heavy Metals Toxicity and 
the Environment’ (2012) 101 EXS 133; Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Health Impacts 
of Transport Emissions in Australia: Economic Costs (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) 7.  
105 Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 11.  
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well-managed through IAEA controls,106 demonstrated by the low number of transport 
incidents in both the Australian and international context. The main risk is the driving 
conditions associated with articulated vehicles. This is a specific problem for WA 
producers because of the distance between the uranium mine and export ports, 
especially the fatigue associated with long-distance haulage. Ironically, the policy ban 
is more likely to increase, not decrease, this risk. The next section will examine the 
factors that influence the policy.  
D Factors Influencing the Policy Ban 
Various factors influence the policy ban. These reflect negative public perceptions 
about the NFC and misconceptions about uranium oxide not necessarily based in fact. 
These factors are roughly characterised as: (1) political factors; (2) social factors; and 
(3) economic considerations.  
1 Political Factors 
There is no bipartisan approach to uranium mining in WA. WA Labor traditionally 
opposes uranium mining and exports,107 while the WA Liberals support it.108 The 
newly-elected Labor Government in WA has vowed no new uranium mines will be 
permitted, but existing approved projects will be allowed to continue.109 In contrast, 
both sides of politics in SA and the NT support uranium mining.110 Further, the Greens 
                                                 
106 These controls, implemented through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Regulations for 
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, are explained in detail in Chapter V.  
107 WA Labor, 2015 Platform <https://www.walabor.org.au/platform> cls 16–7.  
108 Liberal Party of Western Australia, Uranium Mining in Western Australia 
<https://www.waliberal.org.au/assets/PartyDocuments/uranium.pdf>. 
109 Ben Harvey, ‘Vimy to beat WA Labor uranium ban’, The West Australian (online), 14 March 2017 
<https://thewest.com.au/business/uranium/vimy-bid-to-beat-wa-labor-uranium-ban-ng-b88414152z>; 
Daniel Mercer, ‘Labor makes point of difference on uranium’, The West Australian (online), 18 
January 2017 <https://thewest.com.au/business/mining/labor-makes-point-of-difference-on-uranium-
ng-b88358036z>; Daniel Zavattiero, ‘Uranium Industry congratulates WA Labor on election victory’ 
(Media Release, 14 March 2017); Tess Ingram, ‘WA Labour readying for new uranium mining ban’, 
Financial Review (online), 11 April 2017 <http://www.afr.com/business/mining/wa-labor-readying-
for-new-uranium-mining-ban-20170411-gvibk7>; Sam Tomlin and Stan Shaw, ‘Uranium mines 
already given green light in WA can go ahead, Labor Government confirms’, ABC News (online), 27 
March 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-27/uranium-mines-will-be-allowed-to-proceed-
labor-minister-confirms/8389622>; Ben Creagh, ‘New WA Government threatens future of uranium 
industry’, Australian Mining (online), 15 March 2017 
<https://www.australianmining.com.au/news/new-wa-government-threatens-future-uranium-
industry/>. 
110 See, eg, Michael Owen and Rebecca Puddy, ‘South Australian Labor defies Bill Shorten by 
backing uranium mining’, The Australian (online), 12 December 2015 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/south-australian-labor-defies-bill-shorten-
by-backing-uranium-mining/news-story/20afbbc67361c59ada3ede234f634770>; email from Graham 
Cobby (Senior Advisor, Department of Mines and Petroleum) to Emily Bell, 4 November 2016.  
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and several unions (eg the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union) are strongly 
anti-uranium.111 
The most suitable ports for uranium export in WA are Fremantle and Esperance. 
Unsurprisingly, concerns about exporting uranium oxide through local ports has been 
voiced by Fremantle and Esperance politicians. Fremantle Port operates in a safe Labor 
seat112 and a Greens-led local government.113 The Greens’ spokesman against uranium 
mining has said that uranium is ‘harmful in ways more far reaching than asbestos. [It] 
brings nothing but contamination and misery’.114 The Fremantle Mayor has observed 
that the government is ‘keenly aware of the power of community backlash [regarding 
uranium oxide export] after 2009 concerns about potential lead pollution’ following 
State Government approval for lead carbonate exports through Fremantle.115 
In 2015, Cameco proffered Esperance as a potential export port for WA uranium.116 
This was rejected. Esperance was regarded as unsuitable because it was surrounded by 
built-up areas.117 Further, public opposition was reported against this ‘emotive 
commodity’,118 with safety concerns following the extensive lead pollution of 
Esperance between 2005 and 2007.119 
                                                 
111 The Greens, Nuclear and Uranium <http://greens.org.au/policies/nuclear-uranium>; Bridget 
Fitzgerald, ‘Minerals council dismisses union claim West Australian uranium projects should not 
proceed’, ABC News (online), 18 April 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2017-04-18/wa-
government-union-uranium-stoush/8451296>; Unions WA, ‘Uranium mine needs a real nuclear test’ 
(Media Release, 26 June 2009); Cobby, above n 110. 
112 Australian Electoral Commission, Profile of the Electoral Division of Fremantle (WA) (19 July 
2016) <http://www.aec.gov.au/profiles/wa/fremantle.htm>. 
113 Glenn Cordingley and Michael Washbourne, ‘Brad Pettitt wins Fremantle mayoral election’, 
PerthNow (online), 18 October 2009 <http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/western-australia/brad-
pettitt-wins-fremantle-mayoral-election/news-story/ea10d98bb308b4a03b3a203ba88d55ec>; Taylor, 
above n 55. 
114 Scott Ludlam, WA Labor’s uranium problem (The Greens, 29 March 2017) <http://scott-
ludlam.greensmps.org.au/articles/wa-labors-uranium-problem>. 
115 Taylor, above n 55.  
116 Jarrod Lucas, ‘Miner flags Esperance as yellowcake export hub’, Kalgoorlie Miner (online), 11 
July 2015 <https://thewest.com.au/news/wa/miner-flags-esperance-as-yellowcake-export-hub-ng-ya-
392227>. Cameco is the proponent of the Yeelirrie mine.  
117 Lauren Vardy, ‘Uranium exports will cause community angst’, The Esperance Express (online) 31 
May 2012 <http://www.esperanceexpress.com.au/story/229753/uranium-exports-will-cause-
community-angst/>. 
118 Ben Hagemann, ‘Shire of Esperance irate about uranium remarks’, Australian Mining (online), 15 
July 2015 <https://www.australianmining.com.au/news/shire-of-esperance-irate-about-uranium-
remarks/>. 
119 Jarrod Lucas, ‘Port wary of uranium plan’, Kalgoorlie Miner (online), 14 July 2015 
<https://thewest.com.au/news/great-southern/port-wary-of-uranium-plan-ng-ya-392244>; Colin Peter, 





Local government opposition also contributes to policy difficulties.120 Many local 
councils, including the City of Fremantle, have established ‘nuclear free zones’ in their 
municipalities.121 For instance, the City of Fremantle’s Nuclear Free Fremantle Policy 
declares that no uranium may be stored or transported in the municipality.122 These 
policies are a statement of opposition to the transport of radioactive materials through 
the local government area, but have no legal force.123 The Joint Standing Committee 
on Delegated Legislation will not approve local laws that attempt to make internal 
policies enforceable.124 In any event, the State Government may override local 
government laws where they are inconsistent with other written laws.125 However, the 
policies reflect communities attitudes and demonstrate the negative perception of 
uranium.  
2 Social Factors 
Public opposition to uranium mining has been widely reported.126 More specifically, 
the Australian public has voiced concerns that the transport of uranium oxide along 
populated routes poses a threat to human health and the environment.127 For instance, 
The Australian reported that Toro’s Energy’s plan to transport uranium oxide through 
Kalgoorlie-Boulder was ‘causing angst’ because houses were only 10 metres away 
from the Goldfields Highway.128 In 2008, the WA Opposition Leader stated there were 
‘many issues’ with the routes, including the safety of those living alongside them.129  
                                                 
120 See, eg, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review, Uranium Mining, Processing 
and Nuclear Energy – Opportunities for Australia? (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2006) 29.  
121 See, for example, City of Vincent, Nuclear Free Zone (Policy No 4.1.8, City of Vincent Policy 
Manual, 1995); City of Kwinana, Policy: Nuclear Free Zones (Policy No 561, 2015) (Kwinana 
Policy).  
122 City of Fremantle, Policy: Nuclear Free Fremantle (No SG20, 2000) cls 1, 3.  
123 This is expressly recognised in the City of Kwinana’s Nuclear Free Zone Policy: Kwinana Policy, 
above n 121, cl 1.  
124 This does not extend to policies made under the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA). See 
also Department of Local Government and Communities, Local Government Operational Guidelines: 
Local Laws (No 16, November 2011) 10–1; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 42. 
125 Local Government Act 1995 (WA) s 3.7.  
126 See, eg, ‘Spill of contaminated material at Ranger uranium mine; locals fear for Kakadu National 
Park’, ABC News (online), 7 December 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-07/spill-at-nt-
uranium-mine-near-kakadu/5142148>; Paul Murray, ‘Sense trumps dodgy science in uranium debate’, 
The West Australian (online), 21 January 2017 <https://thewest.com.au/opinion/sense-trumps-dodgy-
science-in-uranium-debate-ng-b88361506z>; ABC Radio National, ‘The long and controversial 
history of uranium mining in Australia’, Rear Vision, 14 July 2015 (Keri Phillips).  
127 See Jones, above n 46; Andrew Burrell, ‘Cameco uranium push goes on’, The Australian (online), 
31 March 2011 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/cameco-uranium-push-goes-on/news-
story/c51c41163880c87619d15947860fffa6>. 
128 Taylor, above n 55.  
129 Clarke, above n 53. 
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However, these concerns do not align with the actual radiological risk posed by 
uranium oxide. A car passing a truck carrying uranium oxide would be exposed to, at 
most, 0.004 mSv.130 Shipments stopped directly next to a building would emit an 
annual dose equal to 0.2 mSv.131 These doses are well under the annual public limit of 
1 mSv. The dust hazard is also low. Uranium oxide is sealed in drums during transport 
and placed inside a shipping container. If material does escape during an accident, it 
is covered and treated like any other heavy metal concentrate. Only those within 10 
metres of a spill are required to wear personal protective equipment.132 
So why then is there such a discrepancy between the public perception of uranium 
oxide and its actual risk? The disparity can be explained by: (a) risk perception; and 
(b) the influence of recent nuclear incidents.  
(a) Risk Perception 
‘Risk’ refers to the chance a hazard will occur, mitigated by any safeguards.133 Risk 
depends on the identification of what can happen, the probability that it will happen, 
and the consequences should it happen.134 However, risk is perceived differently by 
different people and always involves a subjective assessment.135 Risk can be 
quantifiably measured by the ‘psychometric paradigm’. 136 For example, a person can 
rate the riskiness of an activity from one to ten (with ten being the most risky).  
Risk perception varies between lay people and experts.137 Experts judge risk according 
to technical estimates, whereas lay people judge risk according to other ‘hazard 
                                                 
130 William Wilkinson, Information Paper: Radiation Dose Assessment for the Transport of Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Materials (World Nuclear Transport Institute, 2013) 6.  
131 J S Hughes et al, ‘Statistics on the Traffic of Radioactive Material, and the Resulting Radiation 
Exposures, in the European Union and Applicant Countries’ (Paper presented at 14th International 
Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Berlin, 20–24 September 
2004) 7.  
132 Personal protective equipment includes equipment such as dust mask: Uranium Council Transport 
Working Group, above n 90, 35.  
133 Stanley Kaplan and B John Garrick, ‘On the Quantitative Definition of Risk’ (1981) 1(1) Risk 
Analysis 11, 12.  
134 Ibid 12–3.  
135 Paul Slovic and Elke U Weber, ‘Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events’ (Paper presented at 
Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World, Palisades, New York, 12–3 April 2002) 4; 
Slovic, above n 50, 23.  
136 Slovic and Weber, above n 135, 4. See also Jens O Zinn, ‘The Contribution of Sociology to the 
Discourse of Risk and Uncertainty’ in Jens O Zinn (ed), Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 1, 6.  
137 Experts are persons with special skill or knowledge in a particular field: Tanja Perko, ‘Radiation 
Risk Perception: A Discrepancy Between the Experts and the General Population’ (2014) 133 Journal 
of Environmental Radioactivity 86, 91; Slovic, above n 50, 165;  Macquarie Dictionary Online 
(Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2016) (definition of ‘expert’).  
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characteristics’ (see Table 5).138 Hendee suggests that nuclear energy satisfies all the 
hazard characteristics for increased public concern: nuclear energy is unfamiliar to 
many people and not well understood, has received plenty of negative media attention, 
and has the ability to impact future generations (eg fallout from Chernobyl in 1986).139 
Similarly, uranium oxide transport is unfamiliar, not well-understood by the public 
and has received negative media attention.  
Table 5: Hazard characteristics involved in public risk perception140 
Factor Conditions 
Increased public concern Decreased public concern 
Catastrophic 
potential 
Fatalities/injuries grouped in 
space and time 
Fatalities/injuries scattered 
and random 
Familiarity Unfamiliar Familiar 







Effects on future 
generations 
Risk to future generations No risk to future generations 
Media attention Much media attention Little media attention 
Accident history Major and sometimes minor 
accidents 
No major or minor accidents 
Origin Caused by human actions or 
failures 
Caused by acts of nature or 
God 
 
Multiple studies demonstrate that experts have lower risk perceptions of radiation than 
the public. 141 In one study,142 experts employed at the Belgium Nuclear Research 
Centre143 and members of the public were asked to evaluate the risks of nuclear waste, 
                                                 
138 Slovic and Weber, above n 135, 8; Matthew Roach, ‘Can “Risk-Based” Regulation Help Increase 
Public Confidence in the Environment Protection Authority? An Evaluation of New South Wales 
Environmental Licensing Reforms’ (2015) 32 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 346, 351; 
Ortwin Renn, Risk Governance: Coping With Uncertainty in a Complex World (Earthscan, 2008) 93.  
139 William R Hendee, ‘Public Perception of Radiation Risks’ in Jack P Young and Roslyn S Yalow 
(eds), Radiation and Public Perception: Benefits and Risks (American Chemical Society, 1995) 13, 
18.  
140 Vincent T Covello, David B McCallum and Marie T Pavlova, ‘Principles and Guidelines for 
Improving Risk Communication’ in Vincent T Covello, David B McCallum and Marie T Pavlova 
(eds), Effective Risk Communication: The Role and Responsibility of Government and Nongovernment 
Organizations (Plenum Press, 1989) 3.  
141 See Perko, above n 137, 91; Slovic, above n 50, 165; Kathleen L Purvis-Roberts, Cynthia A 
Werner and Irene Frank, ‘Perceived Risks from Radiation and Nuclear Testing Between Physicians, 
Scientists and the Public’ (2007) 27(2) Risk Analysis 291; Adam Corner et al, ‘Nuclear Power, 
Climate Change and Energy Security: Exploring British Public Attitudes’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 
4823; Lennart Sjöberg and Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjöberg, ‘Knowledge and Risk Perception Among 
Nuclear Power Plant Employees’ (1991) 11(4) Risk Analysis 607; Reiko Kanda, Satsuki Tsuji and 
Hidenori Yonehara, ‘Perceived Risks of Nuclear Power and Other Risks During the Last 25 Years in 
Japan’ (2012) 102(4) Health Physics 384.  
142 Perko, above n 137.  
143 The experts, on average, had worked in nuclear applications for 15 years, were regularly exposed 
to regulation, and 70 per cent had higher degrees. 
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an accident at a nuclear installation, natural radiation and medical x-rays on a scale of 
one (very low risk) to five (very high risk). The general population rated nuclear waste 
and a nuclear accident as riskier than natural radiation and x-rays – for the experts, the 
opposite was found.144 Another study measured the risk perception of nuclear testing 
of scientists, doctors and villages in Kazakhstan.145 The participants were asked 
questions related to the health effects of radiation exposure and nuclear testing in 
Kazakhstan. The villagers exhibited the highest risk response, followed by the doctors 
and then the scientists.  
(b) Nuclear incidents 
Nuclear disasters in recent memory also contribute to public fear and distrust of the 
NFC. In 2011, the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima) experienced 
a meltdown following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami.146 This was the largest 
civilian nuclear accident since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.147 No radiation-related 
deaths or acute diseases among the public or radiation workers are reported by 
UNSCEAR,148 but the fear of future health impact remain.149  
                                                 
144 Factors that contributed to a lower risk perception included professional experience (ie the more 
experienced a radiation expert was, the less risky radiation was), a feeling of protection from radiation 
risks in nuclear installations, and a higher perceived control of radiation by authorities. 
145 Purvis-Roberts, Werner and Frank, above n 141.  
146 See, eg, Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Japan Advisory – The 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (2016) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/pubs/factsheets/FukushimaNPPaccident.pdf>. 
147 See International Atomic Energy Agency,  IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (2011) 
131; Nuclear Energy Institute, Fukushima, Chernobyl and the Nuclear Event Scale (2011) 
<https://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/fukushima-chernobyl-and-the-nuclear-
event-scale>; Timothy J Jorgensen, ‘Forget Fukushima: Chernobyl Still Holds Record as Worst 
Nuclear Accident for Public Health, The Conversation (online), 25 April 2016 
<https://theconversation.com/forget-fukushima-chernobyl-still-holds-record-as-worst-nuclear-
accident-for-public-health-57942>. 
148 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources, Effects and 
Risks of Ionising Radiation: UNSCEAR 2013 Report – Levels and Effects of Radiation Exposure Due 
to the Nuclear Accident after the 2011 Great East-Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (United Nations, 
2014) vol I, Scientific Annex A, 10.  
149 See World Health Organization, Health Risk Assessment after the Nuclear Accident after the 2011 
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Based on Preliminary Dose Estimation (2013); United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Developments Since the 2013 
UNSCEAR Report on the Levels and Effects of Radiation Exposure Due to the Nuclear Accident 
Following the Great East-Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: A 2016 White Paper to Guide the 
Scientific Committee’s Future Programme of Work (United Nations, 2016); Léa Surugue, ‘Fukushima 
nuclear disaster health effects: Trauma, psychological distress and cancer threaten survivors’, 
International Business Times (online), 8 March 2016 <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/fukushima-nuclear-
disaster-health-effects-trauma-psychological-distress-cancer-threaten-survivors-1548049>; Carol 





Fukushima has also impacted the public perception of nuclear energy. Bird et al 
assessed Australian opinions of nuclear power in 2010 and again in 2012 following 
Fukushima.150 They found that following Fukushima, less Australians were willing to 
accept nuclear power as a form of energy and saw nuclear power as having more risks 
than benefits. 
3 Economic Considerations 
Economic factors also influence the ban. It can be argued that it makes economic sense 
to only export uranium oxide from the existing ports in Adelaide and Darwin. This is 
for two main reasons: (a) the availability of willing carriers; and (b) the nature of 
uranium as a low-volume export. 
(a) Carriers 
A major problem for the NFC is the availability of sea carriers willing to accept 
radioactive consignments.151 The World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) explains: 
Ocean carriers may reject carriage of radioactive materials outright, claiming that their 
hull insurance, or owner(s) prohibit such transport service. In cases where ocean 
carriers are willing to accept the cargo, there may be ports on the vessel rotation which 
refuse to accept such freight, or will only do so following time consuming permit 
procedures, virtually ensuring that the necessary authorisation will not be available by 
the time the shipment is scheduled to take place.152 
(b) Low-volume export 
The use of Adelaide and Darwin ‘largely reflects the availability of commercially 
viable shipping lines for uranium given its low volume/high value nature and the 
relevant safety and security aspects of uranium transport’.153 In Queensland, it was 
recommended that if uranium mining commenced again in that State, that uranium 
should be exported through either Darwin or Adelaide because the amount of uranium 
that would be produced made it unlikely a new shipping route would be established 
                                                 
150 Deanne K Bird et al, ‘Nuclear Power in Australia: A Comparative Analysis of Public Opinion 
Regarding Climate Change and the Fukushima Disaster’ (2014) 65 Energy Policy 644.  
151 World Nuclear Association, above n 1.  
152 World Nuclear Transport Institute, Radioactive Materials Transport: Industry Experience 
(Information Paper, 2013) 4.  
153 Uranium Mining Implementation Committee, Recommencement of Uranium Mining in 
Queensland: A Best Practice Framework (Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2013) 4–19. See also 
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Assembly Estimates Committee, 25 May 2016, 286b–
300a [11] (S K L’Estrange, R Sellers). 
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from a Queensland port.154 Queensland’s RAR is 40,000 tonnes,155 which represents 
about 4 per cent of Australia’s total RAR.156 This is a comparable volume to WA’s 
RAR representing 6 per cent of Australia’s RAR overall,157 and suggests that similar 
logic may be applied to WA ports.  
(c) The future? 
These economic practicalities could easily shift. The Port of Darwin only services 
chartered shipments to China,158 and there have been difficulties since 2000 shipping 
uranium oxide from Adelaide because of cancellations in shipping services, extra 
charges, and competition for shipping services from other commodities.159 If 
Queensland also commences uranium oxide production, then there will be additional 
pressure on the existing ports. This may make a WA uranium export port viable.  
E The Way Forward? 
The above factors indicate it is unlikely that uranium oxide will be exported from WA 
in the near future. However, if the ban were lifted, this thesis contends that Fremantle 
Port is well-placed to service uranium oxide exports under its current operating 
procedures. This is for three reasons.  
First, Fremantle Port regularly handles tantalum glass.160 Tantalum glass is an LSA-I 
material under the International Regulations and Transport Code,161 the same 
classification as uranium oxide. It is also transported in the same manner, inside drums 
stowed in shipping containers.162  
                                                 
154 Uranium Mining Implementation Committee, above n 153, 1–4, 4–19.  
155 At less than US$130 per kilogram: ibid 2–3.  
156 Geoscience Australia, Uranium (2013) <http://www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/minerals/mineral-
resources/uranium>. 
157 Ibid.  
158 Uranium Mining Implementation Committee, above n 153, 3–19. Australia also supplies the USA, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Taiwan, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden and 
Belgium: Vanessa Guthrie, Australian Uranium Industry (Presented at 7th Australia-China Bilateral 
Dialogue on Resource and Energy Cooperation, Perth, 6 February 2015) 8. 
159 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Parliament of Australia, 
Australia’s Uranium – Greenhouse Friendly Fuel for an Energy Hungry World (2006) (Prosser 
Report) 598. 
160 Fremantle Ports, Dangerous Cargoes Standard (February 2017) 37.  
161 LSA stands for ‘low specific activity’. LSA-I is the least radioactive material regulated by the 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. See Chapter V.  
162 See Ulric Schwela and Doug Chambers, ‘Transport of Tantalum Raw Materials, Other NORM and 
Waste’ (Presented at EAN-NORM 2nd Workshop, Dresden, 24–26 November 2009) 14; Fremantle 
Ports, above n 160, 37; International Atomic Energy Agency, Assessing the Need for Radiation 
Protection Measures in Work Involving Minerals and Raw Materials (Safety Reports Series No 49, 
2006) 25. See also SENES Consultants Ltd, Radiological Risk Assessment of the Transport of 
Tantalum Raw Materials (Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center, April 2007).  
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Secondly, uranium oxide is regulated under the existing procedural framework.163 
Owners of ‘dangerous things’ within Fremantle Port must comply with Australian 
Standard AS 3846 (AS 3846).164 AS 3846 outlines minimum safety requirements and 
technical guidance for the transport and handling of dangerous goods in port 
facilities.165 It applies to ‘dangerous cargoes’ which include those dangerous goods 
within the scope of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG 
Code).166 The IMDG Code expressly regulates radioactive materials,167 with specific 
provisions based on the International Regulations.168  
Under AS 3846, freight containers brought into the port area must conform to the 
International Regulations’ requirements.169 Radioactive consignments will not be 
received into the port area more than 24 hours prior to shipment although LSA 
materials (including uranium oxide) can be held in the port’s restricted area for up to 
five days if permission is granted by the Fremantle Port Authority.170 
AS 3846 is implemented by Fremantle Port’s Dangerous Cargoes Standard 
(Fremantle Standard). In addition to the AS 3846 requirements, the Fremantle 
Standard requires advance notice of at least 48 hours before any dangerous cargoes are 
brought onto a berth.171 ‘High hazard dangerous cargoes’ (including radioactive 
materials) need permission to enter the port and must be obtained well in advance of 
this 48 hours.172 
                                                 
163 In general, dangerous goods in ports are regulated under Pt 8A of the Dangerous Goods Safety 
(Storage & Handling of Non-explosives) Regulations 2007 (WA). This replaced the Dangerous Goods 
Safety (Goods in Ports) Regulations 2007 (WA) which were repealed in 2014. These Regulations do 
not apply to Class 7 radioactive materials: see reg 8(5)(c). Consequently, Class 7 radioactive materials 
in WA ports are regulated under the Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) and any directions made by 
harbourmasters under s 105 of the Port Authorities Act 1999 (WA). Note that a port needs to be 
licensed to store radioactive materials under the Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA).  
164 Fremantle Ports, above n 160, 7; Standards Australia, Australian Standard – The Handling and 
Transport of Dangerous Cargoes in Port Areas (AS 3846–2005). See also Port Authorities Act 1999 
(WA) ss, 30, 103, 105.  
165 Standards Australia, above n 164, cl 1.1. AS 3846 operates in conjunction with existing regulatory 
requirements: Standards Australia, above n 164, cl 1.2. 
166 Ibid cl 1.4.20(d).  
167 See International Maritime Organization, International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code 
(Incorporating Amendment 36–12) (2012 ed, 2012) chs 1.5, 2.7, 5.1.5, 6.4. 
168 This is the 2009 version of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material: ibid cl 
1.5.1.1. 
169 This is the 1996 version of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material: 
Standards Australia, above n 164, cl 7.2. In any event, the 2005 International Regulations for the Safe 
Transport of Radioactive Material are enforced in WA through the Radiation Safety (Transport of 
Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA). See Chapters IV and V.   
170 Standards Australia, above n 164, cl 7.4.1. 
171 Fremantle Ports, above n 160, cl 2.1; Standards Australia, above n 164, s 5.  
172 Fremantle Ports, above n 160, cl 2.2.  
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Finally, WA has existing emergency response arrangements in the case of a 
radiological emergency. The producer and transporter must have an Emergency 
Response Plan (EMP).173 This is usually submitted to the Radiological Council as part 
of the Transport Management Plan.174 The EMP outlines the procedures to manage 
any transport accidents involving uranium oxide – this generally includes a 
requirement that the driver will undertake appropriate training and will carry an 
emergency response kit to clean-up any spills.175 Further, Fire and Emergency Services 
(FESA) will respond to an incident involving uranium oxide as they would for any 
other incident involving hazardous materials. These procedures are outlined in the 
State Hazard Plan for Hazardous Materials Emergencies.176 
The combination of these three factors demonstrates that Fremantle Port is well-
situated to become a port of export for uranium oxide if the policy ban is lifted. AS 
3846 and the Fremantle Standard are a complete procedural approach to the handling 
of uranium oxide in port areas. As AS 3846 is based on international best practice,177 
it is not recommended that these procedures be modified in any way.  
F Concluding Remarks 
Uranium oxide, like other radioactive materials and heavy metals, has risks associated 
with its transport which are well-managed under the International Regulations.178 
Despite this, negative public perceptions persist, influenced by misunderstandings of 
the actual risk posed by uranium oxide, negative media coverage, and nuclear disasters 
in recent memory.  
In the short and medium term, it is unlikely that the policy will change. This is, in part, 
due to practical factors (eg the availability of carriers) and political factors (ie the new 
Labor government). While the ban remains in place, WA uranium oxide must be 
transported interstate for export. This has two main consequences. First, and ironically, 
                                                 
173 Department of Mines and Petroleum, Guide to Uranium in Western Australia (2013) 19.  
174 The Transport Management Plan is included as part of the Radiation Protection Programme: see 
Chapters III and IV; Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) 
reg 5.  
175 Department of Mines and Petroleum, Guide to Uranium in Western Australia, above n 173, 19.  
176 Department of Fire and Emergency Services, State Hazard Plan for Hazardous Materials 
Emergencies: Westplan – HAZMAT (Res No 19/2016, approved 24 May 2016). The Office of 
Emergency Management has also produced a Westplan Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear. This is in restricted circulation and was unavailable to the author: Office of Emergency 
Management, Westplans (2017) <https://www.oem.wa.gov.au/resources/legislation-and-policy-
framework/plan/westplans>. 
177 That is, AS 3846 is based on the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material: see 
pages 26–7.  
178 See Chapter V. 
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interstate transport increases the risk of a transport accident. Secondly, interstate 
transport exposes WA uranium producers to multiple regulatory regimes. This 
increases regulatory burden, time delays, and compliance costs. This is discussed in 





III AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME 
A Introduction 
Unlike other producing nations, there is no single national regulator to control all 
aspects of the NFC in Australia.179 As a result, the transport of uranium oxide in 
Australia is regulated by multiple agencies across numerous statutes and policies. WA 
uranium oxide will be transported across the border to either Port Adelaide or Port 
Darwin for export.180 Consequently, WA producers are exposed to more regulators 
than their NT and SA counterparts.  
This chapter provides a broad overview of the legislative scheme applicable to the 
transport of uranium oxide through WA only. It outlines the division of power between 
the Commonwealth and WA and then examines the main legal areas of regulation: 
mining, radiation protection, environmental protection, non-proliferation, and export. 
Finally, this chapter highlights the practical consequences of this overlapping regime 
on WA producers. The radiation protection regime in the NT and SA is explored in 
Chapter IV.  
B Division of Regulatory Power 
To address why multiple regulators exist over uranium, one must identify who has the 
capacity to regulate uranium as a mineral. The State of WA owns all uranium deposits 
within its borders.181 For this reason, the State has a general power to regulate all 
aspects of the NFC within its borders under the ‘peace, order and good governance’ 
provision of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA).182 This power enables state 
environmental and radiation protection legislation.183  
The Commonwealth may only restrict this control through legislation enacted under 
one of the heads of power in s 51 of the Australian Constitution. There is no specific 
                                                 
179 Contrast the Australian position to Canada, where NFC activities are controlled entirely by the 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (except for provincial environmental approvals). For an 
overview of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, see Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear 
Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries: Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear 
Activities – Canada (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009) 20; James 
Fahey and Richard Pu, ‘Regulation of the Uranium Industry in Australia: A Comparison to the 
Canadian Approach and the Need for a Single Federal Regulator’ (2007) 26 Australian Resources and 
Energy Law Journal 268.  
180 See Chapter II.  
181 Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 9(1)(b): minerals (aside from gold, silver and other precious metals) 
existing in their natural condition on or below the surface of any land that was not alienated in fee 
simple from the Crown before 1 January 1899 are the property of the Crown.  
182 Constitution Act 1889 (WA) s 2(1). See also Gerard Carney, ‘Constitutional Framework for 
Regulation of the Australian Uranium Industry’ (2007) 26 Australian Resources and Energy Law 
Journal 235, 237.  
183 Christopher Reynolds, Public Health and Environment Law (Federation Press, 2011) 22.  
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head of power under the Australian Constitution for mining, energy or transport. 
Instead, the Commonwealth has historically regulated uranium through the trade and 
commerce power,184 and the external affairs power.185 The trade and commerce power 
extends to ‘all matters which may affect beneficially or adversely the export trade of 
Australia in any commodity produced or manufactured in Australia’.186 Although the 
power is only used to control the export of uranium oxide from Australia,187 Carney 
believes the power is wide enough to regulate all aspects of uranium mining and 
transport because all Australian uranium is exported overseas.188 
The external affairs power enables the Commonwealth to enact legislation to give 
effect to any international legal obligation to which the government has agreed to be 
bound.189 The most salient example of this in the uranium context is the Non-
Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) (NPS Act) which gives effect to obligations 
incurred under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.190 Australia 
is also a state party to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 
Statute).191 The IAEA is responsible for, among other things, nuclear safety and 
security, including the transport of radioactive materials.192 The Commonwealth may 
have scope to regulate the transport of uranium oxide because of its status as a 
signatory of the IAEA Statute,193 but this has yet to occur.194 
This chapter now turns to examine the main subject areas of regulation for uranium 
oxide transport. Before doing so, it is useful to address the provisions that govern the 
mining of uranium ore.  
                                                 
184 Australian Constitution s 51(i). 
185 Ibid s 51(xxix). The Commonwealth may also regulate uranium through the corporations power 
(Australian Constitution s 51(xx)) and the defence power (Australian Constitution s 51(vi) – see, eg, 
Atomic Energy Act 1953 (Cth)). See also Carney, above n 182, 40.   
186 O’Sullivan v Noarlunga Meat Ltd (1954) 92 CLR 565, 598 (Fullagar J).  
187 The export of uranium is controlled under the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and Customs (Prohibited 
Exports Regulations 1958 (Cth). This legislation is explained later in this Chapter.  
188 Carney, above n 182, 239.  
189 Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’) (1983) 158 CLR 1, 170–8 (Murphy J), 222 
(Brennan J).  
190 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 
161; [1973] ATS 3 (entered into force 5 March 1970).  
191 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature 26 October 1956, [1957] 
ATS 11 (entered into force 29 July 1957).  
192 The role of the IAEA is discussed further in Chapter V.  
193 See Carney, above n 182, 340. 
194 The extension of the use of these heads of power may be a solution to the existing regulatory 




Uranium mining is governed by the Mining Act 1978 (WA), but there are no special 
provisions targetting uranium.195 However, Hunt observes that it is more difficult to 
obtain the approvals for uranium mining as opposed to other minerals because of the 
number of agencies involved in the process. He estimates that 38 separate approvals 
across 12 separate pieces of legislation and 11 agencies are required before mine 
construction can commence.196 These include the approvals discussed later in this 
chapter, as well as native title agreements, water use agreements, and the mining lease 
itself. The most important approvals for transport obtained at the mine development 
stage are for radiation protection and environmental protection.197 
C Applicable Laws for the Transport of Uranium Oxide 
The regulation of uranium oxide transport falls under five broad legal areas. These are: 
(1) radiation protection; (2) environmental protection; (3) dangerous goods; (4) non-
proliferation; and (5) exports. Each of these is now discussed.  
1 Radiation Protection 
The main act governing radiation safety in WA is the Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) 
(RSA). Regulations made under the RSA include the Radiation Safety (General) 
Regulations 1983 (WA) (WA General Regulations) and the Radiation Safety 
(Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) (WA Transport 
Regulations).198  
The RSA establishes the Radiological Council.199 The Radiological Council is 
responsible for the administration of the RSA, including its licensing provisions.200 
Briefly, any person who wishes to deal with a radioactive substance must do so under 
                                                 
195 Michael W Hunt, Hunt on Mining Law of Western Australia (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2015) 331. 
196 Ibid.  
197 There are also specific radiation protection measures for mines enforced under the Mines Safety 
and Inspection Regulations 1995 (WA) pt 16. These are enforced by the Department of Mines and 
Petroleum, whereas responsibility for the transport of radioactive substances rests with the 
Radiological Council. See Memorandum of Understanding in Relation to the regulation of Radiation 
Safety for Mining Operations between the Department of Mines and Petroleum and the Radiological 
Council in Western Australia (December 2012) cl 1. 
198 The other regulations made under the RSA are the Radiation Safety (Qualifications) Regulations 
1980 (WA). This provides that a person may not use, install or repair x-ray or irradiating apparatus 
without first having passed a radiation safety examination approved by the Radiological Council.  
199 Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) pt II.  
200 Ibid s 10(2).  
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a licence.201 If a material is a ‘radioactive substance’ within the meaning of the RSA,202 
then the transport of that material is regulated under the WA Transport Regulations.203 
The WA Transport Regulations adopt the 2008 version of the Transport Code, based 
on the 2005 version of the International Regulations. The provisions of the RSA and 
Transport Code are considered further in Chapters IV and V. 
2 Environmental Protection 
(a) Western Australia 
The transport routes and transport procedures for uranium oxide are relevant to the 
environmental assessment of a uranium mine. In WA, ‘significant proposals’ are 
referred to the EPA for assessment under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 
(WA) (EP Act). A ‘significant proposal’ is a proposal likely, if implemented, to have 
a significant impact on the environment.204 The EPA decides whether to assess the 
proposal, and if so, sets a level of assessment as either ‘assessment on proponent 
information’ or ‘public environmental review’ (PER). PER is the more stringent 
standard. The four major uranium projects in WA (see Table 4) were subject to a 
PER.205 
The EPA then assesses the proposal and reports on key environmental factors to the 
Minister.206 Relevantly, under the WA Transport Regulations, a carrier must prepare 
a Radiation Protection Programme (RPP) which is assessed by the Radiological 
Council and ASNO.207 The RPP is considered by the PER because it addresses two 
key environmental factors: air quality and human health.208 
                                                 
201 A person who operates, uses, manufactures, stores, transports, sells, possesses, installs, services, 
maintains, repairs or otherwise deals with any radioactive substance, irradiating apparatus or 
electronic product must hold a licence: ibid s 25(1). 
202 ‘Radioactive substance’ is defined widely: Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 4 (definition of 
‘radioactive substance’). The definition is provided in full and explained in Chapter IV. 
203 Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 3.  
204 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 38(1). The Minister may also refer a proposal to the 
EPA if it appears that there is public concern about the likely effect of the proposal, if implemented, 
on the environment: Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 37B(1).  
205 Environ Australia Pty Ltd, Kintyre Uranium Project: Environmental Review and Management 
Programme (Cameco Australia Pty Ltd, November 2013); Vimy Resources, Mulga Rock Uranium 
Project: Public Environmental Review (December 2015); Toro Energy Ltd, Wiluna Uranium Project: 
Environmental Review and Management Programme (July 2011); Cameco Australia Pty Ltd, 
Yeelirrie Uranium Project: Public Environmental Review (2015).  
206 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 44.  
207 Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 5(1); 
Department of Mines and Petroleum, above n 173, 18. The RPP is also called a ‘Transport 
Management Plan’ (TMP). See page 27. 
208 There are 14 key environmental factors identified by the EPA for consideration. These are listed in 
Appendix C.  
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Air quality is addressed because of the risk that uranium dust may be released along 
transport routes during an accident,209 whereas human health specifically addresses the 
impact of radiation.210 In assessing human health, the EPA defers to the expert advice 
and technical documents produced by the Radiological Council, ARPANSA, and 
international organisations such as the ICRP.211 Consequently, an approved RPP is 
commonly accepted as evidence that the radiation risk posed by the transport of 
uranium oxide from a mining project is adequately managed.212  
(b) Commonwealth 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC 
Act) enables the Commonwealth to regulate the mining, use and disposal of uranium 
in Australia. The Commonwealth must assess any ‘nuclear action’ that has, will have, 
or is likely to have a significant impact on the environment.213 Identified nuclear 
actions includes the transport of radioactive waste products and the mining and milling 
of uranium ore.214 The transport of uranium ore or oxide is not identified as a nuclear 
action. Consequently, the EPBC Act does not specifically govern the transport of 
uranium oxide.215  
3 A Note on Dangerous Goods 
Radioactive materials (including uranium oxide) are classified as Class 7 dangerous 
goods under the international dangerous goods scheme.216 In WA, the Department of 
                                                 
209 See, eg, Environ Australia Pty Ltd, above n 205, 48. Note that the risk from uranium dust was 
considered in Chapter II.  
210 Environmental Protection Authority, Environmental Factor Guideline: Human Health (December 
2016) 2.  
211 Ibid 2.  
212 See, eg, Environmental Protection Authority, Report and Recommendations of the Environmental 
Protection Authority: Mulga Rock Uranium Project (Report No 1576, August 2016) 5.  
213 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 21. Only specific people 
and agencies must not take these nuclear actions – these include constitutional corporations, the 
Commonwealth, and Commonwealth agencies: see Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 21(1)–(3). 
214 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 22(1)(b), (d).  
215 In any event, because of a bilateral agreement between the Commonwealth and Western Australia, 
the EPA’s assessment would be considered in the place of a separate federal review. A bilateral 
agreement between Western Australia and the Commonwealth was made in 2014 pursuant to 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conversation Act 1999 (Cth) s 45. This means the 
Commonwealth can rely on the EPA’s environmental assessments when made at the Public 
Environmental Review level for its own approval decisions. See Bilateral Agreement Made Under 
Section 45 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) Relating to 
Environmental Assessment (Commonwealth of Australian and Western Australia) executed 3 October 
2014. 
216 See United Nations, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods: Model Regulations, 
vol 1 (19th ed, 2015) ch 2.7; Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, 
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, vol 1 
(United Nations, 2016) cl 2.2.7. See Appendix E for a list of all dangerous good classes.  
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Mines and Petroleum (DMP) administers the Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004 (WA) 
(DGS Act).217 In particular, the road transport of dangerous goods is regulated by the 
Dangerous Goods Safety (Road and Rail Transport of Non-explosives) Regulations 
2007 (WA) (DG Transport Regulations). The DG Transport Regulations implement 
the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (ADG 
Code). This is a national code given force by legislation in each State and Territory. 
The DG Transport Regulations implement mutual recognition provisions that 
harmonise the licensing requirements under the dangerous goods scheme across 
Australia.218 
Oddly, neither the DGS Act nor the ADG Code regulate the transport Class 7 materials 
unless that material is transported with another dangerous good.219 Instead, the DGS 
Act and the ADG Code defer to the Transport Code and International Regulations. In 
WA, Class 7 materials are regulated generally under the RSA.  
4 Non-Proliferation 
Once the uranium producer obtains state-based approvals, they must then approach the 
Commonwealth for separate permits from ASNO and the Department of Industry, 
Innovation and Science (DIIS).  
ASNO administers the NPS Act as well as Australia’s general uranium export 
policy.220 Australian uranium may only be exported for ‘peaceful non-explosive 
purposes under Australia’s network of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements’.221 
Part II of the NPS Act outlines the different permits in operation to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear material.222 Relevantly for the transport of uranium oxide, 
                                                 
217 The Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004 (WA) reflects the provisions of the National Transport 
Commission (Model Legislation – Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road or Rail) Regulations 2007 
(Cth).  
218 See Dangerous Goods Safety (Road and Rail Transport of Non-explosives) Regulations 2007 
(WA) pt 19.  
219 Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004 (WA) s 3(1); Dangerous Goods Safety (General) Regulations 
2007 (WA) reg 4(4); National Transport Commission, Australian Code for the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (7.5 ed, 2017) xxv, 41, 43, 139. For a list of the classes and 
divisions of dangerous goods regulated by the ADG Code, see Appendix E.  
220 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Uranium Export Policy (2017) 
<http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-
control/policies-agreements-treaties/Pages/australias-uranium-export-policy.aspx>. 
221 Ibid; Andrew Leask, ‘Uranium Mining: Safeguards and Non-Proliferation – A Comment’ [2006] 
AMPLA Yearbook 55; Andrew Leask and David Mason, ‘International Law and Australian 
Implementation of Controls on the Production and Export of Uranium Ore Concentrate’ (2007) 26 
Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 249. See Appendix A for a list of Australia’s bilateral 
agreements.  
222 Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) ss 9, 11. The definition of ‘nuclear material’ 
includes uranium oxide: Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) s 4(1), sch 3 art 99; Statute of 
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these include a permit to possess nuclear material223 and a permit to possess nuclear 
material for the purpose of transport.224 Both permits are issued subject to 
conditions.225 The permits may also require the producer to include a clause in 
commercial contracts that states the contract is subject to the relevant bilateral 
agreement.226 
5 Exports 
Once the ASNO permits are obtained, a uranium producer will discuss their export 
proposal with DIIS. 227 Uranium cannot be exported from Australia unless permission 
in writing has been granted by the relevant Minister.228 This permit is called a Mineral 
Export Permit.229 The Mineral Export Permit is usually granted for 10 years at a time, 
but additional approval is required for every individual shipment of uranium oxide.230 
D Practical Effects of the Legislative Scheme 
The timeline for obtaining transport permits for uranium can be thought of in terms of 
the domino effect. The Mineral Export Permit considers the ANSO permits, which 
considers the other permits granted in WA. The analysis of the human health and air 
quality factors by the EPA depends on the RPP assessed by the Radiological Council 
and ASNO.  
Practically, the process to obtain permits for transport ceases if the producer falls at 
any of these approval hurdles. If this occurs, the overall time to complete the approvals 
process is extended, impacting the time it takes to deliver the uranium oxide to 
overseas consumers. Table 6 outlines the estimated time taken to process and approve 
these licenses and permits at the WA and Commonwealth levels (assuming no 
                                                 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature 26 October 1956, [1957] ATS 11 
(entered into force 29 July 1957) art XX; Lisa Thiele, ‘Uranium Mining and Production: A Legal 
Perspective on Regulating an Important Resource’ (2013) 92(2) Nuclear Law Bulletin 9, 22. 
223  Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) s 13.  
224 Ibid s 16.  
225 These conditions include a specified transport route and security measures: Non-Proliferation 
(Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) ss 13(3), 16(3). 
226 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, above n 220.  
227 Uranium Industry and Nuclear Section, Application Information for Uranium Oxide Concentrate 
Export Permissions (Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, December 2015) 
<http://industry.gov.au/resource/Mining/AustralianMineralCommodities/Uranium/Pages/default.aspx
> 1.  
228 Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth) reg 9. The prohibition applies to all nuclear 
material. This is specified in Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth) sch 7(1)(a)–(d). 
229 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, Mineral Export Controls (2017) 
<https://industry.gov.au/resource/Mining/AustralianMineralCommodities/Pages/MineralExportContro
ls.aspx>. 
230 Uranium Industry and Nuclear Section, above n 227, 2. 
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additional information is required by the regulator and no appeals are undertaken). 
WA uranium producers face an initial approval process of approximately 2 ½ years. 
This does not include the additional permits required by the NT or SA.  
Table 6: Estimated approval times for transport-related uranium oxide permit/approvals231 
Approval/permit type Agency/Department Estimated time of approval 
Licence to deal with 
radioactive substances 
Radiological Council232 21 days 
 
Radiation Management 
Plan (or RPP) 
30 days 
Environmental approval 
under EP Act  
EPA Minimum 46–61 weeks233  
Preparation of the 
Environmental Review 
Document for PER by the 
proponent may take an 
additional 12 months234 
Environmental approval 
under EPBC Act 
Department of the 
Environment and Energy 
20 days (decision to assess)235 
30 days (assessment under 
bilateral agreement after 
receiving assessment report)236 
Permit to possess nuclear 
material 
ASNO 42 days  
Permit to transport nuclear 
material 
14 days 
Mineral Export Permit DIIS 60 days 
 
These licences and permits are not granted for an indefinite period or even the life of 
the project. A producer must renew the licence or permit when it expires. If there is a 
delay in reissuing the approval, the shipment of uranium oxide overseas is also 
delayed. A licence under the RSA is issued for one to three years.237 Any amendments 
to the RPP must also be approved by the Radiological Council and ASNO.238 Further, 
                                                 
231 Unless otherwise indicated, this Table’s information is extracted from Department of Mines and 
Petroleum, Uranium Approvals Spreadsheet (18 February 2016) 
<http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Community-Education/Uranium-Approvals.xlsx>. 
232 Note that the Radiological Council only convenes once every month: Radiological Council, 
Members of the Radiological Council (23 August 2013) 
<http://www.radiologicalcouncil.wa.gov.au/Pages/CouncilMembers.html>. See also Radiation Safety 
Act 1975 (WA) s 16(7): ‘the Council shall hold meetings at such times and places as the Council 
determines’. 
233 Environmental Protection Authority, Environmental Impact Assessment (Part IV Divisions 1 and 
2) Procedures Manual 2016 (December 2016, ver 1.1) 46. See Appendix D for a breakdown of the 
timeline in the EPA’s environmental impact assessment.  
234 Department of Mines and Petroleum, Uranium Approvals Spreadsheet, above n 231. 
235 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 75(5).  
236 Ibid s 130(1B)(a).  
237 Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 37(1).  
238 Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 5(1)(b); 
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Form ASO113: Application to Approve a New 
(or a Variation to a Current) Transport Plan (21 January 2011) (Form ASO113). The Radiological 
Council and ASNO do not state how long this approval process takes. However, ASNO must receive 
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DIIS requires approval for every individual shipment of uranium oxide.239 
Approximately 50 shipments occur each year between the four operating uranium 
mines in Australia.240 On average, this means that each producer obtains 12 individual 
approvals for shipments from DIIS annually. 
Another practical factor to consider is the cost of each permit. Some costs are directly 
quantifiable. For instance, the annual fee for a licence to deal with radioactive 
substances is $70 and the triennial fee is $140.241 Further, the base cost of environment 
assessment is estimated at $18,146.242 Overall, these costs are huge. For instance, 
Vimy Resources reported in their 2016 Annual Report that they had drawdown $7.5 
million to maintain the progress on the Definitive Feasibility Study on Mulga Rock.243 
These are examples of recurring and one-off compliance costs.244 Other costs to 
producers may include administrative costs (ie complying with licence conditions), 
training and education costs to workers and commercial losses (eg if a shipment is 
delayed because a permit has not been obtained).245 
E Concluding Remarks 
The legislative scheme governing the transport of uranium oxide is complex. An 
Australian producer must obtain approval from not just one, but at least five separate 
agencies in relation to transport alone. These agencies may issue multiple permits (as 
demonstrated by ASNO and DIIS) which are accompanied by additional costs, 
timeframes and compliance obligations. These factors contribute to the regulatory and 
cost burden facing uranium producers Australia-wide.  
WA producers find themselves in a much more diabolical position than their interstate 
counterparts. This is because they must also contend with the regulatory regimes of 
                                                 
the TMP within 10 days for modified plans and 20 days prior to a new transport route being used, and 
the Radiological Council requires the RPP within three months of the person becoming a carrier: see 
Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 5(3); Form 
ASO113. 
239 Uranium Industry and Nuclear Section, above n 227, 2. 
240 See Minerals Council of Australia, Australia’s Uranium Industry: Transport (2017) 
<http://www.minerals.org.au/resources/uranium/transport>. 
241 Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) sch XV pt 1 item 4(1). 
242 This is under a bilateral agreement under the EPBC Act: Department of the Environment and 
Energy, Cost Recovery Implementation Statement: Cost Recovery for Environmental Assessment 
under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 – 2016–17 (2016) 28.  
243 A Definitive Feasibility Study asseses whether the uranium can be mined economically and is 
included as part of the environmental impact assessment: Vimy Resources Limited, Annual Report 
2016, 68. 
244 Deloitte, above n 51, 79. 
245 Ibid; Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review, above n 120, 29.  
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either SA or the NT to get the uranium oxide to export. The resultant issues facing WA 






IV A COMPARISON OF THE RADIATION PROTECTION LEGISLATION OF THE 
NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
A Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the complex legislative scheme for the transport of 
uranium oxide at the WA and Commonwealth levels. It introduced the RSA and its 
subordinate legislation governing radiation protection and radioactive materials 
transport in WA. WA uranium oxide must travel interstate for export. This means WA 
producers are also subject to the radiation protection legislation in the NT or SA. This 
chapter introduces the radiation protection schemes of the NT, SA and WA. It first 
outlines previous attempts to achieve national uniformity in radiation protection. It 
then explores inconsistency between the three jurisdictions by exploring definitions, 
licensing, reporting, carrier and consignor obligations, and penalties.  
Several Acts and Regulations are repeatedly referred to in this chapter. These are 
abbreviated in Table 7 for ease of reference.  
Table 7: Abbreviations for NT, SA and WA Radiation Protection Legislation 
Jurisdiction Act/Regulation Abbreviation 
Northern Territory Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging 
and Transport) Act 1980 
NT Act 
Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging 
and Transport) Regulations 1980 
NT Regulations 
South Australia Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 SA Act 
Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of 
Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2003 
SA Transport 
Regulations 
Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising 
Radiation) Regulations 2000 
SA General 
Regulations 
Western Australia Radiation Safety Act 1975  RSA 
Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive 
Substances) Regulations 2002 
WA Transport 
Regulations 
Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983  WA General 
Regulations 
B Australian Attempts to Achieve Uniformity in Radiation Protection Laws 
The transport of radioactive materials warrants special regulation because of the risk 
posed to human health and safety.246 It is regulated under public health law, and more 
specifically, radiation protection laws, because of that special risk. The States have 
legislative responsibility for the majority of public health issues including radiation.247 
                                                 
246 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, National Competition Policy Review 
of Radiation Protection Legislation: Final Report (May 2001) (ARPANSA Competition Review) 
22–4.  
247 See Ian Bidmeade and Chris Reynolds, Public Health Law in Australia: Its Current State and 
Future Directions (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997) 4, 6; Brian R Opeskin, ‘The Architecture of 
Public Health Law Reform: Harmonisation of Law in a Federal System’ (1998) 22 Melbourne 
University Law Review 337. 
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Consequently, 11 ‘competent authorities’ regulate radiation protection and the 
transport of radioactive materials across Australia (see Table 8).  
Table 8: Australian Competent Authorities for Radioactive Materials Transport 
Jurisdiction Competent Authority 
Mode of transport: Road, rail and inland waterways 
Commonwealth ARPANSA 
Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) 
ACT Radiation Council – ACT Health Directorate 
New South Wales Environment Protection Authority 
Northern Territory Work Health Authority – Department of Business (for 
the transport of radioactive ores and concentrates) 
Department of Health (other radioactive materials) 
Queensland Department of Health 
South Australia Minister for Sustainability, Environment and 
Conservation – Environment Protection Authority 
Tasmania Director of Public Health – Department of Health and 
Human Services 
Victoria Secretary, Department of Health 
Western Australia Radiological Council 
Mode of transport: air and sea (international and interstate) 
Air Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) 
Sea Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) 
 
Various attempts have been made since the 1950s to achieve uniformity in radiation 
protection laws.248 Two recent important developments are the establishment of the 
ARPANSA and the development of the National Directory for Radiation Protection 
(NDRP). 
1 ARPANSA 
ARPANSA was established in 1998 by the Australian Radiation Protection and 
Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (Cth) (ARPANS Act). Prior to this enactment, the use of 
ionising radiation in Commonwealth facilities was unregulated.249 The ARPANS Act 
tasks the ARPANSA CEO with promoting uniformity in radiation protection and 
nuclear safety policy across Australia.250 It also establishes the Radiation Health and 
Safety Advisory Council (RHSAC),251 Radiation Health Committee (RHC),252 and 
Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC).253 In particular, the RHC is responsible for 
                                                 
248 Bidmeade and Reynolds, above n 247, 64.  
249 See R C Smart, ‘Radiation Protection in Australia: A Thirty Year Perspective’ (2007) 30(3) 
Australasian Physical & Engineering Sciences in Medicine 155, 156.  
250 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (Cth) s 15(1)(a).  
251 Ibid ss 19–21. 
252 Ibid ss 22–24. 
253 Ibid ss 25–27. 
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developing policies and publications to promote uniform national standards for 
radiation protection.254  
2 National Directory for Radiation Protection 
The RHC developed the NDRP following endorsement in 1999 by the Australian 
Health Ministers’ Conference. The NDRP has been amended six times since its initial 
publication in 2004. The NDRP is a broad document that aims to ‘provide an overall 
agreed framework for radiation safety … together with clear regulatory statements to 
be adopted by the Commonwealth, States and Territories’.255 It outlines agreed 
principles for radiation protection,256 uniform regulatory elements,257 and guidelines 
for best practice.258  
The NDRP is not template or model legislation – this option was rejected by the RHC 
because there was no evidence that legislative inconsistency negatively affected 
human health or the environment.259 Instead, the NDRP is a guiding framework. 
Consequently, inconsistent legislative provisions for radiation protection have 
developed in each jurisdiction. It is telling that not even the NDRP’s primary objective 
is uniformly implemented in each jurisdiction. All radiation protection legislation must 
promote the protection of the health and safety of people and the environment from 
the harmful effects of ionising and non-ionising radiation. 260  But between the NT, SA 
and WA, this objective is only expressly included in the SA Act.261 A consistent 
objective is important because the ‘effectiveness of all other provisions in the 
legislation and the feasibility of policy options for radiation safety administration will 
be judged against [it].’262  
                                                 
254 Ibid s 23(1)(b).  
255 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, National Directory for Radiation 
Protection (2014) (National Directory for Radiation Protection) Foreword; J Koperski, ‘Towards 
Uniformity of Radiation Protection Legislation in a Multi-Jurisdictional Country – the Australian 
Experience’ (Paper presented at 11th International Congress of the international Radiation Protection 
Association, Madrid, Spain, 23–28 May 2004) 5.  
256 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, Part A.  
257 Ibid Part B.  
258 Ibid Part C.  
259 Although it was recognised that the current legislative scheme was administratively inefficient. 
However, ARPANSA believes the NDRP is a stepping stone to template or mirror legislation and 
must be given time to develop: ARPANSA Competition Review, above n 246, 38–9. 
260 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, cl 2.1.  
261 Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA) s 23(1). But see Radiation Protection Act 2004 
(NT) s 3 and Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 10(1). 
262 ARPANSA Competition Review, above n 246, 18.  
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The remainder of this Chapter will compare the main provisions of the radiation 
protection legislation in the NT, SA and WA.  
C Comparing Radiation Protection Legislation 
ARPANSA and the NDRP can only promote national uniformity for radiation 
protection; the actual regulation and enforcement is the responsibility of individual 
states and territories. The freedom to legislate is broad in the absence of model 
legislation or binding principles. Consequently, WA producers must comply with 
different requirements across jurisdictions when transporting uranium oxide for 
export. 
This part examines six major areas encompassed by the radiation protection legislation 
of the NT, SA and WA. These are: (1) definitions; (2) licensing; (3) dose limits; (4) 
reporting; (5) carrier and consignor obligations; and (6) criminal penalties. The 
consistency of the legislation and any problems arising from inconsistency is assessed. 
1 Definitions 
(a) Legislative Provisions 
Varying definitions are confusing and impose additional costs on businesses working 
across jurisdictions.263 Before assessing other areas of inconsistency in the legislation, 
it is helpful to first examine how each jurisdiction defines ‘radioactive material’ or 
‘radioactive substance’ (and by extension, uranium oxide).264As a baseline, the NDRP 
defines ‘radioactive material’ as any material that emits ionising radiation 
spontaneously.265  
In WA, there is a single broad definition of ‘radioactive substance’: 
Radioactive substance means any substances, whether natural or artificial, and 
whether in the form of a solid, a liquid, a gas, or a vapour, or any compound or mixture, 
including any article that has been manufactured or subjected to any artificial 
treatment or process, which consists of or contains more than the maximum 
                                                 
263 Productivity Commission, Identifying and Evaluating Regulation Reforms (Research Report, 
December 2011, Commonwealth of Australia) 14, appendix F.  
264 The terms ‘radioactive material’ and ‘radioactive substance’ are used interchangeably between the 
radiation protection legislation of the NT, SA and WA.  
265 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, Glossary. Radioactive material is 
exempted from this definition where is has an activity concentration less than the prescribed amount 
or an activity concentration greater than the prescribed amount but causes an annual effective dose to 
an individual member of the public of less than 10 Sv: NDRP cl 3.2.2. The prescribed activity 
concentration for natural uranium is one Bq per gram: NDRP sch 4.  
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prescribed concentration of any radioactive element, whether natural or 
artificial.266 
Relevantly, a natural radioactive substance of an equivalent specific radioactivity not 
exceeding 0.03 MQB/kg or a quantity of natural uranium not exceeding 4.0 MBq are 
exempt from the definition.267 
In SA, a radioactive substance is: 
A substance occurring naturally or artificially produced (whether solid, liquid or 
gaseous) which consists of or contains any radioactive element or compound whether 
natural or artificial and includes any device or thing that contains such a substance.268 
This definition is similar to WA’s, but does not reference vapours or mixtures. This is 
significant for the legislation’s scope because vapours are distinct from gases, and 
mixtures are distinct from compounds.269 In any event, ‘radioactive ore’ is defined 
separately as an ‘ore or mineral containing more than the prescribed concentrations of 
a radioactive element or compound.’270 The prescribed concentration is 35 kBq/kg.271 
The NT’s definitions are straightforward. This is because radiation protection laws are 
separated into two Acts. The NT Act governs the packaging and transport of 
radioactive ores and concentrates, whereas the Radiation Protection Act 2004 (NT) 
applies to all other radioactive materials.272 The NT Act defines ‘radioactive material’ 
as ‘uranium ores and concentrates, uranium oxide (U3O8) and any other prescribed 
radioactive ore and concentrate with a specific activity greater than 0.002 microcuries 
per gram’.273 The NT Act does not apply to radioactive material with a total measured 
dose rate less than 0.75 millirem per hour.274 
                                                 
266 Radiation Safety Act 1974 (WA) s 4 (emphasis added).  
267 Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) reg 5(1)(a), (b).  
268 Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA) s 5. 
269 A mixture refers to two distinct chemical substances, whereas a compound is formed by a chemical 
reaction and cannot be separated by physical means: John Daintith (ed), A Dictionary of Chemistry 
(Oxford University Press, 6th ed, 2008).  
270 Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA) s 5. 
271 Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) reg 6. The 
radioactive ore must also have a total activity more than or equal to one, calculated using a specific 
formula set out in Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) reg 
6. This total activity is dependent on the unique characteristics of the material being measured at the 
time.  
272 Radiation Protection Act 2004 (NT) s 9. The Radiation Protection Act 2004 (NT) s 6(3) defines 
radioactive material as material that (a) spontaneously emits ionising radiation as a consequence of 
nuclear transformations; and (b) has or exceeds the activity or activity concentration prescribed by the 
Regulations. 
273 Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and Transport) Act 1980 (NT) s 3. 
274 Ibid s 4(2). This is measured at one metre. The radioactive material must also have parent 




There is little consistency between the different Acts. The NT Act is most similar to 
the NDRP definition because it exempts material based on both activity and exposure 
rates,275 whereas SA and WA calculate exemptions based solely on activity. The 
NDRP definition (and therefore the NT Act definition) is preferred because the NDRP 
was developed by the RHC (comprised of representatives from each jurisdiction) 
operating under ARPANSA and approved by the Australian Health Ministers.276 It 
also reflects international best practice.277   
However, the NT Act is not perfect. It uses the outdated measurements of ‘rem’ and 
‘curie’ which have been replaced by the Sievert and Becquerel respectively under the 
International System of Units (SI).278 Australia has adopted the SI measurements as 
legal units of measurement,279 consistently with international organisations the IAEA, 
ICRP and the International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements 
(ICRU)280 In fact, the ICRU recommended that the rem and curie be abandoned in 
1975 in favour of the SI system.281 In practice, SI units must be converted into rem 
and curie for the NT Act to make sense. Conversion is not ideal because calculation 
mistakes can occur, especially when each container and drum will have its own unique 
level of activity. Further, the SI units are used by the International Regulations and 
Transport Code.  
In any event, there is no consistency between converted exemption levels in each 
jurisdiction (see Table 9). Consequently, a material may be regulated in one 
jurisdiction, but excluded in another. Despite this, it is unlikely that a uranium oxide 
consignment will ever be exempt under these definitions, as a single drum has a 
contained activity of 10,000 MBq.282 However, a uranium producer is still required to 
                                                 
275 See 44 n 266. 
276 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, Foreword; Australian Radiation 
Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Radiation Health Committee (6 March 2017) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/AboutUs/Committees/rhc.cfm>.  
277 See, eg, Valentin, above n 39.  
278 Bureau International des Poids et Mesures, above n 84, 152; National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, NIST Guide for the Use of the International System of Units (2016, US Department of 
Commerce) para 5.2.  
279 See National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) and National Measurement Regulations 1999 (Cth)  
sch 1 pt 4.  
280 See, eg, International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements, Fundamental Quantities 
and Units for Ionizing Radiation (Revised) (ICRU Report No. 85, October 2011) 7.  
281 H O Wyckoff, A Allisy and K Lidén, ‘The New Special Names of SI Units in the Field of Ionising 
Radiations’ (1975) 20(6) Physics in Medicine and Biology 1029, 1030.  
282 Ibid; Uranium Council, Guide to Safe Transport of Uranium Oxide Concentrate (Department of 
Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2012) 14. See Table 3 in Chapter II. 
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calculate the maximum activity of the radioactive material (eg for transport 
documentation),283 and if crossing into NT, convert that into rem and curie. These 
inconsistencies demonstrate, at a threshold level, the hurdles facing WA producers.   
Table 9: Exemption levels based on activity rates284 
 Northern Territory South Australia Western Australia 
Activity 0.000024 Ci 35 kBq/kg 0.03 MBq/kg  
Conversion 
to MBq 
0.888 MBq 0.035 MBq 0.03 MBq 
 
2 Licensing 
A licence must be obtained for ‘radioactive material’ caught by the radiation protection 
legislation in each jurisdiction.285 The NDRP requires that a responsible person who 
seeks to possess or be in control of a radiation source must hold an authorisation to 
possess issued by the competent authority.286 This is the extent of the requirement – 
the States and Territories otherwise have complete freedom to legislate the licence 
process and licence conditions. 
(a) Western Australia 
The scope for licensing in WA is very broad: 
Unless he does so under, and in accordance with any conditions, restrictions or 
limitations imposed in relation to, a licence under this Act of which he is the holder 
or by virtue of which he is acting under the direction and supervision of the holder, 
and which authorises him so to do, a person who operates or uses, or manufactures, 
stores, transports, sells, possesses, installs, services, maintains, repairs, or otherwise 
deals with any radioactive substance, irradiating apparatus or electronic product where 
no exemption granted pursuant to this Act applies, commits an offence.287  
Two types of licenses are issued under the RSA. The first are licenses authorising 
people to operate or use radioactive substances, irradiating apparatus or electronic 
products for a specified purpose (such as medical diagnosis).288 The second are 
                                                 
283 See Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Road/Rail/Inland Waterways 
Consignor’s Declaration for Dangerous Goods – Class 7 Radioactive Material (September 2009) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/pubs/rps/cons_dec.pdf>.  
284 Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 14.  
285 The producer should also have permits to possess and transport nuclear material from ASNO and a 
Mineral Export Permit from DIIS: see Chapter III.  
286 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, cl 4.1. 
287 Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 25(1) (emphasis added).  
288 Ibid s 26(1)(a).  
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licences authorising people to deal with radioactive substances in other ways, 
including transport.289  
The licence is issued to a natural person because the proposed licensee must undertake 
and pass a recognised training course and examination in radioactive materials 
transport.290 However, a person ‘acting under the direction and supervision’ of the 
licensee is also authorised to deal with the material. 291 The licensee must provide an 
appropriate level of direction and supervision,292 and ensure their workers are familiar 
with the regulations and basic radiation safety practices.293 
The licence may relate to several matters,294 so a licence for transport may also 
authorise possession and storage.295 However, a transport company (through its 
proposed licensee) must obtain a separate licence. 296 Individual drivers do not have to 
obtain separate licences to transport uranium oxide because they act under the 
direction and supervision of the transporter’s licensee.  
(b) Northern Territory 
The NT’s licensing scheme is straightforward. The owner of the material, who intends 
to transport radioactive materials, or their agent,297 applies in the prescribed form for 
the grant of a licence.298 The transporter and its drivers do not need to apply for a 
separate licence because the licence conditions will specify who will transport the 
material.299 
                                                 
289 Ibid s 26(1)(b).  
290 Radiological Council, Transport of Radioactive Substances (2012) 
<http://www.radiologicalcouncil.wa.gov.au/Pages/Transport.html>; Radiological Council, Radiation 
Safety Act – First Application for a Licence / Exemption from Licence – Radioactive Substances 
<http://www.radiologicalcouncil.wa.gov.au/PDF/forms/LS%20package.pdf>.  
291 Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 25(1). 
292 Ibid. Regulations may specify the requisite degree of direction and supervision that is required in 
the circumstance: ibid s 25(2). See, eg, Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) regs 17(4), 
23(4)(a), 27(1), (5), 28(2).   
293 Radiological Council, Transport of Radioactive Substances, above n 290.  
294 Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 26(3). 
295 Note that if the producer holds a licence to use the radioactive substance, they do not need to 
obtain a separate licence for transport: Radiological Council, Transport of Radioactive Substances, 
above n 290.  
296 Ibid.  
297 The owner cannot transport or cause or allow the transport of radioactive materials unless he has an 
agent who is a natural person resident in the Northern Territory and employed by the owner: 
Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and Transport) Act 1980 (NT) 9(1).  
298 Ibid ss 12(1), 13(a), sch (Form 1). 
299 Ibid s 14(2)(b).  
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(c) South Australia 
The SA Act has multiple licence provisions (see Table 10). There is no specific licence 
for the transport of radioactive substances under this scheme. Instead, conditions for 
transport are usually included in a producer’s mining licence (s 24) or facilities licence 
(s 29A). This is obviously not applicable to WA producers because their mines do not 
operate in SA.  
Table 10: Main licence provisions under the SA Act 
SA Act 
provision Licence Description 
23A Licence to test for 
developmental purposes 
Developmental testing operations in mining 
or mineral processing 
24 Licence to carry out mining or 
mineral processing 
Operations for or in relation to mining or 
mineral processing 
28 Licence to use or handle 
radioactive substances 
Natural persons using or handling 
radioactive substances 
29A Facilities licence Facilities where a radiation source is 
produced, used, stored etc 
33A Licence to possess a radiation 
source 
Persons in possession of a radiation source 
 
On its face, the licence to use or handle radioactive substances under SA Act s 28 
seems applicable. However, that licence only applies to natural persons300 and 
excludes members of the public who handle radioactive substances packaged for 
transport.301 
Instead, the transporter must obtain a licence under s 33A to possess a radiation 
source.302 The meaning of ‘possession’ causes some difficulties. Practically, if a 
producer has contracted a separate transport company to transport uranium oxide from 
the mine to port, then it is the transport company that is in possession and would 
require the licence. The SA Act does not define ‘possession’ and the Second Reading 
Speech provides no further insight.303 However, the SA Act is currently under review. 
The draft Bill provides that a person has possession of a radioactive source where it is 
                                                 
300 Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA) s 28(1). 
301 Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2013 reg 124(b)(v). 
302 Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA) s 33A(1). ‘Radiation source’ includes an unsealed 
radioactive source (which is a radioactive substance that is not a sealed radioactive source): Radiation 
Protection and Control Act 1982 (SA) s 5. Under this definition, uranium oxide is an unsealed 
radioactive source, although the term is commonly used to describe substances used in a laboratory.  
303 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 16 September 2010, 1287–97 (K O 
Foley). Section 33A commenced in 2012 under the Statutes Amendment Budget (2010) Act 2010 (SA) 
s 75. Explanatory Memoranda are not issued separately for Bills in South Australia; rather a clause-
by-clause explanation is given in the Second Reading Speech: Patrick O’Neill, ‘‘Was there an EM?’: 
Explanatory Memoranda in the Commonwealth Parliament 1901–82’ (2005) 13(1) Australian Law 
Librarian 7, 21.    
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under their control (whether or not the source is in their custody), but not where the 
overall control of the source is the responsibility of another person or if the source is 
being transported by the person.304 Under the draft Bill then, the producer acquires the 
licence, rather than the transport company.305 
(d) Summary 
A WA producer requires a licence under either the NT Act or SA Act to transport 
uranium oxide to the export port. Including the Commonwealth and WA permits, this 
equates to at least seven different approvals solely for transport. This increases the cost 
of doing business for WA producers.  
Quantifiable costs include the licence application fee. In SA, this could be up to 
$1,906.00 (plus other fees on licence renewal).306 Other costs are incurred finding a 
transporter willing to transport the material. This may be difficult as the transporter 
incurs licence costs themselves (because they are not covered under the producer’s 
licence) and through additional training requirements. This may lead to delays in 
shipment,307 which has consequences under the contract between the producer and 
overseas consumer. Unquantifiable costs are the time and effort exerted navigating and 
satisfying the requirements of duplicate licence conditions, reporting obligations and 
other legislative duties throughout the various channels in the chain.  
3 Dose Limits 
An RPP establishes a documented framework of controls for transport that satisfies 
radiation protection requirements specified by the Transport Code and the 
International Regulations.308 The RPP measures must be commensurate with the 
                                                 
304 Radiation Protection and Control Bill 2013 (SA) cl 4(4)(a), (b); Environment Protection Authority 
(SA), Radiation Protection and Control Bill 2013 and Explanatory Report (October 2013) 8, 15.  
305 Note that a possession licence is also not required where the radiation source is only in possession 
for the purposes of transportation and is a category 4 or category 5 radiation source under the Code of 
Practice for the Security of Radioactive Sources (2007): Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising 
Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) reg 188(f). A category 4 radioactive source has an activity between 
0.01 GBq and 1 GBq. A category 5 radioactive source has an activity below 0.01 GBq. As a single 
drum of UOC has an activity of 10 GBq, a consignment of UOC will not be excluded under this 
provision.  
306 Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) sch 4 cl 
10(3)(a).The RPP is also known as a TMP or Radiation Mangement Plan under domestic legislation. 
307 See page 73. 
308 International Atomic Energy Agency, Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of 
Radioactive Material (Safety Guide No. TS–G–1.3, 2007) cl 2.1. 
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‘magnitude and likelihood of the radiation exposures’,309 and should therefore comply 
with maximum dose and exposure limits. 
The NDRP dose limits represent best practice because they reflect the 
recommendations of the ICRP and ARPANSA’s Recommendations for Limiting 
Exposure to Ionising Radiation.310 The ICRP’s recommendations have developed over 
90 years and reflect the current research on ionising radiation protection.311 The NDRP 
dose limits are outlined in Table 11.  
Table 11: NDRP Dose Limits 
Application Dose Limits 
 Occupational Public 
Effective Dose 20 mSv per year, averaged 
over period of 5 consecutive 
years312 
1 mSv in a year 
Annual equivalent dose   
Lens of the eye 150 mSv 15 mSv 
Skin 500 mSv 50 mSv 
Hands and feet 500 mSv NA  
 
SA adopts the NDRP dose limits,313 but additionally requires that the maximum annual 
effective dose cannot exceed 50 mSv in any single year.314  
The NT Act is silent.315 However, as the NT Act adopts the Transport Code, 316 the 
radiation measures outlined there are applicable (see Chapter V).  
WA only adopts the NDRP’s effective dose limits, but introduces additional time 
periods from which dose exposure is calculated (see Table 12).317 
                                                 
309 Ibid cl 3.4. 
310 See Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) reg 14; National 
Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, sch 1; Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear 
Safety Agency, Fundamentals: Protection Against Ionising Radiation, above n 86; Valentin, above n 
39. 
311 Valentin, above n 39, 36-7; Warren K Sinclair, ‘Radiation Protection Recommendations on Dose 
Limits: The Role on the NCRP and the ICRP and Future Developments’ (1995) 31(2) International 
Journal of Radiation Oncology*Biology*Physics 387.  
312 The fetus or embryo of a pregnant employee is afforded same level of protection as a member of 
the public: National Directory of Radiation Protection, above n 255, sch 1 note 2.  
313 Radiation Protection and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) reg 13.  
314 Ibid reg 13(1)(a)(ii).  
315 Note that the Radiation Protection Regulations 2007 (NT) reg 8 adopts the dose limits in the 
NDRP.  
316 Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and Transport) Act 1980 (NT) s 25(1); Minister 
for Justice and Attorney-General (NT), ‘Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and 
Transport) Act – Revocation of Adoption and Adoption of Code of Practice’ in Northern Territory, 
Government Gazette, No G28, 11 July 2012, 5.  
317 Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) sch I.  
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Table 12: Western Australian Dose Limits 
 Radiation Worker318 Public 
Annually (averaged over 5 
years) 
20 mSv per year 1 mSv 
12 months 50 mSv 5 mSv 
Less than 12 months, more 
than one month 
50 mSv ratio of weeks to 52 
weeks319 
NA 
Less than one month 1/12 of 50 mSv (4.2 mSv) NA 
One hour NA 20 mSv 
Seven days NA 250 mSv 
 
The dose limit inconsistencies are problematic from a safety perspective. This is 
because individual jurisdictions have modified international best practice without 
justification. Such inconsistencies raise less concerns for the business costs of WA 
producers. This is because WA producers are relieved from calculating the additional 
time periods (identified in Table 12) when they cross into SA or the NT.  
4 Reporting Obligations 
The NDRP requires competent authorities to report radiation incidents to ARPANSA 
for inclusion in the ARIR.320 A radiation incident is: 
Any unintended or ill-advised event when using … radioactive substances, which 
results in, or has the potential to result in, an exposure to radiation to any person or 
the environment, outside the range of that normally expected for a particular 
practice including events resulting from operator error, equipment failure, or the 
failure of management systems that warranted investigations.321  
The NDRP requires excessive radiation doses to workers or members of the public, 
damage to packages during transport, and packages transported without the required 
documentation to be reported. 322 In order for a competent authority to report to ARIR, 
their legislation must compel the people dealing with the radioactive substances to 
report in the first instance.  
                                                 
318 The dose limit for a pregnant radiation worker who has notified her employer that she is pregnant 
is 2 mSv to the surface of her abdomen: Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) sch I(2).  
319 For example, the ratio of 12 weeks to 52 weeks is 3/13. Multiplied by 50, the dose limit for 12 
weeks is 11.5 mSv.  
320 The frequency of transport incidents, as recorded in the ARIR, were outlined in Chapter II.  
321 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, sch 13 (emphasis added).  
322 Ibid.  
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(a) Western Australia 
In WA, the loss or theft of radioactive substances must be reported to the Radiological 
Council,323 along with ‘abnormal or unplanned’ radiation exposures.324 Further, a 
common licence condition requires the Radiological Council to be notified if there is 
any incident involving the transport of radioactive material where damage or loss to a 
package is caused or suspected. 325  
(b) South Australia 
In SA, reporting obligations are split between drivers and ‘specified employers’.326 
Specified employers must report ‘radiation emergencies’, including the loss and theft 
of radioactive substances and radiation accidents where control is not fully regained.327 
A driver must report to the carrier, consignor and Minister if, during transportation: 
• a package is lost, wrongfully interfered with, or damaged;328 
• radioactive material leaks from the package;329 or 
• the vehicle is involved in an accident that results in, or is likely to result in, 
damage to the package or a leak of radioactive material from the package.330 
(c) Northern Territory 
The NT’s reporting obligations are wider. The person in charge of a vehicle must 
report if:331 
• the vehicle carrying radioactive material is involved in an accident or is subject 
to unusual delay;332 and 
                                                 
323 Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) reg 14.  
324 Ibid reg 19A(2)(a). Abnormal and unplanned radiation exposures are outlined in reg 19A(1).  
325 Radiological Council, Radiation Safety Act – Conditions, Restrictions and Limitations (Section 36) 
– Transport  <http://www.radiologicalcouncil.wa.gov.au/PDF/conditions/Con21.pdf>.  
326 A specified employer includes someone who employs a radiation worker. A radiation worker 
includes a person directly involved in the transport of a radioactive substance: Radiation Protection 
and Control (Ionising Radiation) Regulations 2015 (SA) reg 3(1).  
327 Ibid reg 31(1).  
328 Ibid reg 7(1)(a).  
329 Ibid reg 7(1)((b).  
330 Ibid reg 7(1)(c).  
331 Once reported, an inspector will report any danger to a person or damage to the environment to the 
Chief Inspector and Chief Health Officer: Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and 
Transport) Act 1980 (NT) s 22(1).  
332 Ibid s 20(1)(a). 
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• environmental contamination or danger to any person has, or may occur, 
because of a leakage or spillage of the radioactive material from a container 
or package.333 
(d) Summary 
The NDRP’s reporting requirements are, to an extent, risk-based; only incidents 
outside the range ‘normally expected’ need to be reported. This approach is criticised 
as ambiguous because it does not refer to clear guidelines on what is reportable by 
reference to significant concentrations or volumes of exposure.334 It is unclear whether 
what is normally expected should be measured by dose limits, or by something else, 
such as activity limits (ie in Becquerals) or by the material type.  
In any event, the NDRP requirements have not been uniformly implemented in the 
jurisdictions, leading to different reporting obligations across borders. For example, in 
both SA and WA, if a vehicle carrying radioactive material is involved in an accident, 
that accident must be reported if it has, or is likely to have, caused a release of the 
radioactive material. This does not recognise that a release may be minor and pose no 
radiological threat. The NT goes further – an accident involving a vehicle carrying 
radioactive material must be reported, whether or not there was a release. These 
situations do not acknowledge that some radioactive materials pose a very low level 
of risk, including uranium oxide.335 But on the other hand, the NT Act requirements 
are a ‘bright-line rule’ and although wide-reaching, are easy to satisfy.  
5 Other Obligations on Carriers and Consignors 
Every jurisdiction implements the Transport Code to govern the technical 
requirements of radioactive materials transport. Different versions of the Transport 
Code are in force in different jurisdictions,336 so producers and transporters face 
slightly different obligations interstate. The differences between Transport Code 
editions are analysed in the following Chapter. 
The SA and WA regulations highlight certain Transport Code obligations and attach 
criminal penalties to them for non-compliance. In both jurisdictions, it is an offence to 
                                                 
333 Ibid s 20(1)(b).  
334 Deloitte, above n 51, 63.  
335 See Chapter II.  
336 The Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2008) applies in the NT and WA, while 
the Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2001) applies in SA. The Commonwealth 
applies the 2014 version.  
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interfere with the contents of a consignment or its labels or markings without the 
permission of the carrier, consignor or competent authority.337 In WA, it is an offence 
to display a radioactive warning label on a package, overpack or freight container that 
does not contain radioactive material.338 Further, in SA, a carrier must ensure, at all 
times during carriage, that each package is stowed and secured in a manner that means 
the package will remain in position despite the vehicle’s movements, and is kept away 
from heavy articles that are likely to cause damage to the package, and that the package 
does not project beyond the periphery of the vehicle.339 
Both jurisdictions also prescribe an overarching obligation to comply with the 
Transport Code. However, subtle differences in the application of Transport Code may 
cause inadvertent breaches. For instance, the Transport Code provides that only items 
necessary for the use of the radioactive material may be transported with it.340 In SA, 
this is the consignor’s obligation, whereas it falls to both the carrier and consignor in 
WA.341 This means that if a package contains unauthorised equipment in SA, the 
consignor would be liable (even if the carrier was responsible for the item).   
Some domestic requirements also exceed those imposed by the Transport Code. For 
example, under the Transport Code, the RPP’s development is the carrier’s 
responsibility. 342 However, in WA, the consignor (producer) must also prepare the 
RPP for the environmental impact assessment. 343 
6 Criminal Offences and Penalties 
Transporting radioactive materials without a licence is a standard offence across the 
three jurisdictions, but the penalty varies greatly (see Table 13). SA may impose a fine 
of up to $100,000 for a company’s breach, whereas a company in WA may only be 
fined $5,000. Large discrepancies in criminal liability are common to other offence 
                                                 
337 Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 6(3), (4); 
Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2003 (SA) reg 
8(1), (2).  
338 Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 6(5). The 
radioactive warning labels are specified in Section V of the International Regulations. See also 
Appendices F and G.  
339 Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2003 (SA) 
reg 6(2).  
340 Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2001) para 503; Code for the Safe Transport 
of Radioactive Material (2008) para 503.  
341 See Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2001, 2008) cls 2.8, 2.9.  
342 Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2008) para 302. See also Radiation Safety 
(Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 5. 
343 See Chapter III.  
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provisions in the radiation protection legislation, including failure to report reportable 
incidents and failure to comply with specified obligations. 
Table 13: NT, SA and WA penalties for possessing radioactive material without a licence 
 Fine Continuing Offence 
Northern Territory344 40 penalty units345  
($6,160.00) 
4 penalty units per day 
($616.00) 
South Australia346 $100,000.00 NA 
Western Australia347 $1,000.00 (natural person) 
$5,000.00 (corporations)348 
$50.00 per day 
 
The effectiveness of the legislation is impacted by large differences between fines. The 
overarching goal of the radiation protection legislation is to protect human health and 
the environment from the negative impacts of radiation. In practice, the legislation also 
creates overlapping obligations in each jurisdiction. This may encourage companies to 
breach their obligations to save costs and simply record fines as a business loss.349 For 
a large company, a fine of $5,000 in Western Australia for failing to comply with the 
Transport Code,350 or even $10,000 in South Australia,351 is a minimal loss in the 
context of the overall business earnings. Any non-compliance impacts the integrity of 
radiation safety measures generally.  
Contrast this with the powers under the EPBC Act to impose significant penalties of 
up to $9 million on corporate offenders,352 or even the $250,000 penalty for unlicensed 
possession of dangerous goods by body corporates under the DGS Act.353 A higher 
maximum penalty allows the regulator to impose a penalty commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence, rather than a manifestly inadequate penalty 354  
                                                 
344 Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and Transport) Act 1980 (NT) s 16.  
345 One penalty unit is equivalent to $154.00: Penalty Units Regulations 2010 (NT) reg 2.  
346 Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 (WA) s 33A(1).  
347 Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) ss 25(1), 52(4).  
348 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 40(5).  
349 See John C Coffee, ‘“No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Sentencing’ (1981) 79(3) Michigan Law Review 386, 386–7; New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Corporate Offenders (Report No 102, June 2003) 88.  
350 Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) reg 6. 
351 Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2003 (SA) 
reg 6(1). 
352 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3 div 1; Zada Lipman, 
‘An Evaluation of Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms in the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) and their Application by the Commonwealth’ (2010) 27 
Environment and Planning Law Journal 98, 104.  
353 Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004 (WA) s 12.  
354 Peter Grabosky and Frances Gant, Improving Environmental Performance, Preventing 
Environmental Crime (Australian Institute of Criminology, Research and Poblic Policy Series, Report 
No 27, 2000) 93.  
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D Concluding Remarks 
The NDRP is a broad framework that attempts to harmonise Australian radiation 
protection legislation. Its goal of harmonisation has been unsuccessful as the States 
and Territories are largely free to regulate radiation protection as they see fit, which 
has created inconsistent regulatory provisions.  
Each jurisdiction implements different licensing requirements. Without a mutual 
recognition scheme in place, this compounds complexity and therefore the business 
costs of WA uranium producers. Compliance costs are also increased because 
reporting obligations, dose limits, and definitions changes from State to State. This 
runs the risk of producers ignoring these obligations and relegating fines as simply 
another business cost. Further, different versions of the Transport Code are 
implemented across Australia. This creates subtle differences in the obligations 





V THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS AND THE TRANSPORT CODE 
A Introduction 
The safe transport of radioactive material is regulated internationally by the IAEA. 
Since 1961, the IAEA has continuously developed and published the International 
Regulations and its associated safety standards. The International Regulations have 
undergone 12 comprehensive revisions since its initial publication, representing ‘a 
balance between the need to take account of technical advances, operational 
experience, and the latest radiation-protection principles while maintaining a stable 
framework of regulatory requirements’.355 
In Australia, the International Regulations are implemented through the Transport 
Code published by ARPANSA.356 Each edition of the Transport Code wholly adopts 
a version of the International Regulations (see Table 14) 357  
Table 14: Equivalent International Regulations and Transport Codes 
International Regulations 1985 1996 2003 2005 2009 2012 
Transport Code 1990 2001 NA 2008 NA 2014 
The Transport Code is intended to establish uniform requirements for the road 
transport of radioactive material in Australia.358 The 2008 Transport Code must be 
adopted by the States and Territories under the NDRP. 359 However, the 2001 
Transport Code remains in force in SA and Victoria.360 Further, the 2008 Transport 
Code has been superseded by the 2014 version in New South Wales and the 
Commonwealth. 361 
                                                 
355 R R Rawl, ‘History and Development of the International System of Transport Safety Regulatory 
Requirements and the Legal Instruments’ (Paper presented at Safety of Transport of Radioactive 
Material, Vienna, 7–11 July 2003) 81.  
356 In this Chapter, the Code of Practice for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material will be 
referred to as the ‘Transport Code’ with the version indicated in parentheses. The Regulations for the 
Safe Transport of Radioactive Material will be referred to as the ‘International Regulations’ with the 
version indicated in parentheses. 
357 The Transport Code modifies the International Regulations slightly to deal with local regulatory 
variations. See, eg, Transport Code (2014) cl 2.  
358 See, eg, Transport Code (2012) cl 1.2  
359 National Directory for Radiation Protection, above n 255, cl 5.1, sch 11. The NDRP is an agreed 
framework developed by ARPANSA’s Radiation Health Committee. The role of the NDRP was 
explained in Chapter IV.  
360 Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2003 (SA) 
regs 3, 6(1), sch 1. Victoria implements the Transport Code through licence conditions. See 
Department of Health (Victoria), The Regulation of the Transport of Radioactive Material: Radiation 
Act 2005 (30 November 2011) <https://www2.health.vic.gov.au/public-health/radiation/radiation-
regulatory-framework/transport-of-radioactive-material/regulation-of-transport-of-radioactive-
material>.  
361 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 1999 (Cth) reg 48(2)(d); 
Radiation Control Regulation 2013 (NSW) reg 36. 
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This confused state of affairs regarding the Transport Code causes two primary issues. 
First, radiological materials transported interstate may be subject to different versions 
of the Transport Code. WA and the NT both implement the 2008 Transport Code, but 
SA enforces the 2001 version. However, this should not create issues for uranium 
producers in practice. Both versions of the Transport Code are substantively similar, 
although the 2008 edition imposes more obligations.362 Accordingly, a WA producer 
would have little difficulty complying with the 2001 Transport Code.  
The bigger problem is whether the Transport Code itself is up-to-date with 
international requirements. The International Regulations are reviewed every two 
years to ensure they reflect international best practice. It is concerning that two 
jurisdictions in Australia, including SA, still implement the 2001 Transport Code 
which mirrors 20-year-old ‘best practice’. The prevalence of different Transport Codes 
in Australia also demonstrates that the NDRP has failed – first, to compel uniformity, 
and secondly, to remain up-to-date itself. 
This Chapter begins by briefly explaining the fundamental concepts underpinning the 
International Regulation’s safety requirements. It then explores each section of the 
International Regulations to highlight the main differences between the 1996, 2005 
and 2012 editions (respectively reflecting the 2001, 2008 and 2014 Transport Codes 
currently in force across Australia).363 Finally, this Chapter considers the importance 
of the Transport Code staying up-to-date with international developments, the 
mechanisms that enable that to occur and why the current Australian situation must 
improve.  
B The Development of the International Regulations 
The IAEA was established in 1956, with the main function of establishing standards 
of safety for the protection of health (Safety Standards).364 The UN Committee of 
Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods requested the IAEA to draft the 
recommendations relating to the transport of radioactive materials for inclusion in the 
                                                 
362 See, eg, Transport Code (2008) para 563 versus Transport Code (2001) para 562: the carrier is 
responsible for package segregation in the Transport Code (2001), but it is the responsibility of both 
the carrier and consignor in the Transport Code (2008).  
363 As this thesis focuses on the road transport of uranium oxide, the provisions in the International 
Regulations specifically related to air, sea and postal transport of radioactive materials have not been 
considered. 
364 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature 23 October 1956, [1957] 
ATS 11 (entered into force 29 July 1957) art 6.  
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overall system of recommendations for the transport of all dangerous goods. 365 In 
1961, the first version of the International Regulations was published.  
The International Regulations sit within a system of Safety Standards, divided into 
three categories (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Hierarchy of Safety Standards with Transport-Specific Examples 
 
The first category is Safety Fundamentals366 which sets the fundamental objective for 
all Safety Standards – the protection of people and the environment from the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation.367 A further 10 ‘safety principles’ are outlined, including 
the role of governments in promoting this fundamental safety objective.368 The second 
category is Safety Requirements. These facilitate the protection of people and the 
environment, and include the International Regulations.369 The third category are 
Safety Guides. These reflect international good or best practice and guide Safety 
Requirement compliance. The International Regulations have six applicable Safety 
Guides,370 including the Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe 
Transport of Radioactive Material (Advisory Material).  
                                                 
365 Rawl, above n 355, 77–8.  
366 This is published as International Atomic Energy Agency, Fundamental Safety Principles (Safety 
Fundamentals No SF–1, 2006). 
367 Ibid s 2.  
368 Ibid cl 3.8–3.11.  
369 Safety Requirements are divided between ‘specific’ and ‘general’ requirements. The International 
Regulations are a specific requirement. For a full list of the Safety Requirements and Safety Guides 
applicable in Australia, see Australian Radiation and Protection Nuclear Safety Agency, Trusted 
International Standards – Ionising Radiation Safety (8 February 2017) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/Regulation/ibp/safetyareas.cfm>. 
370 These latest editions of these publications are: (1) Planning and Preparing for Emergency 
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C Fundamental Concepts 
The core objective of the International Regulations is the safe transport of radioactive 
materials.371 This is primarily achieved using packaging as a passive safety measure.372 
The International Regulations’ standards control two main hazards associated with 
uranium oxide transport: radiation emanating from the material, and the containment 
of material during normal and accident transport conditions. 373 
Packaging and radiation protection are interrelated concepts as the correct package is 
determined by the ‘content limit’ of the material. Upper limits on radioactivity are 
based on the activity content limits of Type A packages (see Table 15).374 These are 
determined by the ‘Q System’ which describes fixed scenarios of radiation exposure 
through different pathways.375 Different values are given to radioactive materials 
based on their form. The A1 value refers to ‘special form material’ (ie non-dispersible 
material), while the A2 value refers to dispersible material (eg gases, liquids, powders). 
The limits for different radioactive materials are outlined in Section IV of the 
International Regulations.  
Uranium ores and concentrates are given a special classification outside the content 
limits established by the Q System. They are classed as ‘low specific activity’ (LSA) 
material.376 This means the material, by its nature, has a low activity per unit mass. 
LSA materials are divided into three categories: LSA-I, LSA-II, and LSA-III. The 
classification depends on the origin of the material and its concentration and 
                                                 
Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of Radioactive Material (TS–G–1.3, 2007); (3) 
Management System for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (TS–G–1.4, 2008); (4) 
Compliance Assurance for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (No TS–G–1.5, 2009); (5) 
Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 
(SSG–33, 2012); and (6) Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Material (SSG–26, 2014). All are published by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  
371 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe 
Transport of Radioactive Material (No SSG–26, 2012) (2012 Advisory Material) cl 104.1. 
372 International Atomic Energy Agency, Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (Training Course 
Series No 1, 4th ed, 2006) (IAEA Training Materials) 75. 
373 A Fairbairn, ‘The IAEA Transport Regulations: A Review of their Development and Coverage’ 
(1979) 21(6) IAEA Bulletin 2, 2; World Nuclear Transport Institute, Radioactive Materials Transport: 
The International Safety Regime – An Overview of Safety Regulations and the Organisations 
Responsible for their Development (World Nuclear Transport Limited, 2006) 18.  The International 
Regulations also control the prevention of criticality (ie a chain reaction in fissile material) and the 
control of high temperatures resulting from decay heat. These concepts are not relevant to uranium 
oxide. ‘Fissile’ material does not include unirradiated natural uranium, and the control of decay heat is 
primarily a concern for high level radioactive wastes: see IAEA, IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology 
used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (2007) 213; Uranium Mining, Processing and 
Nuclear Energy Review, above n 120, 20.  
374 IAEA Training Materials, above n 372, 56, 92, 195.  
375 Ibid 85. These pathways include inhalation and consumption.  
376 International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 226; International Regulations (2012) paras 228,  
408–11, 517–522.  
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distribution of radioactivity.377 Uranium ores and concentrates fall under the LSA-I 
category. Consequently, LSA-I material is transported in a Type IP-1 package (see 
Table 15).  
Table 15: Package Types378 
Package (IR 2012 
paragraph) Material type Example 
Unpackaged (520) Certain LSA-I and SCO-I materials  
Excepted (622) Contents with low radioactivity, where 
potential hazards are insignificant 
Smoke detectors 
Small sealed sources 
Radiopharmaceuticals for 
medical purposes 
Industrial Type 1 
(IP-1) 
(623–630) 
Solid LSA-I material 
Liquid LSA-I material under exclusive 
use379 
SCO-I380 
Uranium ores and 
concentrates 
Very low level waste 
Reactor maintenance 
equipment 
Industrial Type 2 
(IP-2) 
(623–630) 
Liquid LSA-I not under exclusive use 
Solid and gaseous LSA-II material 
LSA-III material under exclusive use 
SCO-II 
Solid low-level 
radioactive waste (eg 
contaminated rubber 
gloves) 
Fresh fuel assemblies 
Industrial Type 3 
(IP-3) 
(623–630) 
Liquid and gaseous LSA-II material 
not under exclusive use 





Falls within the A1 or A2 levels and is 
not otherwise excepted or LSA 
Radioistopes 
Industrial sources (eg 
well logging) 
Type B(U) and 
Type B(M)381 
(652–668) 
Materials exceeding the A1 or A2 
levels 
Bulk radioistopes 












Type IP-1 packages must comply with the minimum standards for packaging outlined 
in Section VI of the International Regulations. For example, the package must be 
                                                 
377 IAEA Training Materials, above n 372, 225.  
378 These examples were extracted from the IAEA Training Materials, above n 372, ch 7.  
379 ‘Exclusive use’ refers to the situation where a consignor or consignee has total control over a 
shipment, such that all loading or unloading of the consignment is carried out in accordance with the 
instructions of that consignor or consignee: IAEA Training Materials, above n 372, 67; International 
Regulations (1996, 2005, 2012) para 221.  
380 ‘SCO’ stands for ‘surface contaminated object’ and is an object which is not itself radioactive, but 
which has radioactive material distributed on its surface: International Regulations (1996, 2005)  
para 241; International Regulations (2012) paras 214, 412–4, 517–22. 
381 Type B(U) packages are unilaterally approved by a single jurisdiction, whereas Type B(M) 
packages require multilateral approval by the competent authorities in each country of shipment. 
Otherwise, the requirements are the same. 
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designed so it cannot collect water and must be able to withstand the routine elements 
of transport.382 All other package types are subject to additional requirements.383 
There are very few substantive changes in Sections VI and VII of the 1996, 2005 and 
2012 International Regulations. The main difference are changes to paragraph 
numbers. However, the 2012 edition also includes a new provision that requires a 
package to provide sufficient shielding to ensure it does not exceed the specified 
radiation values.384 ARPANSA believes that this provision bridges other requirements 
and does not impose any additional burdens on stakeholders.385 Other sections have 
undergone much more significant change.   
D Disparity Between Different Versions of the International Regulations and 
Transport Code 
The International Regulations class uranium oxide concentrate as UN2912 
‘Radioactive Material Low Specific Activity (LSA-I), Non-Fissile or Fissile Excepted’ 
(UN2912).386 The International Regulations set out a Schedule for UN2912 which 
specifies its carriage requirements,387 and is a useful tool to assess the differences for 
UN2912 across the International Regulations’ versions.   
The Transport Code clarifies the International Regulations’ application in the 
Australian context. Clauses 2.8 and 2.9 of the Transport Code specify carrier and 
consignor obligations and responsibilities. The clauses are also useful in highlighting 
the differences across versions of the Transport Code.  
The International Regulations are divided into eight sections (Table 16). This Chapter 
analyses Sections II, III and V. The other Sections are uncontentious because there are 
minimal changes between editions. 
  
                                                 
382 International Regulations (1996, 2005) paras 610, 612; International Regulations (2012) para 613.  
383 These requirements include that a package is able to withstand the accident conditions of transport. 
Section VII outlines test procedures to check the strength of each package type. 
384 International Regulations (2012) para 617.  
385 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority, Changes Between the 2012 IAEA 
Transport Regulations (SSR–6) and the 2005 IAEA Transport Regulations (TS-R-1) 
<http://www.arpansa.gov.au/pubs/rps/rpsc-2_changes.pdf> (ARPANSA Comparison Table) 13.  
386 See Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 7.  
387 The Schedule’s objective is to assist users of the International Regulations to identify the correct 
package type and the appropriate requirements necessary for the material’s transport: See, eg, IAEA, 
Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 
Edition) (Specific Safety Guide No. SSG–33, 2015) cl 1.8. 
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Table 16: Sections in the International Regulations 
Section I Introduction 
Section II Definitions  
Section III General Provisions 
Section IV 1996/2005 IR: Activity Limits and Material Restrictions 
2012 IR: Activity Limits and Classification 
Section V Requirements and Controls for Transport 
Section VI Requirements for Radioactive Materials and for Packagings and 
Packages  
Section VII Test Procedures 
Section VIII Approval and Administrative Requirements 
1 Section II  – Definitions 
Several key definitions remain constant throughout each version. These include 
‘carrier’,388 ‘competent authority’,389 ‘consignment’,390 and ‘shipment’.391 However, 
other central definitions change, in particular, the definitions of ‘consignee’, 
‘consignor’ and ‘quality assurance’.  
The 1996 and 2005 International Regulations define ‘consignee’ as any person, 
organisation or government which receives a consignment.392  The 2012 edition 
extends the definition to any person, organisation or government that is entitled to take 
delivery of a consignment.393  No reasons are given in the Advisory Material for this 
change. The older wording suggests that a consignee was any person who received a 
consignment, whether authorised or not. If so, technically, this would impose 
obligations on ‘accidental’ consignees. Practically, it is unlikely this would occur 
given the level of control imposed by the Australian licensing scheme.394 It is more 
likely that the definitional change simply reflects the 2012 International Regulations’ 
overall objective to clarify existing provisions. 395  
‘Consignor’ is defined in the 2005 and 2012 editions as any person, organisation or 
government which prepares a consignment for transport.396  The definition in the 1996 
version also requires that a consignor is named in the transport documents.397 The 
requirement to be named in the transport documents is moved in the later versions to 
Section V of the International Regulations. In any event, it is unlikely that a consignor 
                                                 
388 International Regulations (1996, 2005, 2012) para 206. 
389 Ibid para 207.  
390 Ibid para 211. 
391 Ibid para 237. 
392 International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 210. 
393 International Regulations (2012) para 210 (emphasis added).  
394 See Chapters III and IV.  
395 Transport Code (2014) i.  
396 International Regulations (2005, 2012) para 212. 
397 International Regulations (1996) para 212.  
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would not be named in the transport documents. For example, the Safety Data Sheet 
for drummed uranium oxide concentrate must identify the name and contact details of 
the supplier.398  
 ‘Quality assurance’ is defined in the 1996 and 2005 editions as a systematic 
programme of controls and inspections applied by an organisation or body involved in 
the transport of radioactive material ‘aimed at providing adequate confidence’ that the 
standards prescribed by the International Regulations are achieved in practice.399 The 
2012 edition removes this term and replaces it with ‘management system’. This refers 
to a system that establishes policies and objectives, and enables those objectives to be 
achieved efficiently and effectively.400 The new terminology reflects the IAEA’s 
desire to assimilate the International Regulations’ definition with internationally 
recognised standards for quality management systems. 401 ARPANSA predicts the 
change will not impact industry because the transition to quality management systems 
have already occurred. 402    
Overall, the changes in definitions between different editions of the International 
Regulations either simplify existing definitions or bring them within the meaning of 
other international developments. Minor definitional changes are unlikely to impact 
WA uranium producers interstate because they do not, by themselves, impose any 
obligations on carriers and consignors.  
2 Section III  – General Provisions 
Section III’s evolution demonstrates the importance of staying up-to-date with the 
International Regulations’ development. Section III introduces general provisions 
relating to radiation protection, emergency response, quality assurance/management 
systems, and importantly, training requirements. The 2005/2012 International 
Regulations differ from the 1996 edition by introducing new provisions for  
non-compliance, training and segregation. Some changes are very minor, comprising 
paragraph reshuffling403 or sentence simplification.404  
                                                 
398 Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 19.  
399 International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 232.  
400 International Regulations (2012) para 228.  
401 2012 Advisory Material, above n 371, cl 228.1–3. 
402 ARPANSA Comparison Table, above n 385, 3.  
403 See International Regulations (1996) para 301 and International Regulations (2005, 2012) para 
302.  
404 See International Regulations (1996) paras 302–3 and International Regulations (2005, 2012) paras 
301, 311.  
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Broadly, radiation protection and emergency procedures are the responsibility of the 
carrier, while training, quality assurance/management systems, segregation and non-
compliance are the responsibility of both the carrier and the consignor.405  
(a) Non-compliance 
The 2005 International Regulations introduce specific provisions for  
non-compliance.406 ‘Non-compliance’ has a very broad meaning and includes all 
situations where a shipment does not fully accord with the regulation’s 
requirements.407 The 2005 International Regulations state that the carrier or consignee 
must inform the consignor if the consignment does not comply with the provisions 
applicable to radiation levels and contamination.408 The 2012 edition broadens this 
notification requirement: the consignee, carrier and ‘any organisation involved during 
transport who may be affected’ must also be notified of non-compliance.409 
ARPANSA considers that this change improves regulatory oversight, transparency 
and safety.410 But it also imposes another duty on carriers, who if operating under the 
2005 International Regulations, may inadvertently overlook this change.  
(b) Training 
Workers must receive general radiation protection training, including precautions to 
restrict occupational exposure and the exposure of other persons.411 The 2009 and 2012 
International Regulations also introduce general training requirements for persons 
‘engaged in the transport of radioactive material’,412 and specific training for 
individuals who, inter alia, classify, pack, mark, label and handle radioactive 
material.413 Additionally, the 2012 edition requires records of this training to be 
kept.414 These new provisions are unlikely to impose additional burdens on producers 
and transporters because legislation already compels training and record-keeping 
                                                 
405 Note that the 2014 Transport Code incorrectly assigns the competent authority’s responsibilities (to 
ensure compliance with the International Regulations and arrange for periodic dose assessments) to 
the carrier: International Regulations (2012) paras 307, 308. 
406 These provisions were developed in response to non-compliance with contamination requirements 
in Europe during the late-1990s. This non-compliance resulted in a shutdown of irradiated fuel 
requirements: International Atomic Energy Agency, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for 
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (No TS–G–1.1, 1st revised ed, 2008) (2005 Advisory 
Materials) cl 309.1.  
407 Ibid cl 309.3.  
408 International Regulations (2005, 2012) para 309.  
409 International Regulations (2012) para 309(a).  
410 ARPANSA Comparison Table, above n 385, 5.  
411 International Regulations (1996) para 303; International Regulations (2005, 2012) para 311. 
412 International Regulations (2005, 2012) para 312. 
413 International Regulations (2005, 2012) para 313.  
414 International Regulations (2012) para 314.  
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requirements. Instead, these provisions aim to ‘complement a uniform approach to 
training’.415 
(c) Segregation 
The 1996 International Regulations provide: 
Radioactive material shall be segregated sufficiently from workers and from members 
of the public. The following values for dose shall be used for the purpose of calculating 
segregation distances or radiation values: 
(a) for members in regularly occupied working areas a dose of 5 mSv in a year; 
(b) for members of the public, in areas where the public has regular access, a dose of 
1 mSv in a year to the critical group.416 
In the 2005 and 2012 versions, the segregation requirement is removed from Section 
III and relocated to Section V.417 There, the requirements extend only to packages, 
overpacks and freight containers containing radioactive material during transport and 
in storage during transit.418 The 1996 version application is much wider. This may be 
a problem for WA producers shipping into SA because the requirements for 
segregation extend to radioactive materials generally, rather than the package itself.  
3 Section V  – Requirements and Controls for Transport 
Section V articulates requirements to ensure appropriate safety controls are followed, 
and communication is facilitated, during transport. 419 Broadly, the changes between 
editions can be split between: (a) general package requirements; (b) marking and 
labelling; and (c) transport documents.   
                                                 
415 2005 Advisory Materials, above n 406, cl 312.2.  
416 International Regulations (1996) para 306. This provision reflects a change from the previously 
conservative constraint value of 0.7 mSv included in the earlier versions of the International 
Regulations. The 2005 Advisory Material criticised the supporting documents of the International 
Regulations (1996) which represented the dose constraint as a realistic model of radiation exposure, 
rather than a pessimistic one: ibid cl 563.3. 
417 Another difference between editions concerns the protection of undeveloped photographic film. 
The International Regulations (1996) paras 306–7 require radioactive materials to be segregated from 
undeveloped photographic film: See paras 306–7. This can be achieved by maintaining a distance of 2 
metres from other vehicles when parking: see ibid 563.13. This provision is echoed in Section V of 
the International Regulations (1996). In the International Regulations (2005, 2012), the provision in 
Section III is removed.  
418 International Regulations (2005) para 563; International Regulations (2012) 562.  
419 IAEA Training Materials, above n 372, 189.  
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(a) General package requirements 
The package requirements for LSA packages420 do not vary between editions.421 For 
instance, the quantity of LSA material in a Type IP-1 package is restricted so the 
external radiation level at three metres from an unshielded object does not exceed 10 
mSv per hour.422  
However, the 2012 International Regulations extend some general provisions that are 
applicable to all packages. A package must be manufactured in conformity with design 
specifications before it can be first used to transport radioactive materials.423 
ARPANSA believes this requirement promotes further safety in packaging as the 
obligation was previously implied.424  
Further, under the 2012 edition, shipments cannot contain radionuclides different from 
those specified on the package design.425 This obligation only existed previously for 
Type B and C packages, but is now extended to Type A packages and IPs.426 
Generally, a package cannot contain any items other than those necessary for the use 
of the radioactive material.427 Under the 1996 International Regulations, the transport 
of other items with LSA material is not precluded provided there is no interaction. This 
obligation rests solely on the consignor.428 The 2005 and 2012 International 
Regulations delete the reference to LSA material and place the obligation on both the 
carrier and consignor. This is a sensible change as the consignor may not have control 
during transport of any items that are packaged with the radioactive material.  
(b) Marking and labelling 
Markings and labels communicate hazards to different parties during transport, 
including to emergency response personnel.429 As a prerequisite to labelling, all 
packages are assigned a category to identify the radioactive nature of the contents.  430 
These categories are I-WHITE, II-YELLOW and III-YELLOW and are assigned 
                                                 
420 International Regulations 1(996, 2005) paras 521–7; International Regulations (2012) para 523.  
421 Except for LSA material that is also fissile material. This is not relevant for uranium oxide: see, eg, 
International Regulations (2012) para 518. 
422 International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 521; International Regulations (2012) para 517.  
423 International Regulations (2012) para 501. This is to ensure compliance with the International 
Regulations and any applicable certificate of approval. This requirement does not exist in the 1996 
and 2005 versions.  
424 ARPANSA Comparison Table, above n 385, 8–9.  
425 International Regulations (2012) para 502.  
426 ARPANSA Comparison Table, above n 385, 9.  
427 International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 503; International Regulations (2012) para 504.  
428 Transport Code (2001) sub-cls 2.8–9.  
429 IAEA Training Materials, above n 372, 197.  
430 Ibid 200; 2012 Advisory Material, above n 371, cl 529.1.  
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based on the ‘transport index’ (TI) and the surface radiation level of the package.431 
The TI is calculated by the maximum radiation level of the package.432 For uranium 
ores and concentrates, the TI is taken as four.433 A container of uranium oxide is 
usually classed as YELLOW-III because the TI is more than 1 but less than 10.434  
Other marking and labelling requirements for LSA-I material include: 
• the UN number and proper shipping name must be legibly and durably marked on 
the outside of the packaging.435 
• the outside of the packaging must identify the consignor, consignee or both.436 
• packages with a gross mass exceeding 50kg must have its permissible gross mass 
legibly and durably marked on the outside of the packaging.437 A typical container 
containing uranium oxide concentrate will weigh somewhere between 17 and 22 
tonnes,438 and a single drum around 400 kg.439 
• a Type IP-1 design must be legibly and durably marked on the outside of the 
packaging with ‘TYPE IP-1’.440 
• the outer surface of receptacles or wrapping materials containing LSA-I 
transported under exclusive use may bear ‘RADIOACTIVE LSA-I’.441 
• each package, overpack and freight container must bear the appropriate category 
label.442 The label is fixed to the two opposite sides of the outside of the package 
or overpack or on the outside of all four sides of a freight container.443  
                                                 
431 International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 533, Table 7; International Regulations (2012) para 
529, Table 8.  
432 International Regulations (2012) para 523.  
433 International Regulations (2012) para 523(a)(i).  
434 Although the maximum radiation level on the external surface is only 0.06 mSv/h (assigned to 
YELLOW-II), the highest category is assigned: International Regulations (1996, 2005) para 533(a), 
Table 7; International Regulations (2012) para 529(a), Table 8; Uranium Council Transport Working 
Group, above n 90, 14.  
435 International Regulations (1996) para 535; International Regulations (2005) para 536; International 
Regulations (2012) para 532.  
436 International Regulations (1996) para 534; International Regulations (2005) para 535; International 
Regulations (2012) para 531.  
437 International Regulations (1996) para 536; International Regulations (2005) para 537; International 
Regulations (2012) para 533. 
438 Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 15.  
439 Ibid 16.  
440 International Regulations (1996) para 537; International Regulations (2005) para 538; International 
Regulations (2012) para 534. 
441 International Regulations (1996) para 540; International Regulations (2005) para 541; International 
Regulations (2012) para 537.  
442 International Regulations (1996) para 541; International Regulations (2005) para 542; International 
Regulations (2012) para 538. See Appendices F and G.  
443 International Regulations (1996) para 542; International Regulations (2005) para 543; International 
Regulations (2012) para 539. Large freight containers must bear four placards which conform to the 
model in Appendix G. Enlarged labels can be used in the place of both labels and placards: 
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• for LSA-I material, the label only needs to read ‘LSA-I’,444 and include the 
maximum activity of the radioactive contents and the TI.445 
• a freight container containing unpackaged LSA-I or an exclusive use consignment 
must display the UN number in either a placard label or on a separate placard on 
all four sides of the freight container.446 
The 1996 and 2005 International Regulations designate these requirements as the 
consignor’s responsibility. 447 However, the corresponding 2001 and 2008 Transport 
Codes set the labelling requirements as the dual responsibility of the carrier and 
consignor. 448 The 2012 International Regulations simply provides that no person may 
offer radioactive materials for transport unless properly marked, labelled, placarded, 
described and certified on a transport document.449 However, this provision is marked 
only as the responsibility of the consignor.450 The requirements of the Transport Code 
complicates the application of the International Regulations. The consignor should be 
responsible for labelling (rather than the carrier) because they know what they have 
packaged and will have calculated the maximum activity and TI of the consignment. 
This is an instance where domestic requirements exceed international standards for no 
explainable reason.  
(c) Transport documents 
The information included in transport documents (and the order in which that 
information must appear) varies between versions. While the 1996 and 2005 versions 
are near identical, 451 the 2012 International Regulations changes the order and imposes 
an additional requirment to include the subsidiary hazard class or division number.452 
                                                 
International Regulations (1996) para 546; International Regulations (2005) para 547; International 
Regulations (2012) para 543. See also International Regulations (1996, 2005, 2012) fig 6. 
444 The name of the radionuclide is not necessary: International Regulations (1996) para 543(a)(ii); 
International Regulations (2005) para 544(a)(ii); International Regulations (2012) para 540(a)(ii). 
445 International Regulations (1996) para 543(b)–(d); International Regulations (2005) para 544(b)–
(d); International Regulations (2012) para 540(b)–(d). 
446 See Appendix G. International Regulations (1996) para 547; International Regulations (2005) para 
548; International Regulations (2012) para 544. See also International Regulations (1996, 2005, 2012) 
fig 7.  
447 International Regulations (1996) paras 520(d), 534–47; International Regulations (2005) paras 
520(d), 534–48.  
448 Transport Code (2001, 2008) sub-cls 2.8–9. 
449 International Regulations (2012) para 545.  
450 The labelling requirements are also a dual responsibility under the Transport Code (2014) cl 2.8–9. 
451 International Regulations (1996) para 549; International Regulations (2005) para 550.  
452 International Regulations (2012) para 546.  
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This difference is unlikely to burden WA uranium producers because there are no 
subsidiary risks allocated to uranium oxide concentrate.453 
The 2012 International Regulations also provide additional requirements to bridge 
compliance with the IMDG Code. For instance, if radioactive material is packed into 
a freight container that will be transported by sea, the person responsible for packing 
the container (the consignor, under the Transport Code) must provide a certificate 
certifying that the operation has been carried out in accordance with the IMDG 
Code.454 
Further, the carrier must ensure: 
• the consignment is accompanied by a copy of the transport documents;455 
• the information applicable to the consignment accompanies the consignment 
to its final destination and must be given to the consignee when delivered;456  
• if that information is given to the carrier in electronic form, it must be available 
at all times during transport to the final destination and must be able to be 
produced without delay as a paper document;457 and 
• that a copy of the transport documents (and additional information) is kept for 
a minimum of three months. 
ARPANSA does not believe that these requirements will increase the burden on 
producers because it is already expected that such records are being kept.458 However, 
they acknowledge that international stakeholders already complying with the 2012 
International Regulations will also expect their Australian counterparts to comply.459 
This may influence shipment denials where producers have only complied with the 
2005 International Regulations.460 
E The Importance of Staying Up to Date 
Australia has three different versions of the International Regulations/Transport Code  
in force across the States, Territories and Commonwealth. Many of the changes in the 
International Regulations have occurred in the transition between the 2005 and 2012 
                                                 
453 See Uranium Council Transport Working Group, above n 90, 24. An example of a subsidiary risk 
is ‘corrosive’ (UN Class 8) for uranium hexafluoride.  
454 International Regulations (2012) paras 550–2.  
455 Ibid para 584. 
456 Ibid para 585. 
457 Ibid paras 586, 588. 
458 ARPANSA Comparison Table, above n 385, 12. 
459 Ibid.   
460 This is discussed later in this Chapter at page 73. 
 
68 
editions. On their face, these changes do not impose greater compliance burdens on 
WA producers. This is because the NT also implements the 2005 edition, while SA 
implements the older 1996 version. However, this has consequences for the NFC 
industry more broadly.  
First, the failure to implement the 2014 Transport Code nationally indicates that both 
the NDRP and the majority of competent authorities are not up-to-date with 
international best practice for the transport of radioactive materials. This has safety 
implications. As observed by Rawl: 
During the 40+ years since the Transport Regulations were first published, there have 
been dramatic changes in the types of radioactive material transported, materials of 
construction, and technologies available for packaging, as well as transport conditions. 
Similarly, the ways in which safety is examined and the standards for acceptable 
societal risk have also changed. 461 
The NDRP is only reviewed when the RHC request the Radiation Health and Safety 
Advisory Council to do so.462 The most recent meeting of the RHC in March 2017 
indicates that discussions regarding redesigning the radiation regulatory system will 
not occur until March 2018.463 The IAEA reviews the International Regulations every 
two years and is currently in its 2015 review cycle.464 By the next RHC meeting, the 
IAEA may have updated the International Regulations and will be in its 2017 review 
cycle. Reforms to compel the radiation protection legislation to stay updated are 
discussed in the following Chapter.  
The second issue concerns denials of shipment.465 Denials of shipment can occur for 
many reasons,466 including where a shipment does not comply with the provisions of 
the International Regulations expected by international stakeholders.467 
                                                 
461 Rawl, above n 355, 77, 87.  
462 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, National Directory for Radiation 
Protection – Document Development (May 2015) <http://www.arpansa.gov.au/archive/ndrp.cfm>. 
463 Radiation Health Committee, Meeting Minutes (Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear 
Safety Agency, 15 March 2017) 2–3.  
464 Rawl, above n 355, 84. See also C Fasten and F Nitsche, ‘Some Views on 2 Year Review/Revision 
Cycle of IAEA Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’ (2006) 17(1) Packaging, 
Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material 7.  
465 A denial of shipment is the ‘explicit or implicit refusal to carry a shipment of radioactive material 
though it conforms to all the applicable Regulations’: Shipment Denial Handbook, above n 42, cl 2.  
466 These include security and liability issues, high insurance costs and the risk that intermediate ports 
will not allow the transit of radioactive cargoes: Prosser Report, above n 159, para 11.125. 
467 This includes consumers of uranium oxide, as well as shipping lines and intermediate ports: World 
Nuclear Transport Institute, above n 152, 4.  
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Eurotom have recognised a lack of harmonisation in nuclear transport across borders 
is a main factor in shipment denial.468 According to Young, the role of the competent 
authority is to: 
Implement the IAEA Regulations, and [to update] them when necessary. The national 
regultions must fully and accurately reflect the requirements of the IAEA Regulations. 
This is necessary to ensure harmony with other countries’ regulations and with 
the international modal transport authorities, thus facilitating international 
trade.469 
As identified above, ARPANSA have noted that a lack of compliance with the 2012 
International Regulations may impact the export of uranium oxide overseas.  
F Concluding Remarks 
The IAEA has regulated the international transport of radioactive materials for over 
fifty years. Regular reviews have ensured that the International Regulations remain 
up-to-date with technological developments, research in radiological protection and 
societal standards.  
The Transport Code reflects the International Regulations’ provisions. However, the 
Transport Code is not uniformly implemented across Australia (despite the efforts of 
the NDRP) and consequently, the 2001, 2008 and 2014 versions are in force in 
different jurisdictions. This creates two major issues.  
First, different obligations apply across the States and Territories. For example, the 
2005 International Regulations introduced new provisions for non-compliance, 
specific training requirements for transport workers, and segregation provisions. These 
provisions do not apply in jurisdictions implementing the 2001 Transport Code (ie 
SA). 
Secondly, disparity between Transport Codes demonstrates Australia does not have in 
place adequate procedures to keep up-to-date with international developments. 
Numerous changes have occurred between the 2005 and 2012 International 
Regulations. In particular, the 2012 International Regulations introduced requirements 
for package shielding, broader notification duties, record keeping obligations, changes 
                                                 
468 Eurotom Supply Agency, Report on Nuclear Fuel Security of Supply (European Commission, 
2015) 16 (emphasis added).  
469 C N Young, ‘The Role of National Competent Authorities in Facilitating Regulation of the 
Transport of Radioactive Material’ (Paper presented at Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, 
Vienna, 7–11 July 2013) 94, 95–6 (emphasis added).  
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to packages, marking and labelling, and further obligations relating to transport 
documents. The 2012 International Regulations also simplified its previous iterations 
and increased consistency with other international developments, such as the IMDG 
Code and management systems.  
This Chapter, alongside Chapters III and IV, demonstrate the complexity of the current 
scheme regulating the transport of radioactive materials in Australia, and the 
consequent problems facing future WA uranium oxide producers. The following 





VI REFORMING THE URANIUM OXIDE TRANSPORT REGIME 
A Introduction 
The previous chapters highlighted significant issues with the current scheme for the 
transport of uranium oxide in Australia. Chapter II introduced the policy ban which 
prohibits uranium oxide exports from WA ports. Consequently, WA uranium oxide 
must travel interstate. In Chapter III, we saw that the responsibility for the regulation 
of radioactive materials is primarily the domain of the States and Territories, with 
Commonwealth intervention in the fields of non-proliferation and exports. For this 
reason, multiple regulators govern the current uranium oxide transport regime. Chapter 
IV examined the consequences of interstate transport, highlighting inconsistencies 
between the radiation protection legislation of the NT, SA and WA. Further, in Chapter 
V, the discrepancies between different versions of the Transport Code were explained.  
The current scheme regulating the transport of uranium oxide is therefore overly 
complex. This renders compliance difficult, compounds the cost of doing business and 
threatens the viability of the developing WA uranium industry. This Chapter proposes 
reform options to simplify the regime and make it fit for purpose. It first delimits the 
scope of potential reforms. Secondly, this Chapter identifies the objectives of reform. 
Finally, it considers three reform options: (1) the internal reform of State-based 
radiation protection legislation; (2) the development of model laws for uranium oxide 
transport; and (3) the establishment of a national regulator.  
B Scope of Reforms 
This thesis addresses the numerous shortcomings of the current regime that impact 
WA uranium oxide producers. The transport of uranium oxide is a subset of a 
conglomeration of legal areas (see Figure 3). In many ways, reform of this area is like 
fighting the Hydra470 – it is impossible to completely unify all aspect of uranium oxide 
transport because other areas inevitably ‘spring up’.  
                                                 
470 The Hydra is a water serpent from Greek mythology. Hercules was tasked with destroying the 
Hydra, but found for each of its heads he cut off, another two grew back in their place: Susie Dent 
(ed), Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (Chambers Harrap, 19th ed, 2013) 682–3; Editors of 




Figure 3: Legal areas encompassing uranium oxide transport471 
 
Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address overarching reforms to the 
radiation protection legislation,472 the transport of radioactive materials generally,473 
or the Australian nuclear fuel cycle.474 Further, this thesis is not an exercise in 
constitutional law. This Chapter does not consider whether the Commonwealth can 
take unilateral action to reform the transport of uranium oxide.475 Instead, it examines 
State-based and cooperative solutions for reform. 
C Objectives of Reform 
Reform objectives guide the process of reform and can be thought of in terms of 
economic, social and governmental policy goals.476 Cost-benefit analysis is an 
important regulatory tool to ensure that legislation is evidence-based and meets 
                                                 
471 Picture from original thesis replaced for copyright reasons.  
472 Reform of Australian radiation protection legislation was attempted under the NDRP (see page 41). 
Radiation protection legislation regulates multiple industries beyond the uranium industry. Any 
reforms to radiation protection legislation would need to consider their impact on radiology, 
diagnostic medicine, radiopharmaceuticals and industry radiography, among other things.  
473 Uranium oxide is classed as LSA-I radioactive material under the Transport Code/International 
Regulations (see page 61). It is subject to less regulation that other radioactive materials that are 
transported as Type A, Type B and Type C packages. Uranium oxide is not fissile and is only mildly 
radioactive (see Chapter II). Reforms to the entire scheme for the transport of radioactive materials 
would need to consider other types of material, such as high-level radioactive waste. See, eg, Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Royal Commission, above n 7, chs 5, 9; Prosser Report, above n 159, ch 5; Department of 
Industry, Innovation and Science, National Radioactive Waste Management Facility (2017) 
<http://www.radioactivewaste.gov.au/>. 
474 Australia only mines, mills and exports uranium overseas and does not use uranium for nuclear 
energy. Previous reviews of the Australian uranium industry have suggested sweeping reforms, as 
well as suggestions for regulation should Australia move to a full nuclear fuel cycle: see Prosser 
Report, above n 159; Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review, above n 120; Sharon 
Mascher, ‘Too Hot to Handle? Uranium and Nuclear Power in Australia’s Energy Mix’ (2007) 26 




475 Chapter III explained that the Commonwealth may have power under the external affairs and trade 
and commerce power in s 51 of the Australian Constitution. However, the use of these powers has not 
been tested in the transport sphere. Instead, transport reforms have been exercises in cooperation 
under the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and the National Transport Commission 
(NTC).  
476 See Eric Windholz, ‘The Multiple Domains of Harmonisation: Politics, Policy, Process and 
Program’ (2012) 71(3) Australian Journal of Public Administration 325, 328.  
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discernable outcomes.477 Australian Government policies that wish to abolish or 
introduce legislation must be accompanied by a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS). 
Among other things, the RIS examines the problem to be solved and why government 
action is needed.478 Reform is more likely to be justified where it achieves its stated 
goal and further, is cost-effective, flexible in its implementation, and is compatible 
with international developments.479 While this Chapter does not attempt to write a RIS 
for the proposed reforms, it identifies three major objectives.480 These are: (1) to 
improve efficiency in regulation; (2) to reduce instances of shipment denial; and (3) to 
improve competition.  
1 Improving Efficiency in Regulation 
The current regime for the transport of uranium oxide is burdensome.481 A WA  
producer must contend with at least five agencies to obtain the relevant transport 
permits and approvals.482 The time to approve each permit varies,483 as does the 
permit’s expiry date.484 Producers incur costs preparing these applications.485 Here, 
‘time is money’ – if an approval is delayed, it has flow-on effects for the relationship 
between the producer and the overseas consumer because the consignment can, 
literally, miss the boat. Further costs are associated with compliance (such as training 
or meeting different obligations across jurisdictions).  
                                                 
477 Paul Rose and Christopher Walker, The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial 
Regulation (Centre for Capital Markets Competitiveness, 2013) 3; Business Council of Australia, 
Policy Essentials: Cost-Benefit Analysis (2012) 2.  
478 See Australian Government, The Australian Government Guide to Regulation (Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2014) 17, 21.  
479 Opeksin, above n 247, 359–67; J A Grant, ‘The Search for Uniformity of Law’ (1983) 32 
American Political Science Review 1082, 1087; Ronald Cuming, ‘Harmonization of Law in Canada: 
An Overview’ in Ronald Cuming (ed) Perspectives on the Harmonization of Law in Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, 1985) 14; Andrew McGee and Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Evolution of 
the Single Market: Harmonisation or Liberalisation’ (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 578, 582; E J 
Wright, ‘Mutual Recognition and the National Market for Goods’ (1993) 21 Australian Business Law 
Review 270, 273.  
480 Another potential objective is to improve safety. However, as was identified in Chapter II, the 
radiological and chemical risks of uranium oxide are well-managed. In reality, the real safety concern 
derives from long-distance transport between the mine site in Western Australia and to the Port of 
Darwin or Port of Adelaide. Reforms to improve general heavy vehicle safety is the domain of the 
National Heavy Vehicle Regulator, and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
481 This has been noted in previous reviews of the uranium industry: see, eg, Deloitte, above n 51,  
77, 80.  
482 See Chapter III, Chapter IV and Table 5. 
483 For example, a licence to deal with radioactive substances from the Radiological Council takes 
approximately 21 days, while the environmental approval process can take up to 2 years: see Table 5. 
484 For example, the Mineral Export Permit (issued by DIIS) is usually granted for a period of 10 
years, whereas the licence to deal with radioactive substances (issued by the Radiological Council) is 
issued for 3 years.  
485 Costs encompass the time it takes to fill out the paperwork and hiring experts to prepare reports 
(especially in the case of environmental approvals).  
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These costs have not been quantified here, but other transport reforms suggest that 
significant economic benefits can be achieved by simplifying the current regime.486 
For example, between 2008 and 2013, the National Transport Commission (NTC) 
consolidated 23 regulators for heavy vehicles, rail safety and maritime safety into three 
national bodies.487 Prior to this reform, compliance costs for interstate heavy trucking 
operations were $17.8 million annually.488 The overall economic benefits of the 
reforms for heavy vehicles alone is estimated at $12 billion.489 Therefore, it is 
predicted that reducing the number of regulators involved in uranium oxide transport 
would likely also reduce costs associated with multiple approvals, delays and 
compliance costs. 
2 Reducing Instances of Shipment Denial 
Overseas consumers of Australian uranium expect consignments to meet the standards 
required by the 2012 International Regulations.490 Shippers, intermediate ports and 
consumers can refuse a shipment where it does not comply.491 To reduce the chance 
of a shipment denial, the Transport Code must be up-to-date with these requirements 
in all Australian jurisdictions. Consequently, a major objective of reform is to develop 
and implement mechanisms to keep the Transport Code current.  
3 Increasing Competition 
Competition is inhibited by legislation that confers significant costs on business.492 
The Australian Government in their Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda 
recognise that ‘remov[ing] inefficient regulation, simplify[ing] compliance and 
                                                 
486 The Business Council of Australia estimates the annual cost of inefficiency in the federal system at 
$9 billion: Business Council of Australia, Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for 
Federal-State Relations – Summary Action Plan (2006) 15. Further, the annual cost of compliance 
with regulation in Western Australia is approximately $2.1 billion (or 2 per cent of gross state 
product): Chris Berg and Christopher Murn, Over-ruled: How Excessive Regulation and Legislation is 
holding back Western Australia (Institute of Public Affairs, 2009).  
487 Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure, Senior Officials’ Committee, Council of 
Australian Governments, 2012 Review of the National Transport Commission and Other Relevant 
Transport Bodies (2013) 6.  
488 Castalia Strategic Advisors, Securing a National Approach to Heavy Vehicle Regulation – Report 
to the National Road Transport Operators Association (NatRoad) (2009) 20.  
489 National Transport Commission, Heavy Vehicle National Law: Regulatory Impact Statement 
(2011) 14. The creation of the National Rail Safety Regulator is estimated to be of an economic 
benefit between $28 million and $71 million: National Transport Commission, Rail Safety National 
Law: Regulatory Impact Statement (2011) v, viii.  
490 See ARPANSA Comparison Table, above n 385, 12. 
491 Prosser Report, above n 169, para 11.125; Eurotom Supply Agency, above n 468, 16.  
492 Frederick G Hilmer, Mark Rayner and Geoffrey Taperell, National Competition Policy Review 
(Commonwealth Government Printer, 1993) pt 9.  
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improve[ing] regulator responsive [will] help small and large businesses thrive’.493 
Increasing competition is important to the uranium industry generally because of the 
small number of transport companies that will agree to transport uranium oxide.494 If 
there are more transport companies, then it is less likely that a denial of shipment will 
occur.495 Further, cost-efficient regulation might offset other concerns, such as 
insurance costs or public perceptions.496 
WA businesses already are at a disadvantage compared to their NT and SA 
counterparts because of the local uranium export ban.497 In addition, newcomers to the 
industry may be discouraged from entering the market due to the compliance 
burden.498 Licensing is a major barrier because it differs in each jurisdiction and 
requires specific qualifications or experience as a prerequisite.499 Simplifying the 
current regime is therefore predicted to increase competition. 
D Proposed Reforms 
‘Harmonisation’ is a term used to describe reform where there is a desire to unify the 
rules, policies or institutions of different jurisdictions.500 This can comprise total 
unification, greater consistency, or even mere compatibility.501 This Part examines 
three approaches to the harmonisation of the uranium oxide transport regime. These 
are: (1) the internal reform of State-based radiation protection legislation; (2) the 
development and application of model laws for the transport of uranium oxide; and (3) 
the establishment of a single national regulator for uranium oxide transport.  
                                                 
493 Australian Government, Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda: An Action Plan for A 
Stronger Australia (2014) IX, 16. 
494 Prosser Report, above n 159, para 11.125. 
495 That is, a denial of shipment unrelated to non-compliance with the International Regulations: see 
page 73. 
496 World Nuclear Transport Institute, above n 152, 4; Prosser Report, above n 159, para 11.125. 
497 See page 73.  
498 Deloitte, above n 51, 80; Prosser Report, above n 159, 599–602; Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking 
Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business (2006) 10-1; Ian 
Bickerdyke and Ralph Lattimore, Reducing the Regulatory Burden: Does Firm Size Matter? (Industry 
Commission, 1997) 30.  
499 ARPANSA Competition Review, above n 246, 42.  
500 David W Leebron, ‘Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims’ in 
Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E Hudec (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free 
Trade (MIT Press, 1996) vol 1, 41, 43; Martin Boodman, ‘The Myth of Harmonization of Laws’ 
(1991) 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 699, 702; Windholz, above n 476, 329–30.  
501 Windholz, above n 476, 330–2.  
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1 Internal Reform of State-Based Radiation Protection Legislation 
The first reform proposal amends the existing radiation protection scheme in WA. At 
present, the WA Transport Regulations are made under the RSA.502 This means that 
the overarching regulations applicable to general radiation protection also apply to 
uranium oxide transport. In contrast, the NT Act exclusively regulates the transport of 
radioactive ores and concentrates. The NT Act has operated in the NT since 1981,503 
regulating an active uranium mining industry.504 
Removing uranium oxide transport from the RSA and placing it in a separate Act has 
several predicted benefits. First, a separate Act would consolidate the requirements 
under the RSA, WA General Regulations and WA Transport Regulations applicable 
to uranium oxide. The WA Transport Regulations only function to implement the 
Transport Code and require carriers to develop an RPP;505 it does not legislate 
licensing, training requirements or reporting obligations.506 
Secondly, a separate Act resolves definitional conflict between the RSA and the 
Transport Code. The RSA has a very wide definition of ‘radioactive substance’ based 
on a material’s radioactivity.507 The Transport Code regulates uranium oxide because 
it is classed as LSA-I material by virtue of being the concentrate of uranium ore.508 
Under the NT Act, ‘radioactive material’ is simply defined as uranium ores and 
concentrates.509 A separate Act would also clarify variances in reporting obligations, 
training requirements and the duties of carriers and consignors between the RSA and 
the Transport Code.  
Finally, a separate Act recognises the special character of uranium oxide. On one hand, 
it demonstrates to the public that the perceived risk of uranium oxide is being 
adequately managed.510 On the other hand, a separate Act also recognises that uranium 
                                                 
502 This part refers to abbreviations of legislation referenced in Chapter IV eg the Radiation Safety Act 
1975 (WA) is referred to as the ‘RSA’. See Table 6. 
503 See A A Browne, ‘Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Uranium’ (1981) 3 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Association Handbook 291, 306.  
504 A brief history of uranium mining in the Northern Territory was given in Chapter I.  
505 See Radiation Safety (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) ss 4, 5.  
506 These are contained in the Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) and the Radiation Safety (General) 
Regulations 1983 (WA). See Chapter IV.  
507 See Radiation Safety Act 1975 (WA) s 4; Radiation Safety (General) Regulations 1983 (WA) reg 
5(1)(a), (b). Natural uranium is only a ‘radioactive substance’ for the purposes of the RSA if it 
exceeds 4.0 MBq.  
508 Transport Code (2008) para 226(a). No calculation of radioactivity is required.  
509 Radioactive Ores and Concentrates (Packaging and Transport Act 1980 (NT) s 3 (definition of 
‘radioactive material’).  
510 See Chapter II for a discussion on the perceived risks of uranium oxide.  
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oxide has a different radiological and chemical risk to other radioactive materials 
transported by road in WA.511 Uranium oxide is only mildly radioactive and presents 
a greater toxicological risk than it does a radiological hazard.512 A separate Act would 
avoid unnecessary regulation that does not add to the safety of uranium oxide 
transport.513 Further, a separate Act can recognise the special risk posed by the long-
distance interstate transport unique to WA uranium oxide and legislate measures to 
alleviate that risk. 
However, internal reform in WA cannot compel similar action in SA,514 although SA 
would also benefit from internal reform. Like WA, the SA Transport Regulations are 
attached to the SA Act. Further, the SA Act’s licensing provisions are extensive, but 
plagued with interpretation difficulties.515 Incorporating a licence requirement in a 
separate Act would clarify the position for stakeholders. 
Internal reform of radiation protection legislation can be achieved by creating a 
separate Act for uranium oxide transport in the spirit of the NT Act. This would 
overcome some of the problems inherent in the current regime, but not all. 
Inconsistencies between licensing, obligations and the application of the Transport 
Code remain. However, this can be resolved through the application of a model law.  
2 Development and Application of Model Laws 
Model laws are templates used by individual jurisdictions to draft their own 
legislation.516 They allow flexibility for the drafter to accommodate the idiosyncrasies 
of their jurisdiction (such as drafting conventions or existing laws).517 Australian 
                                                 
511 For example, medical radioactive waste: see Department of Health, Clinical and Related Waste 
Management Policy (Operational Directive No 0651/16, 2016).  
512 See Chapter II.  
513 Uranium Industry Framework Steering Group, Uranium Industry Framework: Report 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) 30.  
514 Although South Australia may choose to ‘observe, evaluate and emulate the policies and programs 
of other governments’ in pursuit of harmonisation: Windholz, above n 476, 332; Opeskin, above n 
247; A Breton, Competitive Governments; An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996); Cliff Walsh, ‘The Economics of Federalism and Federal 
Reform’ (2008) 31(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 553. 
515 See Chapter IV on page 48. 
516 See, eg, Productivity Commission, Chemicals and Plastics Regulations: Lessons for National 
Approaches to Regulation (Supplement to Research Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 24. 
Contrast the concept of ‘model laws’ to ‘applied laws’. Applied law refer to a law which is enacted by 
one jurisdiction and then mirrored in all other jurisdictions.  
517 See, eg, Pieter Sanders, ‘Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law’ (1995) 11(1) 
Arbitration International 1; George A Zaphirion, ‘Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to 
Global and Regional Trading’ (1993–1994) 14 Northern Illinois University Law Review 407.  
 
78 
governments have used model laws to harmonise, inter alia,518 the legal profession,519 
road rules,520 and work health and safety.521 Model laws have also been utilised to 
uniformly implement international model laws, including the United Nations 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (DG Model Law).522  
A model law for the transport of uranium oxide can also be developed. It will be 
referred to in this part as the ‘Model Law for Uranium Oxide Transport’ (or MLUOT). 
MLUOT could either be promulgated as a model law by the Commonwealth (with no 
legislative force) which is then adopted in each State or Territory, or enacted in a ‘host’ 
jurisdiction and then mirrored by the remaining States and Territories.  
MLUOT’s development depends on three factors: (a) the content of the model law; (b) 
the entity responsible for drafting and maintaining the model law; and (c) the 
mechanisms that will keep the model law up-to-date. 
(a) Content of the Model Law 
MLUOT would consolidate the central provisions of the radiation protection 
legislation applicable to uranium oxide transport. MLUOT would: 
• implement the 2014 Transport Code; 
• define ‘radioactive material’ by reference to uranium ores and concentrates, 
consistent with the 2014 Transport Code; 
• implement consistent licensing provisions, including set fees, licence expiry 
periods, and standard conditions; 
• prescribe training requirements and reporting obligations consistent with the 2014 
Transport Code; and 
                                                 
518 For a list of official versions of national uniform legislation, see Australasian Parliamentary 
Counsel’s Committee, National Uniform Legislation – Official Versions (undated) 
<http://www.pcc.gov.au/uniform_legislation_official_versions.html>. 
519 See G E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 2017) 22–3.  
520 National Road Transport Commission, Australian Road Rules (National Transport Commission, 
2012); National Transport Commission, The Australian Road Rules (2016) 
<http://www.ntc.gov.au/roads/rules-compliance/the-australian-road-rules/>. 
521 The Safe Work Australia contains the Work Health and Safety Model Law, its Regulations and 
explanatory material: see <https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/law-and-regulation/model-whs-
laws#model-whs-act>. The WHS Model Law is hotly contested and as of yet, has not been 
implemented in Western Australia: see Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, ‘Work Health and 
Safety Bill 2014: Statement by Minister for Commerce’ 23 October 2017, 7796c–7799a, Michael 
Mischin; Eric L Windholz, ‘Revising the COAG Case for OHS Harmonisation’ (2013) 5(1) Journal 
of Health and Safety, Research and Practice 9.  
522 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Recommendations on the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods: Model Regulations (rev 17, 2015); Transport and Infrastructure Council, Model 
Act on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee, 
2016). See also ‘A Note on Dangerous Goods’ in Chapter III.  
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• implement the obligations of carriers and consignors consistently with the 2014 
Transport Code.  
(b) Who will draft MLUOT and keep it updated? 
There are two existing agencies with the potential to draft and administer the MLUOT: 
ARPANSA and the NTC.523  
On one hand, ARPANSA is well-placed to draft the MLUOT because they are already 
responsible for the development of the Transport Code and other radiation protection 
guidance material.524 The RHC is empowered to formulate codes, policies and 
standards in relation to radiation protection legislation for consideration by the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories.525 However, there is no provision giving 
ARPANSA power to create model laws.  
The NTC’s position to develop the MLUOT is stronger. The NTC’s functions are 
conferred by the COAG Transport and Infrastructure Council (Transport Council).526 
The Transport Council has charged the NTC with developing nationally consistent 
regulatory and operational arrangements for road transport.527 Model legislation may 
be set out in regulations made under the National Transport Commission Act 2003 
(Cth).528  
The NTC is responsible for the DG Model Law and the ADG Code.529 Radioactive 
materials have not historically been regulated under the ADG Code because of the 
special risks associated with radioactivity.530 Despite this, there is nothing in the 
NTC’s mandate that would prohibit them from developing the MLUOT. In any event, 
the NTC must, where appropriate to do so in the performance of its functions, consult 
with governments and government bodies, industry stakeholders, and other interested 
                                                 
523 The National Road Transport Commission was established in 1991 under the National Road 
Transport Commission Act 1991 (Cth). It was replaced by the National Transport Commission in 
2003 under the National Transport Commission Act 2003 (Cth) s 5(1). The COAG Transport and 
Infrastructure Council oversees the NTC under the Inter-Governmental Agreement for Regulatory and 
Operational Reform in Road, Rail and Intermodal Transport.  
524 The general functions of ARPANSA were outlined in Chapter IV. 
525 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (Cth) s 23(1)(c).  
526 National Transport Commission Act 2003 (Cth) s 6(1)(c).  
527 Inter-Governmental Agreement for Regulatory and Operational Reform in Road, Rail and 
Intermodal Transport cl 5.1(a).  
528 National Transport Commission Act 2003 (Cth) s 7(1). This legislation does not have the force of 
law: s 7(2)(a).  
529 See Transport and Infrastructure Council, Model Act on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by 
Road and Rail (Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee, 2016); National Transport Commission, 
Australian Dangerous Goods Code (2017) <http://www.ntc.gov.au/heavy-vehicles/safety/australian-
dangerous-goods-code/>. 
530 See Chapter III.  
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people, bodies and organisations.531 This would compel the NTC to consult with 
ARPANSA, alongside ASNO and the State-based radiation protection authorities.532 
The NTC is therefore the most appropriate existing agency to draft the MLUOT. But 
how can the NTC ensure that the MLUOT remains up-to-date? 
(c) How will the MLUOT stay updated? 
There is no mechanism within the current radiation protection scheme in WA to 
compel regulators to keep their legislation up-to-date with either Australian or 
international developments.533  
‘Sunsetting’ is one option to keep the MLUOT current. In SA, certain regulations534 
expire every ten years.535 This can be postponed for periods not exceeding two 
years.536 The SA Transport Regulations will expire on 1 September 2017.537 The 
MLUOT can contain a sunset clause to ensure it is reviewed at regular intervals. 
Alternatively, the MLUOT can mandate regular reviews. For example, the IAEA 
reviews the International Regulations biannually.538 This accords with the biannual 
review of the Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods internationally 
and the ADG Code in Australia.539 
A further option is to implement the Transport Code ‘as amended from time to time’ 
or a wording variation giving effect to the latest reiteration of the Transport Code, as 
published by ARPANSA. A drawback of this approach is that stakeholders may be 
                                                 
531 National Transport Commission Act 2003 (Cth) s 9.  
532 See Table 7 in Chapter IV. 
533 This part discusses how the MLUOT can stay up-to-date. These suggestions are also applicable to 
the internal reforms discussed above. In addition, the WA Transport Regulations could stay up-to-date 
by changing the way the Transport Code is implemented. The WA Transport Regulations directly 
implement the Transport Code and the International Regulations: Radiation Safety (Transport of 
Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2002 (WA) s 2 (definition of ‘Code’ and ‘International 
Regulations’). The SA Transport Regulations also directly implement the Transport and International 
Regulations: Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 
2003 (SA) reg 3(1) (definition of ‘Transport Code’ and ‘International Regulations’). On the other 
hand, the NT Act adopts the Transport Code via the Government Gazette. This is a much more 
flexible option because it does not require regulations to be amended. 
534 Subordinate Legislation Act 1978 (SA) s 16A. For instance, local government by-laws are 
excluded from sun-setting.  
535 Specifically, the regulations expire on 1 September of the year following the year in which the 
tenth anniversary of the day on which the regulations were made: Subordinate Legislation Act 1978 
(SA) 16B(1)(g). 
536 Subordinate Legislation Act 1978 (SA) 16C.  
537 This was postponed from 1 September 2014.  
538 This does not mean that new International Regulations are developed every two years, but rather, 
gives different agencies around the world the opportunity to provide feedback on their operation. See 
Fasten and Nitsche, above n 464.  
539 National Transport Commission, Strategic Framework Review of the Regulation of Land Transport 
of Dangerous Goods: Final Recommendations (undated) pt 3.2.  
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surprised by new versions of the Transport Code if ARPANSA did not advertise 
upcoming editions. 
(d) But what about multiple regulators? 
Even if model legislation was established and implemented in each jurisdiction, 
without a national regulator, licences would be separately issued by the competent 
authority in each jurisdiction. This overlap can be resolved through a mutual 
recognition scheme.  
A widely-recognised mutual recognition scheme is established under the Mutual 
Recognition Act 1992 (Cth) (MRA).540 The MRA enables a person licenced in an 
occupation in one jurisdiction to apply for registration in an equivalent occupation in 
another jurisdiction. This circumvents additional training and the associated cost.541 
However, the MRA only extends to the licence’s authorisation; it does not unify the 
obligations attached to the occupation, which will still vary in each jurisdiction.542 This 
would not be problematic under the MLUOT because obligations would be uniform 
in each jurisdiction anyway. 543 However, the MRA does not reduce the number of 
regulatory bodies operating in a particular field,544 and is not ideal for dealing with 
cross-border practices. 545 Consequently, the inability of the MRA to handle multiple 
regulatory bodies hinders the intended results of the scheme.  
The mutual recognition provisions under the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model 
Law work differently to the MRA.546  Proponents do not need to apply for mutual 
recognition in each jurisdiction because the licence is automatically recognised 
                                                 
540 The MRA is established in each jurisdiction. See, eg, Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 
2010 (WA).  
541 See Licence Recognition, Mutual Recognition of Licensed Occupations (2017, Department of 
Industry, Innovation and Science) 
<http://www.licencerecognition.gov.au/Mutual%20recognition/Pages/default.aspx>. 
542 Commonwealth of Australia, User’s Guide: To the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) and the 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) (2006) 13. 
543 However, an MRA-type scheme would be problematic in the absence of a model law ie if transport 
licences could be registered in another jurisdiction, because different obligations may still apply 
interstate.  
544 For instance, even with the MRA in place, 97 health practitioner boards regulated health 
practitioner until the establishment of the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme and the 
Australian Health Practitioner Regulatory Authority in 2010: Georgie Haysom, ‘Review of the 
National Registration and Accreditation Scheme for Health Practitioners’ February 2015 Australian 
Health Law Bulletin 12. 
545 Productivity Commission, Australia’s Health Workforce (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) 137. 
546 See National Transport Commission (Model Legislation- Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road 
or Rail Regulations 2007 (Cth); Dangerous Goods Safety (Road and Rail Transport of Non-
explosives) Regulations 2007 (WA).  
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interstate.547 Automatic mutual recognition would be effective under MLUOT. 
MLUOT is based on the existing State radiation protection framework and the 
Transport Code. The current radiation protection legislation, despite jurisdictional 
differences, successfully achieves the same objective to protect the health and safety 
of people and the environment Australia-wide (even if this objective is not uniformly 
espoused in the legislation). 
Alternatively, the problem of multiple regulators can be addressed by creating a single 
national regulator for the transport of uranium oxide. 
3 Single National Regulator 
A single national regulator can be established under the Transport Council.548 This was 
the process for establishing the National Rail Safety Regulator (NRSR). The NRSR 
(and a corresponding national law) was created by COAG under an Intergovernmental 
Agreement549 between the Commonwealth and all States and Territories.550 
Indeed, the IAEA suggested that ARPANSA assume the powers of a national transport 
regulator.551 This idea was ultimately rejected because a review of the ARPANS Act 
concluded that there was no legislative basis for ARPANSA to actively regulate the 
land transport of radioactive materials.552 The Deloitte Report also suggested the 
creation of the ‘Australian Radiation Management Authority’ (or ARMA). ARMA 
would be a statutory body established by COAG and comprised of consultants from 
ARPANSA, ANSO domestic security advisors, and the responsible agencies for 
radiation and environment protection and uranium mining in the NT and SA.553 
ARMA has not been adopted.  
                                                 
547 See Dangerous Goods Safety (Road and Rail Transport of Non-explosives) Regulations 2007 
(WA) pt 19; National Transport Commission (Model Legislation – Transport of Dangerous Goods by 
Road or Rail) Regulations 2007 (Cth) pt 15; Department of Mines and Petroleum, Mutual Recognition 
of Dangerous Goods and Explosives Licences – General Information 
<http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Dangerous-Goods/DGS_IS_DGDLMutualRecognition.pdf>. 
548 Other reviews of the Australian uranium industry have also suggested the creation of a national 
regulator (albeit with functions wider than transport): see Fahey and Pu, above n 179.  
549 Intergovernmental Agreement on Rail Safety Regulation and Investigation Reform (2009).  
550 Queensland has yet to implement the National Law, but is expected to do so in June 2017: National 
Rail Safety Regulator, About ONRSR (2016) <https://www.onrsr.com.au/about-onrsr>. 
551 International Atomic Energy Agency, Integrated Regulatory Review Service for ARPANSA (2007) 
90. 
552 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, Closure of Recommendations and 
Suggestions from 2011 IAEA Integrated Regulatory Service Review of ARPANSA (Regulatory 
Services Branch, 2015) 17. 
553 Deloitte, above n 51, 85. ARMA would not be responsible for ASNO’s non-proliferation functions 
or the functions of DIIS.  
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A national regulator can be developed on the same principles as the NRSR. It would 
regulate the transport of uranium oxide by assuming the functions currently being 
performed by the State-based competent authorities.554 Like the Deloitte Report, this 
reform does not propose that a national regulator should also assume responsibility for 
non-proliferation and exports.555  
Even if a national regulator was created consolidating the functions under the current 
radiation protection scheme, Commonwealth approvals would still be managed by 
separate agencies.  
However, the national regulator could be a single point of contact for all uranium 
approvals, even if it did not exercise the powers of ASNO or DIIS.556 An information 
sharing agreement between the bodies would reduce the amount of applications made 
and thereby the duplication of information. This could be achieved via a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) between agencies. A MUO clarifies the responsibilities of 
the Radiological Council and the DMP in WA regarding radiation protection on mine 
sites.557 Further, a bilateral agreement between the Commonwealth and States enables 
environmental approvals that would otherwise need to be obtained under the EPBC 
Act to be granted under the State assessment.558 
A drawback of the MUO approach is that approvals for uranium oxide transport are 
issued at different times. Even if licences under radiation protection were unified (eg 
under the MLUOT), Commonwealth approvals would remain out of sync. For 
instance, the Mineral Export Permit is issued for ten years, but DIIS must also approve 
every other shipment. Consequently, it may be illogical for a proponent to go through 
the radiation protection body where, for example, they only need a single permit from 
DIIS.  
                                                 
554 See Table 7 in Chapter IV for all Australian competent authorities for the transport of radioactive 
materials.  
555 Although the Deloitte Report did suggest a single national regulator for uranium transport could be 
established under ASNO: Deloitte, above n 51, 104.  
556 The Commonwealth Government in submissions to the Uranium Mining Implementation 
Committee (Queensland) suggested the best practice for approvals would be multiple authorities 
working through a single point of contact with the proponent: Uranium Mining Implementation 
Committee, above n 153, Appendix B, 17.  
557 See Memorandum of Understanding in Relation to the Regulation of Radiation Safety for Mining 
Operations Between the Department of Mines and Petroleum and the Radiological Council in 
Western Australia (December 2012).  
558 That is, under the EP Act: see Bilateral Agreement Made Under Section 45 of the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) Relating to Environmental Assessment 
(Commonwealth of Australian and Western Australia) executed 3 October 2014.  
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E Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has recommended three sweeping reforms to the current scheme for the 
transport of uranium oxide in Australia. First, it suggests the internal reform of State-
based radiation protection legislation by separating the requirements for the transport 
of uranium oxide into an independent Act, based on the NT’s model. This reform 
cannot compel consistent change in other jurisdictions, but a model law (here, 
MLUOT) can. 
The MLUOT consolidates the radiation protection legislation consistently with the 
Transport Code’s requirements. It would be developed by the NTC and include 
mechanisms (eg sunsetting) to ensure it remained up-to-date. The MLUOT does not 
reduce the number of regulators, although an automatic mutual recognition scheme 
can reduce agency contact across borders. Alternatively, a national regulator can be 
established which consolidates these functions. It would not consolidate 
Commonwealth approvals, but would represent a single point of contact (through a 
MOU) to reduce administrative costs. 
These reforms will achieve greater efficiency in regulation, decrease instances of 
shipment denial, and improve competition. However, in practice, it is difficult to 
propose a comprehensive solution for reform. This is because the scheme for the road 
transport of uranium oxide canvasses multiple legal areas and exists within a 
complicated legislative framework. The situation is ‘hydra-headed’ – the transport of 
uranium oxide cannot be reformed without also considering reforms to the transport 
of all radioactive materials, uranium mining, and the entirety of the Australian nuclear 
fuel cycle. In summary, such reform cannot occur in a vacuum and must consider its 







This thesis examined the legislative regime for the transport of uranium oxide in WA. 
The WA uranium industry is slowly developing, with four major projects at various 
stages of approval. When these mines do commence production, the milled uranium 
oxide will travel interstate for export from Port Adelaide or Port Darwin. This is 
because a policy ban prohibits the export of uranium oxide from WA. This ban is 
largely influenced by the negative public perceptions of uranium oxide, caused in part 
by misunderstandings of the level of risk the material poses. The policy is unlikely to 
change soon – the recently elected WA Labor Government is ideologically opposed to 
uranium mining. Further, the low-volume nature of uranium and the availability of 
willing carriers means a WA port is unlikely to be economically viable at this stage. 
In the absence of WA export ports, uranium oxide must travel interstate. Each State 
and Territory implements its own scheme of radiation protection legislation. Without 
national uniformity, WA producers must comply with three separate legislative 
regimes when they cross the State border. On the other hand, NT and SA producers 
must comply only with their own legislation and the Commonwealth regime.  
It is apparent that the overarching regime for the transport of uranium oxide is 
complicated and overlapping. Besides the State-based radiation protection legislation, 
Australian producers must also obtain Commonwealth approvals. These include 
approvals under the EPBC Act for the mine generally (although these do not impact 
the transport of uranium oxide directly), possession and transport permits from ASNO, 
and Mineral Export Permits plus individual consignment approval from DIIS. Coupled 
with the State-based radiation and environmental approvals, WA producers face 
obtaining up to seven different approvals, from five regulatory agencies across three 
governments.  
The current scheme compounds the cost of doing business for Australian producers, 
and disproportionally affects the nascent WA uranium industry. Some costs can be 
quantified, such as licence fees. Other costs are trickier to calculate, such as the 
compliance cost of abiding by multiple regulatory regimes and training requirements. 
Further, delays in the approvals process can impact the contractual relationship with 
the overseas consumer.  
Another issue with the scheme is the enforcement of the Transport Code, 
implementing the International Regulations. Three different versions of the Transport 
Code are in force across Australia, although the NDRP requires the 2008 Transport 
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Code to be implemented across Australia. This has occurred in WA and the NT. 
However, SA continues to use the 2001 Transport Code, while the Commonwealth 
(through ARPANSA) has adopted the 2014 Code, based on the latest edition of the 
International Regulations. These discrepancies demonstrate that the current regime is 
incapable of staying up-to-date. This has safety implications, especially where the 
International Regulations are reviewed biannually to implement the latest radiological 
research and technological developments. Overseas consumers will expect Australian 
producers to comply with the latest version of the International Regulations. Non-
compliance may result in shipment denials. This is undesirable, especially in Australia 
where there are limited ports and carriers willing to handle uranium oxide.  
A solution to the current problem is not straightforward. The transport of uranium 
oxide exists within a mass of other legal areas, including radiation protection, the 
transport of radioactive materials generally, and within the NFC. Any change to the 
regime has the capacity to inadvertently impact these other areas. Despite this, some 
reform can be attempted through the internal revision of State-based radiation 
protection measures, the development of a model law, and the creation of a single 
national regulator. Until that occurs, future WA uranium producers must contend with 
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A Australia’s Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements559 
 
Country Agreement 
Date of Entry 
into Force 
Argentina Agreement between Australia and the Argentine 
Republic Concerning Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy 
[2005] ATS 5 
12 January 2005 
Canada Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of Canada concerning the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy  
[1981] ATS 8 
9 March 1981 
Czech Republic Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Czech Republic on 
Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of  Nuclear Energy 
and the Transfer of Nuclear Material  
[2002] ATS 8 
17 May 2002 
Egypt Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt concerning Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of 
Nuclear Material between Australia and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt 
[1989] ATS 14 
2 June 1989 
Euratom560 Agreement between the Government of Australian 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Eurotom) for Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy 
[2012] ATS 3 
1 January 2012 
Finland Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
concerning the Transfer of Nuclear Material 
between Australia and Finland 
[1980] ATS 4 
9 February 1980 
France Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the French Republic 
concerning Nuclear Transfers between Australia 
and France 
[1981] ATS 23 
12 September 
1981 
                                                 




560 Eurotom is the European Union’s atomic energy agency. The Agreement applies to EU member 




Hungary Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Republic of Hungary 
on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear Material 
[2002] ATS 10 
15 June 2002 
India Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of India on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
[2015] ATS 9 
13 November 
2015 
Japan Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of Japan for Co-operation in 
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
[1982] ATS 22 
17 August 1982 
Mexico Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the United Mexican States 
concerning Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear 
Material 
[1992] ATS 32 
17 July 1992 
New Zealand Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of New Zealand concerning 
the Transfer of Uranium 
[2000] ATS 16 




Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy 
[2007] ATS 4 
3 February 2007 
Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Transfer of Nuclear Material 
[2007] ATS 3 
3 February 2007 
Philippines Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines concerning Co-operation in Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of 
Nuclear Material 
[1982] ATS 25 




Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Republic of Korea 
concerning Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear 
Material 
[1979] ATS 5 
2 May 1979 
Russian 
Federation 
Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Russian Federation on 






[2010] ATS 22 
Sweden Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of Sweden on Conditions and 
Controls for Nuclear Transfers for Peaceful 
Purposes between Australia and Sweden 
[1981] ATS 13 
22 May 1981 
Switzerland Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the Swiss Confederation 
concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
[1988] ATS 15 
27 July 1988 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the United Arab Emirates 
on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy 
[2014] ATS 10 
14 April 2014 
United States of 
America 
Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the United States of 
America concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy 
[2010] ATS 25 
22 December 
2010 
Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement 
between Australia and the United States of 
America Concerning Cooperation on the 
Application of Non Proliferation Assurances on 
Retransfer to Taiwan 
[2002] ATS 9 
17 May 2002 
Agreement for Cooperation between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of 
the United States of America concerning 
Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of 
Uranium by Laser Excitation  (Silex Agreement) 
[2000] ATS 19 








B International System of Units (SI) Prefixes 
 
Multiples Fractions 
Name Symbol Factor Name Symbol Factor 
Deca da 101 Deci d 10-1 
Hecto h 102 Centi c 10-2 
Kilo k 103 Milli m 10-3 
Mega M 106 Micro μ 10-6 
Giga G 109 Nano n 10-9 
Tera T 1012 Pico p 10-12 
Peta P 1015 Femto f 10-15 
Exa E 1018 Atto a 10-18 
Zetta Z 1021 Zepto z 10-21 






C Factors and Objectives Considered by the Environmental Protection 
Authority under s 44(2) of the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)561 
 
Theme Factor Objective 
Sea Benthic Communities and 
Habitats 
To protect benthic communities and habitats 
so that biological diversity and ecological 
integrity are maintained. 
Coastal Processes To maintain the geophysical processes that 
shape coastal morphology so that the 




To maintain the quality of water, sediment and 
biota so that environmental values are 
protected. 
Marine Fauna To protect marine fauna so that biological 
diversity and ecological integrity are 
maintained. 
Land Flora and Vegetation To protect flora and vegetation so that 
biological diversity and ecological integrity 
are maintained. 
Landforms To maintain the variety and integrity of 
distinctive physical landforms so that 
environmental values are protected. 
Subterranean Fauna To protect subterranean fauna so that 




To maintain the quality of land and soils so 
that environmental values are protected. 
Terrestrial Fauna To protect terrestrial fauna so that biological 
diversity and ecological integrity are 
maintained. 
                                                 
561 Environmental Protection Authority, Statement of Environmental Principles, Factors and 
Objectives (December 2016) 6. 
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Water Hydrological Processes To maintain the hydrological regimes of 
groundwater and surface water so that 
environmental values are protected. 
Inland Waters 
Environmental Quality 
To maintain the quality of groundwater and 
surface water so that environmental values are 
protected. 
Air Air Quality To maintain air quality and minimise 
emissions so that environmental values are 
protected. 
People Social Surroundings To protect social surroundings from 
significant harm. 






D Timeline of Approval Process under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 
(WA)562 
 
Stage Process Time 
Referral of proposal Pre-referral process 
Meeting with EPA 
Preparing contents of referral 
Variable 
Decision to assess 
referred proposal 
EPA may request further information 
from proponent 
Variable 
Referral published for public comment 7 days 
EPA decides whether to assess 28 days 
Public environmental 
review 
Scoping proponent’s environmental 
review 
10–16 weeks 
Preparation of Environmental Review 
Document and additional assessment 
information 
6 weeks 
Public review 11–21 weeks 
Preparation of draft 
assessment report 
 6 weeks 
Finalisation of report  1 week 
Proponent comment on conditions 7 days 
Publishing 3 days 







                                                 
562 This Appendix’s information is extracted from Environmental Protection Authority, above n 233, 
and Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA).  
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E Classes of Dangerous Goods under the ADG Code 
 
Class and Division Examples 
Class 1: Explosives563 





1.2 Substances and articles which have a 
projection hazard but not mass explosion 
hazard 
Preloaded mortar shells 
Roman candles 
1.3 Substances and articles which have a fire 
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a 
minor projection hazard or both, but not a 
mass explosion hazard 
Surface flares 




1.5 Very insensitive substances which have a 
mass explosion hazard 
Blasting agents 
1.6 Extremely insensitive articles which do not 
have a mass explosion hazard 
 
Class 2: Gases 
2.1 Flammable gases Butane 
2.2 Non-flammable, non-toxic gases Carbon dioxide 
2.3 Toxic gases Ammonia 
Class 3: Flammable liquids 
NA  Acetone 
Petroleum 
Class 4: Flammable solids 
Substances liable to spontaneous combustion 
Substance which on contact with water emit flammable gases 
4.1 Flammable solids, self-reactive substances 
and solid de-sensitized explosives 
Sulphur 
4.2 Substances liable to spontaneous 
combustion 
Wet cotton 
                                                 
563 Explosives are regulated by separate legislation (ie not by the ADG Code) in New South Wales 




4.3 Substances which in contact with water 
emit flammable gases 
Calcium 
Magnesium powder 
Class 5: Oxidizing substances and organic peroxides 
5.1 Oxidizing substances Hydrogen peroxide 
5.2 Organic peroxides Luperox® 
Class 6: Toxic and infectious substances 
6.1 Toxic substances Arsenic 
Calcium cyanide 
6.2 Infectious substances564 Clinical waste 
Polio virus 
Class 7: Radioactive materials565 
NA  Uranium oxide concentrate 
Uranium hexafluoride 
Class 8: Corrosive substances 
NA  Hydrochloric acid 
Class 9: Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles, including environmentally 
hazardous substances 




                                                 
564 Infectious substances are not regulated under the ADG Code in Western Australia. See Dangerous 
Good Safety (General) Regulations 2007 (WA) reg 4(4)(a); Health (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1911 Part IX. 
565 Radioactive substances are not regulated under the ADG Code in Western Australia. See 




F Category III Placard Label566 
 
G Placard Label567 
 
                                                 
566 International Regulations fig 4. 
567 International Regulations fig 6.  
